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This thesis investigates the impact of board busyness (i.e. multiple directorships 
held by outside board members) on the financial stability, stock market valuations 
and dividend payout policy of banks in a dual banking system (i.e. Conventional 
and Islamic). The results provide strong evidence for opposing effects of board 
busyness in terms of the two banking models. Specifically, conventional banks 
with busy boards of directors exhibit high financial stability (i.e. high 
profitability; low cost-to-income ratio; low insolvency risk and low credit risk). 
Board busyness in conventional banks is significantly and positively valued by 
the stock market. Furthermore, there is significant evidence that busy boards have 
a positive influence on conventional banks’ dividend payout levels. In contrast to 
these findings, the financial stability of Islamic banks is adversely affected by the 
presence of busy board members. There is no supporting evidence concerning the 
market valuations of board busyness in the case of this bank type. Furthermore, 
Islamic banks that employ a busy board report a lower dividend payout ratio. 
Extended analyses indicate that busy Shari’ah advisory boards, which act as an 
additional layer of governance in Islamic banks, are negatively associated with 
the banks’ financial stability. Likewise, investors provide significantly low 
market valuations for such an attribute of board busyness. The overall findings in 
the thesis are explained in terms of the extended agency conflicts, complex 
governance structure and the unique business model of Islamic banks, which 
require effective monitoring from two different boards (i.e. board of directors and 
the Shari’ah board). Conventional banks operate on a relatively less complex 
business model. Therefore, the various reputational benefits associated with 
board busyness (e.g. better decision-making, efficient utilisation of resources and 
effective monitoring) are more likely to be available and prevalent for these 
banks to enhance financial stability, equity value as well as payout strategies. The 
three empirical studies in the thesis offer important policy implications for 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 marked a more controlled operational 
environment, increased complexity in governance and additional calls for 
effective monitoring by boards of directors (BoD) in the banking system (see 
Erkens et al., 2012; Körner, 2017; Anginer et al., 2018). This was followed by 
public calls and support from policymakers in designing effective board 
governance in banks so as to align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Shibani and Fuentes, 2017). While items of 
post-crisis financial regulatory reform (e.g. heightened capital and liquidity 
regulation, tools to solve regulatory migration, resolution authority, stress testing 
and capital planning) have significantly improved the performance and stability of 
financial institutions, other areas of reform (e.g. supplementary leverage ratio, 
compensation regulation) have caused greater instability. New stringent 
regulations have been proposed since 2010 to increase bank capital and liquidity 
requirements and to develop new tools to manage institutional failure. The 
primary objective of these attempts was to mitigate the probabilities of failed 
performance and promote long-term stability for financial institutions.  
The complexity of banking transactions and financial instruments leads to 
substantial information asymmetries. At the same time, research related to the 
structure of effective governance and the financial stability, market valuations and 
dividend policy of banks is still developing. These financial indicators form 
essential pillars for a country’s economic growth and stability as well as for 
banks’ rigorous and prudent risk management (Kanas, 2013), and they have 
recently moved into the regulatory spotlight (Lepetit et al., 2018). For a broader 
set of stakeholders such as shareholders, managers, regulators and investors, 
internal governance mechanisms in banks (e.g. BoD and audit committees) are 
unique and more complex than in non-financial institutions (Elyasiani and Zhang, 
2015). Intense regulation and greater asymmetry in banks lead to the special 
relevance and role of the BoD, which is responsible for approving a bank’s 
policies, procedures and business strategies as well as has an ultimate oversight 
for corporate decisions. The duties and obligations of the bank directors (i.e. 
inside and outside directors) serving on the board may arise in two main contexts: 
a discrete decision brought to the board for approval, which increases the 
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directors’ legal responsibility in terms of the bank’s safety and soundness, and 
their obligation to provide oversight for the boards they serve (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003; Adams and Mehran, 2003). 
The uniqueness of governance mechanisms in banks implies the dominant role of 
the BoD in performance and risk-taking behaviour, market valuation and dividend 
payouts (e.g. Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Onali et al., 2016; Faleye and Krishnan, 
2017). To inhibit misconduct and excessive risk-taking, both shareholders and 
regulators expect these boards to be active in establishing effective risk 
monitoring systems (Kress, 2018). Resource dependence theorists argue that 
monitoring by the BoD is vital for efficient resource allocation and risk mitigation 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). This board has the final say on 
a bank’s strategic policies and decisions and can hence effectively mitigate 
possible agency issues that may arise. Consequently, the quality of board 
monitoring and their engagements in managerial decision-making can have direct 
implications for banks’ financial stability, market value and dividend strategies 
(Yermack, 1996; Lin and Liu, 2009; Liu, 2015; Onali et al., 2016; Meng et al., 
2018). Accordingly, undertaking too many directorships (i.e. board busyness) is 
likely to influence directors’ performance in terms of bank stability and decision-
making. It can also affect investors’ perceptions of their bank’s value and 
dividend policies, and it tends to be related to the extent of agency conflicts and/or 
the complication of a bank business model.  
Research related to board busyness in the banking sector is indispensable due to 
the central role of the BoD in governing the business. Board busyness is a 
prevalent notion in both academia and the real world. A busy board refers to a 
board which includes a large proportion of “busy” outside members, who hold 
two or more outside directorships. In most cases, directors are “over-boarded”, 
which means that they hold an excessive number of seats across different boards 
(Cashman et al., 2012). In principle, the busyness of an individual is gauged to 
infer their monitoring and advising ability through their involvement, attention, 
knowledge, skills, experience and networking, and hence, their behaviour in 
financial and business contexts. However, a precise assessment of board busyness 
and its influences on banks’ outcomes and decision-making is challenging and 
inconclusive in relation to the two opposing arguments surrounding this attribute 
of the board. On one hand, it has long been argued that busy boards can offer 
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reputational benefits to their firms, such as extended business 
networking/connections and quick access to market resources (Jiraporn et al., 
2009; Brennan et al., 2016). Holding multiple board seats can also promote 
effective monitoring due to a director’s rich experience and valuable skills, which 
accrue from serving many firms (Jiraporn et al., 2008). This might enhance the 
quality of long-term decision-making and hence, such reputational benefits might 
lead to favourable implications for a firm’s financial stability and value (Field et 
al., 2013; Muravyev et al., 2016). In addition, banks employing busy outside 
directors can positively influence their dividends policy through flexible access to 
capital markets to raise funds at lower costs. As such, the resource-rich outside 
directors can contribute to the higher demand of the banks regarding external 
resources or environmental interdependency (Kutubi et al., 2018). On the other 
hand, a criticism levelled is that directors are unable to monitor their firms 
effectively when they are “over-boarded”, as they will have limited time to 
scrutinise the bank’s operations and strategic decisions. This can adversely affect 
a bank’s performance, increase risk-taking behaviour (Ferris et al., 2003; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006) and give rise to agency problems (Core et al., 1999). The 
disadvantages of board members’ multiple affiliations are particularly severe for 
large and complex financial firms (Kress, 2018). The accumulation of multiple 
directorships by outside directors can further entail negative implications for bank 
governance and dividend strategy. Board busyness can lead to higher agency costs 
related to free cash flow and can promote adverse impacts on a bank’s dividend 
policy (Chou and Feng, 2018).  
A study to investigate the issue of multiple directorships related to performance in 
industrial institutions was first conducted by Ferris et al. (2003), which was 
followed by substantial contrasting evidence exploring multiple perspectives on 
the issue of director busyness in the non-financial sector (e.g. Harris and Shimizu, 
2004; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Cashman et al., 2012; Field et al., 2013; Falato 
et al., 2014; Sharma, 2011; Chou and Feng, 2018). In relation to banking, a few 
prior studies have examined the various factors underlying cross-variation in 
banks’ financial stability (performance and risk) and other financial outcomes. 
Some studies (see, among others, Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Elyasiani and Zhang, 
2015; Mollah et al., 2017) have specifically investigated the important role played 
by corporate governance (CG), such as BoD characteristics/structure, the BoD’s 
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and managers’ compensation packages and ownership structure. However, 
research related to BoD busyness (except for Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015, Kutubi 
et al., 2018) often excluded banks from their samples. This is because the 
complexity and opaqueness1 of banks have an influential role in their governance 
mechanism (i.e. in both the interaction between managers and the boards and 
between the regulators and the bank), exacerbate the information asymmetry 
(agency) issue and require more difficult scrutiny from the BoD over bank 
decisions than in the case of any other non-financial firms (Macey and O’Hara, 
2003; Onali et al., 2016).  
No empirical work to date has investigated the effect of board busyness on 
financial stability, market valuations and payout decisions across different bank 
types. In conventional banking literature, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) demonstrate 
that busyness has a significant impact on the performance and risks in US bank 
holding companies. Kutubi et al. (2018) present similar evidence on board 
busyness for South East Asian banks, which are characterised by weak governance 
and high concentrated ownership. In addition, within the banking setting, 
examining stock market valuations (e.g. Caprio et al., 2007; Belkhir, 2009; 
Zulkafli et al., 2010) and dividend policy (e.g. Onali et al., 2016) is restricted to 
focusing only on other CG mechanisms and characteristics (e.g. ownership 
structure, board size and CEO duality).  
To the best of my knowledge, empirical evidence on board busyness within the 
Islamic banking context is scarce. Therefore, this thesis aims at filling this 
important gap in the current banking literature through conducting a comparative 
and empirical assessment between Islamic banks (IBs hereafter) and conventional 
banks (CBs hereafter). CBs are a part of the traditional banking model, which 
provides services on a regular interest basis (Hoepner et al., 2011; Alnasser and 
Muhammed, 2012). Meanwhile, the operations of IBs are principally driven by a 
constrained banking model, which inherits both moral accountability values and 
legal responsibilities (Abdelsalam et al., 2016). Investigating board busyness in a 
comparative manner across IBs and CBs is indispensable to the ongoing debate 
                                                          
1 Banking firms are able to change the risk composition of their book value of total assets more quickly than 
other industrial firms. They are also able to readily hide problems by many ways such as extending loans to 
customers which cannot service previous debt obligations (Levine, 2004). Furthermore, “the business of 
securitization has in essence (1) speeded up the process of lending at the origination stage and in interbank 
markets (for example, repo) and (2) increased opacity by merging large amounts of information and relying 
on credit ratings” (Mehran et al., 2011, p.4-5). 
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related to factors contributing to the resilience and stability of the two banking 
sectors (see Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013). The 
rapid growth of IBs in the past four decades implies that the impact of this bank 
type on the global economy might be substantial. The financial crisis in 2007–
2009 has further amplified the attraction of exploring the stability, market value 
and policy efficiency of the IB model on the part of practitioners and monetary 
authorities, with the aim to explore a viable and resilient alternative financial 
system to the CB system (Ibrahim, 2015). Accordingly, gaining an in-depth 
knowledge about issues surrounding the IB system would assist bank regulators in 
producing reflective guidelines in order to improve the managerial quality of such 
banks as well as to enhance the sustainable stability of the international banking 
sector. 
The theoretical motivation for the research questions of the thesis is identified by 
the systematic differences in governance structures adopted by IBs and CBs 
(Mollah and Zaman, 2015). For IBs, under the constrained banking model and the 
nature of the products/services offered, the BoD has additional responsibilities 
related to the establishment of the appropriate Shari’ah governance framework 
besides the development of relevant policies to ensure that all activities are 
conducted in compliance with the Shari’ah law. Moreover, unlike the single-
governance layer in CBs (i.e. BoD), IBs are subject to a double-governance 
mechanism with a Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB hereafter) in addition to their 
regular BoD. The decisions of the BoD depend significantly on the supervisory 
effectiveness of the SSB for Shari’ah compliance (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). In 
contrast, the single-tier (unitary) boards in CBs are more likely to make decisions 
faster, as the frequency of board meetings is greater than in the dual-board 
structure (Jungmann, 2006). All directors in this unitary board structure are 
involved in the board’s decision-making process and have the same access to 
information, which can improve the information flow. However, the main 
drawback of the unitary board in CBs is the non-separation between managerial 
and supervisory roles, which is reflected as the main advantage of the dual-board 
structure in IBs. Consequently, it is essential to understand how IBs are typically 
governed by a unique dual-board governance in contrast to the single-tier boards 
in CBs (Farag et al., 2018).  
As such, three empirical studies will be carried out, with the first investigation 
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focusing on both listed and non-listed banks’ financial stability in a comparison 
between IBs and CBs employing busy boards. The other two empirical studies 
will focus on the examination of listed banks that are being traded on stock 
markets. These studies include an exploration of the way in which board 
busyness relates to the market valuations and dividend payout decisions of the 
two bank types. The reasons to choose these three financial indicators as the 
outcomes of board busyness are threefold. First, findings related to such indices 
could draw important continuing stories about the banking health and 
performance because they are mostly concerned by regulators, investors and 
other stakeholders. Practitioners and scholars have both highlighted the 
importance and influence of these variables on the health of the whole economy. 
Second, research questions about stability, market value, and dividend policy 
effectiveness emerge under the increasing financial instability of global banking 
system due to the complexity of the market and market volatility. Last but not 
least, they also emerge under the revolution of financial institutions after a recent 
turmoil caused by several reasons including corporate governance issues. Taken 
together, this thesis has laid an emphasis on the importance of empirical studies 
related to these financial indicators of banks, which are of great interests of 
numerous prior research particularly in corporate governance area. 
Therefore, the specific research objectives are the following: 
(i) To investigate the effects of busy boards of directors on the 
financial stability of conventional banks in comparison to their 
Islamic counterparts. To additionally examine the effects of busy 
Shari’ah supervisory boards on financial stability within Islamic 
banks. 
(ii) To comparatively assess the influences of busy boards of directors 
on the market valuations of listed conventional banks and their 
Islamic counterparts. To additionally investigate the effects of busy 
Shari’ah supervisory boards on the market valuations of listed 
Islamic banks. 
(iii) To examine the effects of busy boards of directors on dividend 




Following above research objectives, the three empirical chapters of the thesis are 
organised as below: 
Study 1- Board Busyness and Financial Stability: Evidence from Alternative 
Banking Models (Chapter 3). This chapter extends the busyness-financial 
stability topic in terms of the non-financial sector by undertaking comparative 
analyses for IBs and CBs. The study employs a multi-country sample for fourteen 
countries for the period of 2010–2015. The results indicate that board busyness 
exhibits a differential impact on bank financial stability. In comparison to CBs, 
IBs with busy boards show low performance and high risk-taking. These findings 
are intensified as the degree of board busyness increases. Moreover, IBs with less 
busy SSBs are relatively more financially stable and have better financial 
performance when compared to those with busy SSBs. Only SSBs with lower 
degrees of busyness can improve the financial stability of their banks. The overall 
findings suggest that the preferential impacts of board busyness on CBs’ stability 
are more dominant when compared to IBs. 
Study 2- Market Valuations of Busy Boards: Evidence from Alternative 
Banking Models (Chapter 4). This chapter further extends the empirical 
examination of the stock market pricing of board busyness across two bank types. 
The aim is to explore whether and how investors valued board busyness for these 
banks. The analyses are based on a multi-country sample for listed IBs and CBs 
operating in eleven countries over the period of 2010–2015. The study finds 
substantial evidence of the differential market valuations of busy boards across 
IBs and CBs. For CBs, investors tend to perceive board busyness as significantly 
increasing the bank’s value. In contrast, investors in IBs seem not to perceive any 
value for their banks when appointing a busy BoD, showing insignificant market 
valuations. However, IBs with busy SSBs exhibit significantly low firm value, 
suggesting that investors tend to be more sensitive to SSB busyness than to the 
busyness associated with the BoDs. 
Study 3- Empirical Study 3: Board Busyness and Dividend Payouts: 
Evidence from Alternative Banking Models (Chapter 5). The purpose of this 
chapter is to test for the effects of board busyness on the dividend payouts policy 
in the two banking models. The study uses a multi-country sample for listed IBs 
and CBs operating in eleven countries between the years 2010–2015. The findings 
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show that a CB with a busy board offers significantly high dividend payout ratios. 
In contrast, having busy boards in IBs leads to a detrimental effect on the banks’ 
dividend level. These results suggest that the dividend strategies of IBs are likely 
to be more sensitive to board busyness level than those of their conventional 
counterparts, which can be attributable to the constrained dividend model of the 
former. 
Notably, busy SSBs are examined in the first two studies because the impressive 
growth rate of IB industry has been accompanied by growing pains in the ear of 
human capital management. This is particularly true of the training and 
preparation of SSB scholars, who are often criticised due to the lack of uniformity 
in their decision rulings. In addition, Shari’ah requirements can lead to unique 
agency relations of IBs resulting in Shari’ah non-compliance risk and in turn, 
financial turmoil. Therefore, we can expect that in theory, SSBs should play an 
important role in matters related to Shari’ah law and their existence may have 
significant effects on financial stability of IBs. We can also predict that this 
religious board might be still valued by market participants because of its 
possible impacts on risks and profitability. However, busy SSBs will not be tested 
in the third empirical chapter due to the lack of theoretical background and 
empirical evidence which can support for the substantial relevance of this board 
in dividend payout decision-making of IBs.  
The thesis contributes to the growing stream of IB–CB literature (see, among 
others, Beck et al., 2013; Abedifar et al., 2013; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah 
et al., 2017; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018a). It extends previous work on the 
implications of overcommitted boards in corporate governance studies (e.g. Field 
et al., 2013; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Chakravarty and Rutherford, 2017). The 
findings in this study are also timely to the paucity of works on governance in the 
two bank types (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). The thesis further adds new insights to 
the ongoing debate about the effect of institutional characteristics and system of 
governance on various corporate outcomes such as firm performance, risk-taking, 
capital structure, cost of debt and cash holdings (see Gompers et al., 2003; Brown 
and Caylor, 2006; Harford et al., 2008; Fahlenbrach, 2008; Chung et al., 2010; 
Meng et al., 2018). More specifically, the thesis offers the first comparative 
assessments between IBs’ and CBs’ financial stability (Study 1), market valuation 
(Study 2) and dividend policy (Study 3) by utilising the important board attribute 
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of busyness. It provides international evidence for the differential effects of board 
busyness across the two bank types.  
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CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter first provides key ideas on CG and BoD attributes, as have been 
reported in the most significant studies in the current banking literature (Section 
2.2). The chapter shall also critically elaborate on four theories (i.e. agency and 
resource dependence, and stakeholders and legitimacy theories, and dividend 
hypotheses) which are employed to formulate hypotheses about the influences of 
board busyness on financial stability, market valuations and dividend payouts of 
banks (Section 2.3). This is followed by the two competing hypotheses of board 
busyness, including the reputation and busyness hypotheses (Section 2.4), prior 
studies on board busyness in non-financial and financial firms (Section 2.5) and a 
background on Islamic banking (Section 2.6). Furthermore, dealing with research 
questions in this thesis requires a profound understanding of IBs in comparison 
with CBs. Section 2.7 hence distinguishes between the two bank types in relation 
to their business models, agency conflicts and governance regime. Finally, 
Section 2.8 summarises the chapter. 
2.2 Corporate Governance in Banking 
The concept of CG has been widely used and studied in numerous disciplines 
such as finance, management and accounting. In general terms, CG can resolve 
certain challenges faced by BoDs, especially the interaction between and the 
relationships of the BoD with managers, shareholders and other stakeholders (e.g. 
creditors, debt financiers, regulators) who are interested in the organisation’s 
affairs (Tricker, 1994). Therefore, the term “CG” is often narrowly applied to 
research questions related to the structure, characteristics and functions of BoDs 
(Blair, 1995). Following this, this thesis considers CG as “the structure whereby 
managers at the organizational apex are controlled through the BoD, its associated 
structures, executive incentive, and other schemes of monitoring and bonding” 
(Donaldson, 1990, p. 376).  
Previous literature beginning from Macey and O’Hara (2003) has underlined the 
dissimilarities between the CG of industrial (non-financial) institutions and their 
financial counterparts such as banks. The former is governed according to the 
Anglo-American model, in which the exclusive focus of CG is to maximise 
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shareholder (owner) wealth, while the CG of the latter (i.e. banks) fits into a 
variant of the Franco-German paradigm where the fiduciary duties of the BoD go 
beyond those towards the shareholders to include other stakeholders such as 
bondholders, depositors, regulators, buyers of bank guarantee services (e.g. loan 
commitments, standby letters of credit) and so on. This unique feature of CG 
challenges banks, as these banks, being value-maximising businesses, must 
balance the shareholders’ demands and the public’s interests; this can potentially 
promote a greater level of agency conflicts among stakeholders and bank 
managers (Mehran et al., 2011; Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012).  
For example, if a bank is publicly traded on stock markets, it has to satisfy 
investors and follow strict banking regulations due to its economic importance 
(i.e. potential for contagion within banks and from banks to the real economy). 
While investors tend to demand a bank’s profitability, regulators are more likely 
to demand a bank’s soundness and financial stability. Thereby, the management 
of a bank must satisfy the demands of both parties, which in most cases are in 
conflict with each other. Profitable projects may not necessarily increase the 
quality of financial intermediations, because profitability is directly associated 
with risky investments. As such, a bank’s BoD should be responsible for 
controlling optimal levels of risk to accomplish target profits, which requires 
bank-specific and macroeconomic inside information and expertise. Therefore, the 
board has an essential duty to balance the objective of bank profitability and 
financial stability via optimal risk-taking (Kutubi et al., 2018), leading to a greater 
degree of pressure from the BoD in advising and monitoring managers (Klein, 
1998). The complexity of bank governance implies dissimilar effects of the BoD’s 
effectiveness on financial indicators compared to industrial entities (see Macey 
and O’Hara, 2003; Adams and Mehran, 2003; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015).  
BoDs in banks accommodate inside and affiliated members, including senior 
managers, as well as outside directors. Insiders have unique business knowledge 
which outsiders do not possess (i.e. information asymmetry – Brennan et al., 
2016). They provide valuable information about the institution’s activities (Byrd 
and Hickman, 1992; Chapra and Ahmed, 2002) but are influenced by the CEO’s 
power (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Meanwhile, the role of the outside directors 
entails two BoD governance functions in serving the owners: (1) initiating, 
approving and implementing management/corporate decisions and (2) ratifying 
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and scrutinising the implementation of those decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 
Shaukat and Trojanowski, 2018). Prior research has shown a link between 
effective monitoring and the presence of outsiders on the board for firms 
experiencing gross failures of strategy and performance (Klein, 1998; Sierra et al., 
2006). Pathan (2009) also reports that outside directors in bank holding companies 
are associated with less risk-taking, suggesting that they “may view their role as 
balancing between the interests of shareholders and the other relevant bank 
stakeholders including depositors and regulators” (p. 1348). The thesis therefore 
focuses on the effectiveness of outside directors but also extends the scope to 
more severe agency conflicts within banks. The issue reflects the higher demand 
for monitoring and consulting by outside directors in banks than in the case of 
non-financial firms. 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
From a simple financial perspective, the vital matter in CG is to envision rules 
(e.g. guidelines, directions) and incentives (e.g. implicit or explicit “contracts”) to 
effectively align the behaviours of management/executives (agents) with the 
wishes of owners (principals) (Hawley and Williams, 1996). Problems related to 
agents can occur when they act opportunistically and make decisions based on 
their self-interest rather than the interests of the principals. This thesis, following 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), identifies this problem as being that of an agency 
conflict, and this includes the sum of the agency costs of monitoring management 
(the agent), bonding the agent to the principals and residual losses (see Figure 
2.1). Among these three main agency costs, the last one is key, as the other two 
expenditures (i.e. monitoring and bonding) are incurred only in the degree to 
which they produce cost-effective decreases in the residual loss (Williamson, 
1988). Residual loss refers to a fall in the firm value obtained when entrepreneurs 
dilute their ownerships, leading to the shift out of income and into managerial 
cost, and in turn, to loss. Monitoring and bonding costs can be helpful in restoring 
the firm’s performance towards pre-dilution stages. The minimum of the sum of 
these three factors, therefore, will be the irreducible agency costs. Equity 
purchasers only pay for the projected performance of a firm after considering 
agency costs of these three kinds. As such, “the entrepreneur will bear the entire 
wealth effects of these expected costs as long as the equity market anticipates 
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Figure 2.1: Agency Cost 
Source: Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
More specifically, agency theorists (e.g. Coase, 1937; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
argue that corporate managers can raise funds for their firms from capital 
providers (i.e. investors) either to put them to effective use or to cash out his/her 
holdings in the company. The capital providers need to take advantage of the 
managers’ ability to generate returns on their money while the managers, in 
contrast, need to utilise the capital from these providers to invest in projects or 
cash out his/her holdings. However, it is probable that funds of the providers 
become a worthless piece of paper back from the manager. As such, in this 
context, the difficulties of capital providers have in assuring that their capital will 
not be expropriated or wasted on negative net present value investments refer to 
the agency problem. Consequently, it can be held that the fundamental inference 
of agency theory is that firm’s value may not be maximised as desired by the 
principals, since the management possesses discretion which can allow them to 
appropriate the value towards themselves before the firm owners.  
In an ideal world, the owners of the firm would require managers to sign a 
complete and legal contract that specifies exactly and thoroughly what and how 
these managers would do under all states of the world and most importantly, how 
profits will be distributed to the owners and to the other stockholders via the 
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contingencies, technically leading to an incomplete contract (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Thereby, managers can obtain the rights to make individual decisions, 
which cannot be clarified or anticipated in the legal contract under which debt or 
equity is constituted (Grossman and Hart, 1986). This results in the principals’ 
problem (Ross, 1973) and the agency problem (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b). In 
addition, in the cases a firm funding is collected from many investors, these 
investors themselves are often hold a very small portion of the whole fund and 
hence, they are very poorly informed to work-out even the control rights they 
should have. The free rider problem discourages those individual investors to 
learn about the firms they owned, or even to take part in the governance (Downs, 
1957), “just as it may not pay citizens to get informed about political candidates 
and vote” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.741). Consequently, if courts or capital 
providers actively get involved in detailed contract enforcement, the managers’ 
effective control rights and thus, the boardroom they have for discretionary 
distribution of capital, would end up being much more extensive than they should 
have been. 
Against the above background, this thesis discusses the agency conflicts or agency 
costs in cases that complete and contingent contracts between managers and 
investors are infeasible. The study claims that the agency theory formula for 
principal-agent conflict looks to BoDs to supervise the verification process on 
behalf of the principals (Brennan et al., 2016) (Figure 2.2). The board is viewed as 
a “professional referee” (Fama, 1980, p. 293), which serves as one of the 
monitoring agents that has a legal and moral obligation in aligning manager and 
shareholder interests to ensure that the business is run in the best interests of 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Monks and Minow, 2011). In other words, 
it has fiduciary responsibility of monitoring the actions of executives (agents) to 
protect shareholders’ interests (principals) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Mizruchi, 1983), supported by legal and finance scholars 
(Bainbridge, 1993; Berle and Means, 1932). Therefore, monitoring by boards is 
essential since potential agency costs could be incurred when executives pursue 
their self-interest at the expense of shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ interests. 
In that way, one can anticipate the fact that board-related characteristics/attributes 
are associated with the levels of agency costs (Renders et al., 2010; Adams et al., 
15 
 
2010; Shaukat and Trojanowski, 2018), and hence, performance, value and other 
financial indicators. 
Remarkably, the studies on the issue of agency conflicts have recently extended 
beyond conventional contractual structures between key executives and 
shareholders. For example, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) emphasise that such 
agency problem could be arisen between strong blockholders and weak minority 
shareholders in the context of family-controlled companies. They explore a 
positive relation between the degree of ownership concentration and effectiveness 
of control mechanisms. Dharwadkar et al. (2000) also apply the agency theory in 
the case of unique CG of privatised companies operating in emerging countries. 
They find the exacerbation of the conventional agency problems and the creation 
of issues associated with the expropriation of minorities’ rights. Bebchuk et al. 
(2008), furthermore, contend that the size of agency conflicts increases when the 
size of cash flow rights reduces. They also find that agency costs in an order of 
magnitude larger than those related to controlling shareholders, could be created 
due to the separation of cash flow and control rights. Relating this finding to the 
case of IBs model, where cash flow and control rights are separated (see more 
details in Section 2.7.2), agency problems of these banks are expected to be 
unique and more severe. More importantly, Safieddine (2009) find that agency 
structure of IBs increases the trade-offs between the compliance of Islamic rulings 
and mechanisms protecting the rights of investors. Accordingly, the uniqueness of 
the agency relationships at institutions offering financial services, whether Islamic 
or conventional, stems from the agents’ duty to protect and promote the interests 
of all capital providers, including depositors, investors and shareholders (Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992; Safieddine, 2009). The unique agency relationships in IBs 
























Figure 2.2: Conceptual Framework of Agency Theory 
Source: Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
2.3.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) was introduced for the first time by a seminal 
work written by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Over time, RDT has been applied 
broadly across various research areas to explain how a firm reduces 
environmental interdependence and uncertainty (Hillman et al., 2009); and till 
date, it is still one of the most influential theories in organisational theory and 
strategic management. The initial premise of this theory is that an organisation 
behaves as an open system (Hatch, 1997), dependent on contingencies and 
external resources in their environment (i.e. all structures, actors and events that 
affect the dependence of an organisation on outside resources) to operate and 
survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Biermann and Harsch, 2017). As stated by 
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their value of shares. 
(2) BoD: maximise their self benefits as 
they are in an influential position. 
(3) Managers or CEOs: maximise their 
personal gains as they may possess more 
knowledge and information related to 
the operation of firms. 
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Hillman et al. (2000), RDT focuses on the role of directors in providing access to 
corporate resources and securing these resources to a firm through their linkages 
to the markets and external environment. Johnson et al. (1996) argue that RDT 
concentrates on the appointment of representatives of independent institutions as 
an effective means to increase access to essential resources, which are critical to a 
firm’s success. For instance, an outside director who are also working in a law 
company, can provide his/her legal advice in the periodic board meetings or even 
private communication with management or executive boards that should 
otherwise be more expensive for an organisation to secure. Accordingly, board 
directors can bring useful resources (e.g. information, skills, legitimacy and 
networking) to their “home” firm. Indeed, strong support has accrued four main 
benefits of those directors which include essential information by providing some 
advice and counsel, accessing to information channels between the organisations 
and environmental contingencies, providing preferential access to corporate 
resources, and legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The dynamic nature of the 
boards, e.g. altering board composition when environmental needs change, is 
likely to be a nearly normative convention. Provan (1980) states that firms can 
attract and recruit powerful community influential onto their boards. Goodstein 
(1999) claim that high-regulated firms tend to need more outsiders with relevant 
industry knowledge and experience. Those outsiders can enhance corporate social 
performance (Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
Existing literature (e.g. Hillman et al., 2000) proposes three main types of 
directors corresponding to the different types of resources that directors can bring 
to a board: business experts, support specialists and community-influential 
directors. Business experts (i.e. current and former senior executives and 
directors of other for-profit companies) can provide their expertise and 
experience in terms of business strategy, decision-making and problem-solving. 
They can contribute good resources for successful firm operations because of 
their professions and connections, and they can therefore enhance the legitimacy 
of the firm in society and accomplish goals of efficiency and better performance 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Farag et al., 2018). Support specialists (e.g. lawyers, bankers, 
representatives for insurance companies, public relations experts) can support the 
firm in their specialised field. Lastly, community-influential directors are those 
serving as political leaders, university faculty members, members of clergy and 
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leaders of social and community institutions (Hillman et al., 2000).  
Despite the predominant theory in the studies on the boards is agency theory (e.g. 
Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Dalton et al., 2007), the greatest 
research influence in this area might be still RDT (Hillman et al., 2009). 
Corporate boards allow companies to minimise dependence or increase resources 
(Pfeffer, 1972). Previous literature on the boards (e.g. Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989) highlight that RDT provides a more successful lens for 
understanding boards than any other board perspectives including agency and 
stakeholders theories. RDT scholars stress two board attributes (composition and 
characteristics) as antecedents of three board roles (service, strategy and control). 
They suggest that directors of the board can bring good resources for successful 
firm operations because of their professions and communities, hence, enhance the 
legitimacy in society of the firm and accomplish goals of efficiency and better 
performance (Pfeffer, 1972). For instance, those directors can be actively 
involved in the strategic arena through advice and guidance to the firm’s CEO, by 
introducing their own evaluates or alternatives. Thus, directors can shape these 
creativities directly by recommending new business ideas or introducing their 
analyses. However, developing and executing those strategies are tasks of CEOs 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Early empirical evidence on the RDT focuses on the BoD’s composition, which 
indicates the board’s ability to provide critical resources to the organisation. 
Typically, Pfeffer (1972) finds that the size of the boards is likely to be associated 
with corporate environmental needs and those with higher interdependence 
require a greater ratio of independent/outside directors. Specifically, firms with 
bigger BoDs are likely to require a higher percentage of independent directors to 
have access to external resources. Sanders and Carpenter (1998) also support this 
idea by providing evidence for the positive link between board size and a firm’s 
level of internationalisation. Other scholars have subsequently emphasised the 
great need to “match” the resources brought by the boards to corporate needs 
(Hillman et al., 2009). Boyd (1990) contends that board size is a hindrance, 
whereas interlocking directorates or multiple directorships are a benefit, implying 
that “resource-rich” directors should be the focus of board composition. Thus, 
“it’s not just the number, but the type of directors on the board that matters” 
(Hillman et al., 2009, p. 1408). Moreover, because the theory recognises the 
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significant role of external factors on firm behaviours, management committee 
acts to mitigate environmental uncertainty and dependence (Hillman et al., 2009). 
However, banks that operate in a stricter regulated environment are less flexible 
in terms of determining their board size and independence. In addition, as argued 
by Engelberg et al. (2012), these banks often employ personal relationship in 
situations that client screening is not easy and active scrutinising is required. 
Therefore, from RDT perspective, they tend to consider board composition while 
focusing on directors’ multiple directorships as an effective way of accessing 
external resources. The resource-rich directors can help fulfil the banks’ demands 
regarding outside resources or environmental interdependency.  
In sum, while agency theory describes problems related to the conflicting 
interests of managers and shareholders, RDT theory focuses on the role of 
directors in providing access to firms’ resources and securing these resources for 
a company through their linkages to the market and outside environments. In this 
research, based on the research questions set in the Introduction Chapter, agency 
theory and RDT are chosen and applied as two fundamental theories because they 
are evidenced to be the most common and biggest theoretical frameworks in the 
CG field. They have been shown to be particularly useful when analysing the 
characteristics and functioning of BoDs in relation to corporate outcomes. With 
regard to agency theory in CG as well as corporate finance, it is gaining 
momentum for all the right reasons. In the context of increasingly volatile 
markets, this theory becomes indispensable when the interests of both 
shareholders and banks need to be taken into account. The former should place 
their trust in the bank managers and make efforts to understand the corporate 
business decisions on a daily basis. Likewise, managers should preserve the trust 
and confidence of shareholders by keeping the interests of the firm’s owners in 
their minds. There should be rich communication between these two parties; for 
example, managers are encouraged to send out valuable information to explain to 
the shareholders the rationale behind key business decisions or any substantial 
changes. 
Equally, RDT theory is also imperative in the context of the CG of banks due to 
their need for external resources under conditions of environmental uncertainty. 
Many of these resources appear to be controlled either directly or indirectly by 
governments; thus, recruiting BoDs, especially those who have a substantial 
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impact on accessing key regulators and the government due to their knowledge 
and connections, is considered to be one of the crucial strategies for bank 
survival. This may, in turn, improve the legitimacy of banks in society and help 
them enhance performance and achieve their ultimate objectives. Consequently, 
this thesis argues that RDT can provide a convincing justification for the creation 
of linkages between banking institutions and their outside environment through 
BoDs since banks that create linkages are more likely to secure their survival and 
performance.  
More importantly, agency and RDT are directly linked to two opposing 
hypotheses of board busyness (i.e. the main variable of interest in this study). 
They are indeed theoretical foundations of the busyness and reputation 
hypotheses, respectively. Drawing on these two theories, board busyness can 
facilitate the contagion of corporate policies and strategies by enhancing the 
knowledge, skills and experiences of outside directors, which are effectively 
utilised in their monitoring role (i.e. agency theory) and in their information, 
networking and advising function (i.e. RDT theory). Therefore, compared to 
other common theoretical frameworks in CG research, these two theories are 
superior in the context of testing board busyness, particularly in the banking 
sector. Hence, they are sensibly employed as key theories in this thesis. More 
detailed discussions are provided in Section 2.4. 
The above theories are used as the dominant theoretical rationales to explain why 
busy boards are related to bank financial outcomes through factors such as 
financial stability, market value and dividend policy. In addition, this study also 
includes two additional theoretical frameworks, i.e. stakeholder and legitimacy 
theories that agency and RDT are narrow forms of, respectively. They are 
expected to add supplementary values and explanations for the study results in 
some cases, including the evaluation of the SSBs’ current role in fulfilling the 
required religio-social legitimacy of IB operations. Specifically, this research 
examines the busyness of SSBs using stakeholder and legitimacy theories, which 
suggest that IBs need to “uphold ethical and religious compliance as a key 
operational characteristic to operate business and to demonstrate ultimate 
accountability to stakeholders” (Haridan et al., 2018, p.1036). The next section 
provides critical in-depth discussions about how stakeholder and legitimacy 
theories could be understood and applied to the particular context of this thesis.  
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2.3.3 Stakeholder and Legitimacy Theories 
Both stakeholder and legitimacy theories claim a broader concept of CG that is 
applied in modern businesses (see Haridan et al., 2018). They therefore help to 
strengthen the arguments in this study. In general terms, these two theories could 
be considered to be extended forms of agency and RDT. While agency theory 
focuses on the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders, 
stakeholder theory extends these conflicts to the case of a broad range of 
stakeholders. Likewise, whilst RDT discourses the role of directors in offering 
valuable resources to their firms such as knowledge and expertise, networking, 
experience and skills, the legitimacy may influence RDT as well as other 
institutional theories because it could be related to the reputational gain of an 
organisation through legitimacy. 
To be more specific, stakeholder theory emphasises that the decision making of 
managers and the interests of all stakeholders have intrinsic value; no one set of 
interests is expected to dominate the others (Freeman et al., 2018). In this thesis, 
the theory is reflected through the unique role of bank boards in balancing the 
different interests of several stakeholders. In other words, it provides greater 
latitude in widening the concept of CG as managers and directors need to serve 
both the interests of the bank owners and the interests of other stakeholders such 
as regulators, policy makers, local communities, creditors, customers, employees, 
investors and market participants (Garcia-Torea et al., 2016). Given that unlike 
non-financial firms, banks themselves should be thought of as groupings of 
stakeholders, managing their interests, needs and viewpoints might be the main 
purpose of banking institutions. This management of stakeholders’ interests is the 
duty of bank managers, who are expected to control their business for the 
stakeholders’ benefits. This ensures their rights and participation in the bank’s 
decision-making process (Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). These managers should 
also act as the agents of the stakeholders to guarantee the bank’s survival and 
hence ensure the long-run stakes of each interest group.  
Existing research has found a significant role for effective CG practices, but this 
depends on how well a firm can manage the diverse expectations and interests of 
various groups of stakeholders. Nevertheless, building a good model to devise a 
principle for making trade-offs among diverse stakeholders appears to be 
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challenging. In the context of IBs, this issue seems more acute because the CG 
objectives of this type of bank comprise reassuring stakeholders that they will 
receive fair investment returns and Shari’ah compliance. Indeed, from the IBs’ 
perspective of the stakeholder theory, it is essential to provide a more enduring 
and solid justification regarding the qualification of stakeholders, as well as the 
rights and duties that both IBs and their various stakeholders may assume. Based 
on the concept of a stakeholder (i.e. having property rights that are at stake or at 
risk because of voluntary or involuntary actions of the company), an IB is 
expected to preserve the property rights of all shareholders and other people 
involved in the process of acquiring or earning the IB’s property, in addition to 
those who can be threatened as a consequence of the IB’s activities. Stakeholders 
of IBs, therefore, include those having obligations arising from either explicit or 
implicit contracts. The former is clearly indicated in the Shari’ah rulings of 
contracting while the latter is “unwritten codes of conduct” for the various 
stakeholders, influenced by IBs’ operations (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2016). 
Furthermore, the need to conform with Shari’ah law in IB transactions suggests 
that these banks are driven not only by the principle of profit maximisation, but 
also by the pursuit of social and moral responsibilities for the well-being of fellow 
men such as consumers, shareholders, etc. Therefore, the Shari’ah framework of 
stakeholders is likely to strive for the balanced and harmonised interests of 
various groups of stakeholders, built upon moral and ethical principles (Metwally, 
1997). For that reason, this thesis argues that social norms and Islamic values in 
the IB sector should exert a significant influence on the use of the stakeholder’s 
concept and on the management of CG issues.  
With regard to legitimacy theory, the term ‘legitimacy’ refers to “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p.574). Against this concept, legitimacy theory has 
become one of the most popular theoretical constructs used for making viable 
predictions. It plays a vital role in describing the behaviours of firms when they 
implement and improve the voluntary disclosures of social, economic and 
environmental information. This development of disclosure aims to fulfil the 
corporate social contract, which helps to recognise firms’ goals and their survival 
in a turbulent environment (Idowu, 2013). Vitally, the activities of organisations 
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should be in accordance with the expectations of society regarding social and 
moral values. They need to justify their existence through legitimate economic 
and social actions that will not endanger the existence of society and the natural 
environment. If they do not, they will be severely sanctioned by the society in 
which they operate, leading to their possible failure (Burlea and Popa, 2013).  
Furthermore, previous studies highlight that legitimacy theory could influence 
RDT and other organisational theories. It is observed as an “anchor-point of a 
vastly expanded theoretical apparatus addressing the normative and cognitive 
forces that constrain, construct, and empower organisational actors” (Suchman, 
1995, p.571). As such, corporate managers have earned the firm’s reputation by 
formulating different strategies to maintain the legitimacy of the firm’s 
operations, thus enhancing the corporate stakeholders’ confidence (Patten, 1992). 
One can translate this theory into the way that firms commit themselves to 
adopting organisational social behaviour in their CG mechanism for the purpose 
of ensuring compliance with the values and social norms of the respective 
societies that they operate in (Golant and Sillince, 2007). This argument implies 
that the integrity of a firm might be undermined when the activities of that 
organisation show less legitimate social behaviour (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
Also, a firm’s legitimacy and reputation could represent assessments of a 
corporation by a social system (Deephouse and Carter, 2005).  
However, the quality of the legitimacy appears to depend a great deal on the 
bank’s management team, which has a central role in assuring the interaction 
between the internal and external environment and in stopping, in time, the 
destruction of the bank’s image. In that way, firm managers and the management 
of legitimacy should be interconnected, as they critically affect one another to 
fulfil the main objectives of economy, society and environment (Idowu, 2013). 
Accordingly, the sustainability of this theory rests upon the management’s 
heritage, which links the conventional social norms and values to modern ethics.  
From the IB perspective, if we assume that there is no religious or ethical 
legitimacy, IBs will certainly become meaningless because the crucial 
requirement of these banks is societal legitimacy, which can attract constituent 
support. Note that this thesis refers to legitimacy and reputation as complicated 
and multi-dimensional concepts and they can be connected to a wide range of 
stakeholders, who have the “significance of being the be all and end all of an IB’s 
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survival” (Haridan et al., 2018, p.1024). Moreover, in IBs, it is not difficult to 
identify their motives for social information disclosure or the critical role of 
religious boards (i.e. SSBs) in delivering compliance with social, ethical and 
moral norms, as well as Islamic rulings in the Muslim community. In other words, 
SSBs are responsible for issuing transparent and independent assurances of 
religion to stakeholders that upsurge public confidence in the survival, position 
and robustness of IB governance in a dual banking system, and endorse the 
religio-ethical legitimacy required by IB stakeholders (Bougatef, 2015; Ullah et 
al., 2018). Subsequently, SSBs’ competency, independence and capability in 
providing quality and religious assurance are considered to be vital CG features, 
showing the role of reliability and soundness in assuring ethical legitimacy, as 
well as adding more value for a wide range of stakeholders. Without this board, 
there would be no CG mechanisms available in IBs, whose main duties are to 
provide the ethical, institutional and religious legitimacy expected by 
stakeholders. As a result, SSBs could be powerful boards that serve the faith of 
the Muslim community. Their members (i.e. Shari’ah scholars) should possess 
rich experiences and qualifications in various disciplines, including Islamic law, 
accounting and finance, auditing, etc. (Gambling et al. 1993; Ginena, 2014). 
In overall, this thesis argues that agency theory in the context of CBs will limit the 
accountabilities of their operations to those of investors alone. Meanwhile, for 
IBs, due to the wide spectrum of IB accountability, agency theory under Islamic 
rulings is broadened by including moral integrity, an appropriate socio-political 
environment and socio-religious compliance by the CG system of this type of 
bank (e.g. Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Safieddine, 2009). As such, the concepts of 
stakeholder interest and business legitimacy have been extended.  
2.3.4 Dividend Theories with a Dominance of Agency Hypothesis 
This section presents popular theories related to dividend payouts policy of a firm. 
Dividend policy is regarded as one of the cornerstones of financial economics, 
and numerous empirical studies have been conducted since the irrelevance of 
dividend policy was introduced by Miller and Modigliani (MM, 1961). Those 
studies try to examine the MM proposition, which hypothesises that dividend 
policy does not influence firm value in a perfect capital market with no taxes, no 
transaction costs and no information asymmetry, to see if the results derived from 
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theory hold in the real stock markets (e.g. Lease et al., 2000). Subsequent research 
extents a range of areas covering payout decisions and how it associates with tax 
clienteles (Elton and Gruber, 1970), agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984), signalling 
effects (Aharony and Swary, 1980), life-cycle factors (DeAngelo et al., 2006), 
catering incentives (Baker and Wurgler, 2004), and behavioural factors (Turner et 
al., 2013).  
Accordingly, existing studies offer some theoretical explanations for ex-ante firm 
pay-out behaviour including agency conflicts, catering, clientele, the birth in hand, 
investment opportunities, and signalling perspective (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 1988; 
Li and Lie, 2006; Jo and Pan, 2009). While the catering theory argues that firms 
tend to pay dividends when the market reaction to corporate payout is greater 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2004), the clientele theory contends that investors often 
prefer dividends if tax on dividends are more favourable (Miller and Modigliani, 
1961). Behavioural hypotheses related to dividend clientele suggest that 
individual investors often prefer capital gains than dividends but they form 
dividend clienteles depending on their age, income or risk aversion (see Shefrin 
and Statman, 1984; Shefrin and Thaler, 1988; Graham and Kumar, 2006). Further, 
dividends might mitigate the potential overconfidence of managers retaining 
earnings to fund suboptimal investments (Graham and Kumar, 2006). In addition, 
the theory of birth in hand contends that due to information asymmetry between 
foreign owners and the firm, foreign shareholders are likely to show preference on 
dividends over retain earnings (Balachandran et al., 2017). Therefore, firms 
having more foreign investors tend to pay future dividends and rise current 
dividends (Baba, 2009). Moreover, some other studies support the signalling 
hypothesis indicating that firms tend to pay dividends to signal future earnings 
and strong financial and earnings performance (Healy and Palepu, 1988; Koch 
and Sun, 2004) and/or earnings persistence (Chen et al., 2007).  
Among all the above highlighted theories, none of them can solely explain 
dividend pay-outs behaviours in firms (Frankfurter and Wood Jr, 2002; Baker and 
Weigand, 2015). The agency theory, however, represents one of the dominant 
views on dividend policies (see Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Denis and Osobov, 
2008; Jo and Pan, 2009; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2015). This theory postulates 
that management boards are self-serving, they have strong incentives to control 
firm’s operating, investing and financing policies to allocate firm resources for 
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their self-interest at the shareholder expenses. For instance, prior studies have 
long argued that managers (e.g. CEOs) have their strong incentives to engage in 
discretionary acts (Williamson, 1964), take excessive compensation and 
perquisites (Sharma, 2011), and utilise excess free cash flow in unprofitable 
projects. Easterbrook (1984) highlights that the monitoring and risk-aversion 
preferences might lead to agency problems between managers and shareholders, 
and hence, result in the arisen of cash dividends. When managers decide to 
finance investments out of internally generated funds rather than via financial 
markets, they mitigate their personal risks as well as the risks of debtholders but 
exacerbate the shareholders’ risks. Dividend payments, therefore, may diminish 
the available free cash flows and in turn, force managers to finance investment 
through financial markets.  
As rational capital suppliers seek regular monitoring and continuous discipline 
over managers, dividend pay-outs appear to play a similar role as an implicit 
governance tool in dealing with managerial discretion over the usage of excess 
free cash flow (Easterbrook, 1984; Sharma, 2011). As such, periodic cash 
dividends can serve as a quasi-contract to restrain wasteful expenditures incurred 
by those managers (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000; Edmans, 2011; Harford et 
al., 2008), especially when managers are more reluctant to return cash to 
stakeholders (Jensen, 1986). Furthermore, in line with risk aversion perspective, 
managers are likely to have lower risk tolerance than shareholders since those 
managers might have substantial personal gains/incentives tied up with the firm’s 
performance. Those managers can change the firm risks through lowering debt to 
equity ratio (i.e. lower bankruptcy risk) by financing projects from retained 
earnings which would transfer wealth from the owners to the creditors (Sharma, 
2011). The research of Easterbrook (1984) then contends that shareholders might 
have preference on higher dividend pay-out since it would mitigate the retained 
earnings and force management to raise outside funds. This helps shareholders to 
avoid being taken advantage of by debtholders. In turn, leveraging on the 
monitoring and risk aversion hypotheses, dividend mechanism is concluded to be 
served to reduce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders within a 
firm. 
Moreover, managers are also likely to manipulate and shift the amounts of 
dividends across future periods (i.e. the earnings smoothing effect) if they have 
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motives to increase the dividend ratios despite the low level of permanent 
earnings. A managerial discretion to establish the payout policy can exacerbate 
the agency problems between managers and shareholders; such conflict is 
particularly more severe in banks due to their highly levered capital structure 
(John et al., 2010). Specifically, banking firms have greater level of opaqueness, 
and thereby, their agency conflicts are known to be more severe than non-
financial busineses. For that reason, the signalling role of cash payouts in banks 
appears to be more important than for any other sectors (Forti and Schiozer, 
2015).  
In a comparison between IBs and CBs, there are several factors which could affect 
the different dividend strategies between these two bank types. For example, due 
to the Shari’ah compliance and religious monitoring, IBs must face additional 
agency problems (see details in Section 2.7.2) which is not present in CBs 
(Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Besides that, IBs tend to adopt a more cautious capital 
structure because they have more limited financing sources than CBs due to the 
prohibition of using derivatives, limited access to short-run borrowing markets, 
and the operation in less developed Islamic capital markets (Abedifar et al., 2013). 
This prevents them from their engagements in asset liability management, and 
thereby, IBs are likely to be more conservative in establishing their dividend 
strategies in order to build capital suffers (Duqi et al., 2019). Beck et al. (2013) 
find that IBs reveal better capitalisation ratios than CBs, which is consistent with 
these assumptions. To avoid repetition, more in-depth discussions about payouts 
theories as well as theoretical differences in dividend policy between IBs and CBs 
are provided in Section 2.7.1 and Section 5.3.3. 
2.4 Competing Hypotheses of Board Busyness 
Driven by the two aforementioned theories (i.e. Agency and RDT theories), 
scholars have proposed two competing hypotheses of board busyness for 
corporate outcomes and strategies: the “reputation hypothesis” and “busyness 
hypothesis”. They assert that multiple directorships are not only observed as a 
positive indicator for the benefits of directors, but also as a negative sign for the 
risks of directors being stretched thin. The effect of multiple directorships on 
financial indicators (e.g. financial stability, market valuations and dividend 
policy) is, in general, an open question, and placing this relationship in the context 
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of specialised settings and particular circumstances is required to explore this idea 
further. 
2.4.1 Reputation Hypothesis  
Under the RDT theory, the reputation hypothesis for outside directors’ multiple 
directorships is established. This hypothesis postulates that the number of outside 
board seats held by outside directors, as a proxy for their reputation capital in the 
external labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Zajac and Westphal, 1996; 
Harris and Shimizu, 2004), is related to their managerial performance as 
monitoring specialists (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). As such, multiple board 
appointments can signal director quality (Fama and Jensen, 1983a) and may 
improve a board’s decision-making ability, leading to a positive outcome for firms 
in which directors hold more outside board seats (Ahn et al., 2010). These 
directors can be a source of valuable knowledge, experience and business 
connections, and they can consequently provide better advice (e.g. Kaplan and 
Reishus, 1990; Gilson, 1990; Haunschild, 1993; Ferris et al., 2003; Harris and 
Shimizu, 2004). Their social ties make them excellent advisors and value-
enhancing directors (Field et al., 2013). The resources that they bring to the 
organisation can reduce bank uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972), transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1984) and mitigate the firms’ dependency on external contingencies 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). If this is the case, they should help in increasing the 
level of board monitoring, lessening agency costs and protecting shareholders’ 
interests. As a result, firms with busy outside directors might exhibit superior 
performance and board decision-making (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). This, in turn, 
can be beneficial to the firm’s financial stability, market valuations and dividend 
policy.  
2.4.2 Busyness Hypothesis  
Although the arguments presented in the section above are consistent with RDT 
predictions (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), it is only part of the story (Laurent, 
2016), and so, it is an ongoing debate. Previous reviews of multiple directorships 
show an overwhelmingly strong opposite view: the Busyness Hypothesis, which 
is derived from agency theory. Indeed, busy directors have been criticised as 
being ineffective, and it is stated that a reduction in their workload is associated 
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with improved operating profits and higher book-to-market ratios (Hauser, 2018). 
Board busyness can lead to a lower monitoring and advisory capacity of the board 
for the following reasons. First, busy outside directors may not have the necessary 
reputation and networking contacts to generate benefits to the institution (Jackling 
and Johl, 2009). Second, they cater to managers (i.e. CEOs) and their busyness 
can be associated with excess CEO rent extraction (Shivdasani and Yermark, 
1999; Falato et al., 2014). Third, outside directors with multiple board seats 
usually ignore board meetings through non-attendance. Hence, they may neglect 
their tasks by not participating in vital and strategic decision-making processes 
(Jiraporn et al., 2008; Falato et al., 2014).  
Fourth, outside directors may not fulfil their monitoring responsibilities if they are 
too busy with multiple board duties, and they are likely to have less time available 
to devote effort to collecting information about the business’s affairs or acquiring 
related knowledge, above what is provided by the management (Hart, 1995). As 
such, they are associated with weak governance structures, giving rise to agency 
problems (Core et al., 1999). Last but not least, busy outside directors could be 
stretched thin; their limited information processing capacity may cause 
information overload (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). They may also have 
experienced negative socio-cognitive externalities from their outside jobs, 
resulting in the ineffective monitoring of managers (Ferris et al., 2003). This 
suggests that busyness can lead to a shirking of the board’s responsibilities, and 
therefore, this can exacerbate agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders; for instance, those related to dividend payouts (Jiraporn and 
Chintrakarn, 2009; Sharma, 2011). Taken together, the busyness hypothesis 
predicts an inverse relation between the board’s busyness and corporate outcomes 
(e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Ahn et al., 2010; Sharma, 2011; Cashman et al., 
2012; Zhang, 2016), implying a predicted decline in firm stability, market 
valuations and the effectiveness of payout policy. 
2.5 Board Busyness in Non-financial and Financial Firms 
Previous research has documented the positive relationships between busy 
directors and industrial firms’ outcomes, which supports the reputation 
hypothesis. Pioneering evidence consistent with this assertion can be found in the 
studies of Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983a), Mace (1986), Kaplan and 
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Reishus (1990), Gilson (1990), Lang and Lockhart (1990), Shivdasani (1993), 
Beasley (1996), Mizruchi (1996), Burt (1997), Cotter et al. (1997), Haunschild 
and Beckman (1998), Brickley et al. (1999), Brown and Maloney (1999) and 
Miwa and Ramseyer (2000). Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983a) were 
among the first scholars to introduce the concepts and knowledge of multiple 
directorships. They generally certify the outstanding ability of individual directors 
in the external labour market because their appointments to numerous boards help 
them to gain diversified experience and exceptional advisory ability, and to extend 
their business networks and contacts. Corporations with such directors, hence, 
might exhibit superior performance and board decision making. Mace (1986) 
further finds that multiple directorships held by an executive could add more 
value to the company since they can permit this executive to either establish a 
wide network or scrutinise corporate relations. Supporting these arguments, a 
number of subsequent empirical studies relating to directors’ busyness and 
interlocking were developed during the 1990s. Typically, Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990) report that top managers who reduce firm dividends tend to obtain 50 per 
cent less external directorships. Gilson (1990), Shivdasani (1993) and Harford 
(2003) conclude that directors related to better-performing firms hold more board 
seats while those related to poorly performing firms hold fewer board seats. 
Beasley (1996) finds a negative relationship between firms with “busy” outside 
directors and their likelihood of financial statement fraud. This implies that these 
firms are less likely to commit fraud.  
Another work of Booth and Deli (1996) finds that CEOs holding multiple 
directorships can transfer decision rights to their eventual successor. Cotter et al. 
(1997) report that the merger premium offered will be greater if a merger target’s 
board comprises “busy” individuals. In the same line with these research, 
Haunschild and Beckman (1998) argue that such directors positively contribute to 
the entire corporate system by the dissemination of innovations throughout 
corporate networks. Brickley et al. (1999) find a positive relationship between a 
retired CEO who sits on his own board or on other boards, and his firm’s 
performance while he was the CEO. Brown and Maloney (1999) also report a 
superior acquisitions’ returns of companies recruiting multiple directors. Miwa 
and Ramseyer (2000) document that during the first decade of the 20th century, 
multiple directors are strongly associated with firm success in the cotton spinning 
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industry in Japan. With regards to interlocking directorate, Lang and Lockhart 
(1990), Palmer et al. (1993) and Ahuja (2000) claim that indirect interlocks are 
considered as a form of board social capital which has a significantly positive 
effect on firm outcomes (e.g. patents development). This is subsequently 
supported by numerous studies such as Mizruchi (1996), Burt (1997), Carpenter 
and Westphal (2001), Hillman and Dalziel (2003). These works generally find 
that board interlocks of directors can add value to the firm because they could 
enhance the BoD’s advising and supervising effectiveness on managers. Also, 
interlocks are found to influence BoD ability through improving directors’ 
knowledge, skills and expertise, which is elucidated by agency and RDT theories.  
More recently, Ferris et al. (2003) find no evidence that busy directors neglect 
their board responsibilities or harm the firm’s performance, while there is 
evidence that busy directors are important sources of extensive knowledge, 
represent an important complement to inside directors (Harris and Shimizu, 2004) 
and contribute positively to firm value (Field et al., 2013). Although Lei and Deng 
(2014) document a positive relation between independent directors’ multiple 
directorships and firm value, they find that the effect of busyness is stronger under 
better governance standards and that the positive effect declines at higher levels of 
busyness. Interestingly, Harford (2003) finds that directors related to better 
performing firms hold more board seats while those related to poor performing 
firms hold fewer board seats. In addition, Harris and Shimizu (2004) highlight a 
positive effect of “busy” directors on acquirer returns. Moreover, Field et al. 
(2013) emphasise that directors with multiple board seats are excellent advisors 
and are in demand by newly-public venture-backed firms. Chakravarty and 
Rutherford (2017) find that, through a hostile takeover framework, busy outside 
directors tend to mitigate a corporate hostile takeover vulnerability and US firm’s 
cost of debt. Chou and Feng (2018) further explore a positive relation between 
busy BoD and dividend payouts when non-financial US firms have more limited 
investment opportunities. They also conclude that BoD busyness leads to a more 
efficient use of cash, and providing direct benefits to shareholders. The studies 
mentioned above advocate for a positive alignment between board members’ 
multiple directorships and shareholders’ interests in the non-financial sector. 
However, the contribution of a director to the board advisory and monitoring 
performance not only depends on their knowledge or skills, but also on the time 
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availability to perform their duties and the time for preparing of the board 
meetings. Therefore, another line of thought within the existing literature on the 
non-financial sector has provided some contrasting evidence for the busyness 
hypothesis. Typically, earlier studies, such as Eisenhardt (1989), Core et al. (1999) 
and Shivdasani and Yermark (1999) argue the potential risks and consequences 
associated with multiple board appointments. They generally indicate that 
directors sitting on several boards affect negatively firm performance. They 
emphasize these directors tend to overstretched themselves and spend less time on 
each individual board. They may also compromise their responsibilities and 
neglect their duties, resulting in ineffective advising and monitoring management. 
This causes decline in firm value. This is followed by Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
who contend that less time to prepare readings distributed in advance of meetings 
also reduces the level of his expected involvement. In addition, Granovetter 
(1973) argues that multiple indirect interlocks are observed as weak ties which are 
only influential if the BoD room depends upon them as final connection tools.    
Recent work on this negative effect of busyness (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; 
Jiraporn et al., 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Cashman et al., 2012; Falato et al., 
2014; Zhang, 2016) contend that busy directors are criticised for being too busy to 
monitor, being unlikely to provide thoughtful advice to and exercise active control 
over executives, and being detrimental to monitoring quality, business valuation 
and shareholder wealth. Chen (2008) also finds that busy directors have a positive 
(negative) impact on the performance of firms having low (high) agency conflicts 
and high (low) growth opportunities. Similarly, Falato et al. (2014) find that 
busyness functioning of outside directors is detrimental to BoD monitoring 
quality. However, Cashman et al. (2012) conclude that the conflicting findings of 
previous research are potentially the result of differences in both the samples 
studied and the empirical designs.  
Moreover, Jackling and Johl (2009) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) also contend 
that over-boarded directors are related to weak CG and thus to poor firm 
performance. News about an overcommitted director leaving the board positively 
affected the returns announcement of the incumbent firms. In contrast, news about 
a director accepting a third board seat adversely impacted the announcement 
returns. Likewise, Jiraporn et al. (2008) find that overcommitted directors suffer 
larger diversification discounts and lower firm value. Ahn et al. (2010) then report 
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that firms experienced more negative acquisition announcement returns if they 
employed over-boarded directors. Faleye et al. (2011) find a positive relationship 
between busy directors and CEO remunerations. Along the same lines, Hauser 
(2018) finds that a reduction in the number of board seats held by outside 
directors will increase the earnings, book-to-market ratio and pay-performance 
sensitivity in the CEO compensation contracts. Moreover, Sharma (2011) finds 
that busy outside directors are negatively associated with a fim’s dividend policy. 
Specifically, busy outside directors tend to reduce the propensity to pay a 
dividend. 
Reconciling the two opposing hypotheses, Jiraporn et al. (2009) indicate a 
nonlinear U-Shape association between overcommitted directors and the number 
of board committees they serve on. Specifically, at lower degrees of busyness, 
directors holding more board seats are likely to serve on fewer board committees, 
and this idea is supported by the busyness hypothesis. However, at higher degrees 
of busyness, directors holding more board seats tend to serve on a higher number 
of board committees, and this idea is supported by the reputation hypothesis. They 
also emphasise that busy directors tend to miss their board meetings.  
In the financial sector, research into internal governance quality (e.g. board 
directorships, size, independence, CEO duality and ownership structure) of banks 
is imperative to improve its managerial quality and CG structure. Almost all 
existing banking literature focuses on examining the effect of other board 
characteristics (i.e. board size, board independence) and CEO’s characteristics 
(i.e. CEO duality, CEO Tenure) on bank performance and risk-taking (e.g. Sierra 
et al., 2006; Pathan, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012). 
However, little attention (except for Cooper and Uzun, 2012; Elyasiani and 
Zhang, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015; Kutubi et al., 2018) has been paid to bank 
boards’ busyness and the manner in which such functioning affects banks’ 
financial stability, market valuation and decisions to pay dividends. Cooper and 
Uzun (2012) find a direct and positive effect of multiple board appointments on 
US banks’ idiosyncratic risk and total risk. This result suggests that multiple 
directorships of directors tend to increase banks’ risk-taking behaviour, which is 
supported by the busyness hypothesis. Similarly, Nguyen et al. (2015) also find a 
negative link between board busyness and market performance of US banks.  
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Conversely, Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) investigate the association between busy 
directors and US bank holding companies’ performance and risks. However, their 
results contrast the findings of Cooper and Uzun (2012) and Nguyen et al. (2015). 
They find that the presence of busy directors has positive impacts on banks’ 
performance indicators (return on equity, Tobin’s Q and Earnings before interest 
and tax over total assets) and negative influences on risk indicators (total, market, 
idiosyncratic, credit and default risks). This evidence supports the reputational 
hypothesis that because of their vast interactions with many industries in the 
economy system, busy directors possess more extensive knowledge, information 
and rich experience than their non-busy counterparts. As such, these directors 
should serve as catalysts in their interactions as BoD members. More importantly, 
Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) argue that busy bank directors are often monitored 
more intensively by regulators and they are often unwilling to take high risks as it 
may affect their reputation as expert directors, and hence, they tend to become 
more effective board members. More recently, Kutubi et al. (2018) have examined 
the relationship between board busyness and bank performance and risk in 
concentrated ownership and weak-external governance regimes in South East 
Asia. They find an inverted U-shaped association between busy BoDs and bank 
performance and a U-shaped association between such boards and banks’ 
financial risk.  
Current banking literature demonstrates that no studies to date have investigated 
the role of busy outside directors in the board’s decision-making processes, and in 
turn, their role in financial stability, market valuations and dividend policy, 
especially in countries having the dual banking system (IBs and CBs). This thesis, 
therefore, fills this important gap. Table 2.1 reports relevant literature, testing for 




































When industrial US firms have more 
limited investment opportunities, 
busyness of BoD is positively 
related to greater dividend payouts. 
In addition, BoD busyness results in 
a more efficient use of cash, and 
providing direct benefits to 
shareholders. 









They find an inverted U-shaped 
association between busy BoD and 
bank performance and a U-shaped 
association between such board and 
bank financial risk.  










Through a hostile takeover 
framework, this study find that busy 
directors are likely to reduce a firm 
hostile takeover vulnerability and 
cost of debt.  












There is positive linkage between 
bank performance and director 
busyness but negative linkage 
between risks and director busyness. 
Performance (risk) benefits of 
having busy directors strengthened 
(weakened) over the crisis. Busy 
directors are not more likely to 
become problem directors. 







There is a negative relation between 
board busyness and US performance 
Yes No No Yes No Yes No No 
Falato et al. Shareholder Independent Independent director busyness is Yes No No Yes No No No No 
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detrimental to board monitoring 
quality. 






Busy boards Busy boards to be common and to 
contribute positively to firm value. 











There is a negative link between 
board busyness and firm 
performance. 
 









Bank risk is positively related to 
multiple board appointments of 
directors. 













This study finds a positive relation 
between the propensity to pay 
dividends and (i) board 
independence and (ii) director 
tenure, and a negative relationship 
between the propensity to pay 
dividends and (i) busy directors and 
(ii) greater equity incentive 
compensation in the director pay 
structure. 












The association between the number 
of outside directorships and the 
number of board committees is non-
linear U-shaped. 












Outside directors with multiple 
appointments appeared to have a 
negative effect on performance, 
suggesting that “busyness” did not 
add value in terms of networks and 
enhancement of resource 
accessibility. 













Directors’ busyness is inversely 
related to firm value. In other words, 
firms where board members hold 
more outside board seats suffer a 
deeper diversification discount. 











Firms with busy BoD are related to 
weak corporate governance; lower 
market-to-book ratios, weaker 
profitability, and lower sensitivity of 
CEO turnover to firm performance. 












Busy directors are important sources 
of knowledge and enhance 
acquisition performance. 
Yes No No Yes No No No No 










Firm performance affects positively 
on the number of board seats held by 
a director.  







Performance  Directors related to better 
performing firms hold more board 
seats whilst those related to poor 
performing firms hold fewer board 
seats. 
Yes No No No No No No No 
Notes: This table summarises the prior studies on busyness in non-financial firms and banks and research gaps. “No” implies not being examined in the relevant study and 
“Yes” means the opposite. 
Table 2.1: Typical Prior Studies on Board Busyness in Non-Financial and Financial Firms 
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2.6 Background on Islamic Banking 
2.6.1 A Brief History of Islamic Banks 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the financial markets in Islamic countries (i.e. those 
where Islamic rulings were dominant) emerged considerably, becoming more 
mature. This enlargement appears to make the concept and principles of IBs more 
feasible and practical. Accordingly, numerous empirical studies were conducted – 
Al-Araby (1967), Siddiqi (1961, 1969) and Al-Sadr (1974). Besides, several 
scientific conferences around the Islamic world were held to discuss issues of IBs; 
typically, the Conference of Finance Ministers held in Karachi in 1970 and the 
International Economic Conference in London in 1977 (Gafoor, 1995). Resulting 
from these activities, several large IB institutions2 capturing an increasing market 
share growth (e.g., 10 per cent per annum) were established in the 1970s, leading 
to a huge, global expansion of this (Olson and Zoubi, 2008; Mallin et al., 2014). 
For example, Iran and Sudan are transforming their entire banking system to 
comply with Islamic rulings (i.e. Shari’ah standards). This rapid growth of IBs has 
resulted in the exponential increase in the demand for Islamic financial products 
and services by the Muslim population worldwide. Till date, IBs have become 
profitable business entities, playing a monopolistic role in the Islamic financial 
market. Moreover, CBs are currently attracted by the significant progress in 
growth and absolute income of IBs; therefore, they have commenced activities 
with Islamic windows to serve customers interested in Shari’ah-compliant 
products and to mitigate competitive pressures from IBs.  
Despite the increasing pains and loss of confidence in global financial systems, 
IBs, representing a subset of the banking industry, have continued to demonstrate 
their fast growth over the past four decades (Safieddine, 2009; Saeed and Izzeldin, 
2016), holding approximately $1.5 trillion in assets in the end of 2015 (Islamic 
Financial Services Board - Stability Report, 2017; Farag et al., 2018). This figure 
is anticipated to reach $3.4 trillion by 2018 (Ernst and Young, 2013) and $6.5 
trillion by 2020 (IFSB, 2010; Čihák and Hesse, 2010). Figure 2.3 shows that IB 
assets remain geographically concentrated, with about 88 per cent of them being 
held in nations which clarify the Islamic financial industry as systemically 
                                                          
2 The world’s first IB is the Dubai Islamic bank established in 1975 (Olson and Zoubi, 2008) 
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dominant, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Indonesia, Sudan, Pakistan, Egypt, 
Jordan, Brunei and Oman. IB operations contribute to social justice and fairness in 
business in economic transactions (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Such social 
objectives are as important as making profits (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007), which 
is allowed in Islam. The proposition of IBs is to build an interest-free banking 
system, based on the concept of profit sharing and cost-plus instruments (Gafoor, 
1995). Since IB and the finance system have expanded globally, the sector is 
likely to face several challenges including the issue of Shari’ah governance 
(Malkawi, 2013). 
 
Figure 2.3: Islamic Banking Assets and Market Share (2Q2016) 
Sources: Islamic Financial Service Industry Stability Report (2017) 
2.6.2 Prior Literature on Islamic versus Conventional Banks 
Existing studies on IBs versus CBs can be classified into two main strands of 
literature. The first strand of literature primarily focuses on the theoretical 
assessments in IBs compared to CBs (e.g. Sundararajan and Errico, 2002; How et 
al., 2005). Typically, How et al. (2005) suggest that IBs could have lower credit 
risk than CBs. IBs can share their losses with their depositors through the Profit 
and Loss Sharing (PLS) paradigm on the liabilities side, an unavailable option in 
CBs. Additionally, due to religious norms, the credit risk of IBs appears to be 
lower, since they must operate in a Shari’ah-compliant business unit and are a 
relationship-type banking system, which helps them better understand and connect 
to their depositors and discern their level of creditworthiness. Contrarily, 
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Sundararajan and Errico (2002) argue that the credit risk of IBs can be increased 
due to the nature of the PLS modes of finance like the Mudaraba and Musharaka. 
Using these modes, IBs have to heavily rely on their partners (i.e. the borrowers). 
Furthermore, there exists a higher chance for the issue of information asymmetry, 
which IBs seem to have little influence over in the decision-making of the funded 
business, with limited access to accounting information. Additionally, since IBs 
must be obliged to absorb any loss in part (Musharaka) or full (Mudaraba), a risky 
borrower is likely to default, thus leading to higher credit risk of IBs. Such 
theoretical evidence suggests that it is unclear whether IBs have lower or higher 
risks as compared to CBs. 
The second strand of research includes an empirically-comparative analysis of 
financial indicators (e.g. stability, performance, efficiency and earnings 
management) between the IBs and CBs; results are mixed. Beck et al. (2013) and 
Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) obtain findings showing no significant difference in the 
business orientation between these two types of banks. However, Beck et al. 
(2013) find strong evidence that IBs are likely to exhibit less cost efficiency but 
greater intermediation ratio, greater asset quality and higher capital-to-asset ratio 
(better capitalisation) than CBs. This implies a more conservative approach to 
risk-taking. Abedifar et al. (2013) and Olson and Zoubi (2008) highlight that IBs 
must face extra risks due to their complex Islamic modes of financing and the 
limitations in their funding, investment and risk management activities. Rashwan 
and Ehab (2016) indicate that IBs have lower cost efficiency, revenue efficiency 
and profit efficiency in comparison with that of CBs; furthermore, they have 
found that the efficiency of IBs is more likely to affect bank profitability as 
compared to CBs. Alternately, Hasan and Dridi (2010) argue that business models 
between IBs and CBs are likely dissimilar and IB business models can contribute 
to mitigating the effect of crisis on corporate profitability. Bourkhis and Nabi 
(2013) also believe that IBs have appeared cost-effective during the recent crisis. 
Furthermore, Khediri et al. (2015) report greater profits, more liquid, better 
capitalised risks and lower credit risks of IBs as compared to CBs.  
Interestingly, Johnes et al. (2014) find that although there exists no difference 
between IBs and CBs in terms of gross efficiency, IBs have greater net efficiency 
owed to high managerial capability and lower type efficiency caused by lack of 
product standardisation, as compared to CBs. Therefore, they conclude that IBs 
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“need to look at the conventional banking system for ideas on how to make their 
own system more efficient” (p. S105). Saeed and Izzeldin (2016) find that for CBs 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a decline in the default risk is related to 
lower efficiency levels. Thus, the trade-off between efficiency and risk is evident. 
For IBs, efficiency and risk are plausible early warning indicators of bank 
instability. Profit efficiency of IBs is positively related to their financial stability; 
there does not exist a trade-off relation between efficiency and risk. Moreover, 
Athari et al. (2016) emphasise a lower competitive operating environment and a 
higher agency problem in IBs relatively to that of CBs’ in Arab markets.  
Few other studies contend that the IB model is perceived to face lower credit risks 
(Elnahass et al., 2014) and to enjoy better performance (Mollah and Zaman, 2015) 
as compared to CBs, owed to contractual arrangements largely driven by and 
conducted in conformity with religious orientations and ethical principles, 
compliant with Shari’ah. Kabir et al. (2015) compare the level of credit risks 
between IBs and CBs using different methods to find mixed results. Employing a 
market-based credit risk measure and the Merton distance to default (DD) model, 
they find IBs to have a significantly lower credit risk than conventional 
counterparts. Contrarily, IBs exhibit a greater level of credit risk than CBs when 
using the z-score and non-performing loan (NPL) ratio. These findings imply that 
the selection of measures has a significant effect on the actual credit risk 
assessment of IBs as compared to CBs.  
Furthermore, IBs are expected to positively influence the investors’ perceptions 
and create confidence, credibility and trust in stakeholders (El-Gamal, 2006; 
Rammal, 2006; Safieddine, 2009; Elnahass et al., 2014). Moreover, the higher 
complexities of IBs, with younger age and smaller size as compared to most CBs, 
could possibly result in higher cost structures; greater administration, legal and 
operating costs and consequent higher operational risk and lower efficiency of IBs 
as compared to CBs (Beck et al., 2013; Johnes et al., 2014; Rashwan and Ehab, 
2016). Cost efficiency can be associated with bank performance (Fries and Taci, 
2005). Abdelsalam et al. (2016) find that IBs are less likely to manage their 
earnings and that they tend to adopt the higher conservative accounting policies 
due to religious norms and issues of moral accountability. Additionally, Elnahass 
et al. (2018) have found a significant evidence of capital and earnings 
management in CBs, more prominent for large and loss-generating CBs. 
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However, irrespective of the firm size, earnings profile or the structure of the 
loan-loss model, IBs are unlikely to employ loss loan provisions in either capital 
or earnings management. This difference is justified through the detailed 
explanation of the constrained IBs business model, their strict CG and their ethical 
orientation.  
Evidence on the governance and financial indicators across two bank types are 
more limited. While Mollah et al. (2017) highlight an insufficient research 
addressing whether the risk-taking behaviour of IBs depends on their governance, 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) call for additional research on the effectiveness and the 
role of boards related to their governance and accountability. Furthermore, the 
latter study finds a positive association between the SSB’s role and the IBs’ 
performance. They emphasise that this board has a potential to make a more 
substantive contribution to the future of this system. Additionally, they suggest 
the importance of enhancing Shari’ah supervision by improving multiple 
directorships of Shari’ah advisors for future studies. Moreover, Mollah et al. 
(2017) have found that the IBs’ governance structure plays a crucial role in 
helping them undertake greater risks and achieve better performance. They have 
constructed an IB’s governance index, based on twelve boardroom characteristics 
dimensions, including board size, independent directors, female directors, board 
meeting, board attendance, board committees, chairman independence, CEO 
duality, internal CEO, CEO qualification, CEO banking experience and CEO 
tenure. However, the study does not focus on the role of the SSB; further research 
is thus suggested.  
Moreover, Alman (2012) find a positive relationship between SSB characteristics 
(i.e. size, the number of top twenty-ranked Shari’ah scholars on board and the 
board composition annual changes) and loan-portfolio risk-taking behaviour of 
IBs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Southeast Asia from 2000–
2010. Mallin et al. (2014) indicate that SSB size has a significantly positive 
influence on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure index, which 
covered ten dimensions. This is in line with the finding of Rahman and Bukair 
(2013), which shows a positive association between the level of CSR disclosure 
and the combination of SSB attributes (SSB size, cross memberships, secular 
education qualifications, reputable SSB members and the expertise of SSB). More 
recently, Safiullah and Shamsuddin (2018a) explore that the SSB attributes do not 
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have significant effects on liquidity and credit risks. However, an increase in SSB 
size and SSB members’ academic qualifications leads to a decline in the IBs’ 
operational and insolvency risks. Meanwhile, an increase in the number of reputed 
Shari’ah scholars on the SSB would lead to an increase in the operational and 
insolvency risks. Similarly, Safiullah and Shamsuddin (2018b) have found a 
positive and significant relationship between a strong SSB (SSB size, SSB 
members’ academic qualifications and the number of reputed Shari’ah scholar on 
the SSB) and the IBs’ profit efficiency. Consistently, Farag et al. (2018) have 
found that a larger SSB relates to better performance, which reinforces the 
fundamental role of this board to certify permissible financial instruments. 
Evidence supporting the operation hypothesis towards both SSB and the BoD 
have been found, since IBs are characterised by a higher level of complex 
operations. It is argued that a larger SSB experiences lower agency costs and that 
unrestricted PLS contracts are a primary cause of the unique agency relationships 
in IBs.  
This thesis differs these lines of investigations, at least in a three-fold manner. 
First, the existing studies do not look at the BoD busyness across IBs and CBs. 
Second, they do not investigate for the influences of SSB busyness within IBs. 
The first empirical study of this thesis differs from Mollah and Zaman (2015) and 
Safiullah and Shamsuddin (2018a, b) in that they only focus on other SSB 
attributes (size, academic qualifications and the number of reputed Shari’ah 
scholars) and their effects on performance/efficiency, while this chapter examines 
the effects of SSB busyness attributes besides that of the BoD busyness. Mollah et 
al. (2017) evaluate the impact of regular board governance (an overall governance 
index, but not the BoD busyness) instead of SSB governance on the IBs’ risk-
taking. Third, all three chapters in this thesis differs from existing banking 
literature, in that they do not test for the influences of board busyness (i.e. BoD 
and SSB) on the banks’ financial stability, market valuations and dividend 
payouts policy across IBs and CBs.  
Table 2.2 illustrates the summary of existing literature on the banking sector, 
especially IBs versus CBs, and CG studies comparing these two bank types.
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 Panel A: Prior literature  Panel B: Research gaps in IB-CB literature 
Authors Research focus Independent 
variables  




















SSB size/qualifications and the number of 
reputed Shari’ah scholars has negative and 
positive, respectively, impact on IB 
operational and insolvency risks.  









Strong SSB positively affects bank profit 
efficiency. 
No No No No No Yes 
Farag et al. 
(2018) 
Profitability (90 
IBs, 13 countries) 
SSB/BoD size Larger SSB is related to the better financial 
performance.  
No No Yes No No No 
Elnahass et al. 
(2018) 
The ratio of loan 
loss provisions to 
total assets - LLP 
(34 IBs, 29 CBs) 
The ratio of the 
total bank Tier 1 
capital to risk 
weighted assets. 
Capital and earnings management in CBs is 
more prominent for large and loss-
generating CBs. However, irrespective of 
the firm size earnings profile, or the 
structure of loan loss model, IBs are not 
likely to employ LLP in in either capital or 
earnings management.  
No No No No No Yes 




IBs, 104 CBs, 14 
countries, 2005-
2013)  
Governance index  Governance structure in IBs allows them to 
take higher risks and achieve better 
performance than CBs because of product 
complexities and transaction mechanisms. 










IBs are less likely to manage earnings and 
they adopt more conservative accounting 
policies due to religious norms and moral 
accountabilities. 




Default risk and 




There exists a causality/reverse causality 
between efficiency and default risk 




IBs, 86 CBs, 2005-
2011) 
 
SSB size; BoD size 
and independence; 
and CEO power 
 
SSB positively impact on IB performance 
when they perform a supervisory role, but 
the impact is negligible when they have only 
advisory role. The effect of board structure 
No No Yes Yes No Yes 
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and CEO power on the performance of IBs 
is overall negative. 
Elnahass et al. 
(2014) 
Bank value (34 




LLP has positive value relevance to 
investors in both types of IBs and CBs.  
No No No Yes No Yes 
Johnes et al. 
(2014) 
Efficiency (45 IBs, 





frontier analysis  
In the second stage, the low type efficiency 
of IBs might be attributed to lack of product 
standardization while high net efficiency 
suggests high managerial capability in IBs. 
No No No No No Yes 
Abedifar et al. 
(2013) 
Risk-taking (553 





Small IBs that are leveraged or based in 
countries with predominantly Muslim 
populations have lower credit risk than CBs. 
In terms of insolvency risk, small IBs also 
appear more stable.  
No No Yes No No Yes 





quality and stability 






There is no significant difference in business 
orientation between these two types of 
banks. IBs seem to be less cost effective but 
greater intermediation ratio and higher 
capital ratio than CBs. 




(34 IBs, 34 CBs, 16 
countries, 2007-
2008) 
Types of banks; 
interaction of bank 
type with the crisis 
period 
There is no significant difference in business 
orientation between these two types of 
banks. IBs appear cost-effective during the 
recent crisis. 




Market value (35 
BHCs, 1986-1999) 




BoD independence is not related to 
performance. However, board size is 
positively related to performance. Increases 
in BoD size due to additions of directors 
with subsidiary directorships may add value 
as BHC complexity increases. 
No No No Yes No Yes 





Governance factors  The performance of banks with smaller 
boards are found better in the later crises’ 
duration. The duality of CEO plays a 
negative role in financial performance. 











Factors related to IBs’ business model 
helped limit the adverse impact on 
profitability in 2008, while weaknesses in 
risk management practices in some IBs led 
to a larger decline in profitability in 2009 
compared to CBs. 
No No Yes No No Yes 










CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, BoD 
independence, and capital are positively 
related to earnings and that earnings, board 
independence, and capital are negatively 
related to earnings management. 




Types of banks (12 





Profitability, efficiency ratios, asset-quality 
indicators, and cash/liability ratios are good 
discriminators between IBs and CBs. 







Board size Bank board composition and size are related 
to directors’ ability to monitor and advise 
management. 
No No Yes No No No 





Board strength A strong board is associated with higher 
firm performance, lower levels of executive 
pay and lower growth rates of executive 
pay. 
No No Yes No No No 
Adams and 
Mehran, 2003 






BoD size (18.2 versus 12.1 members) and 
the percentage of outside directors (68.7 
percent versus 60.6 percent) are 
significantly larger on average. 
No No No No No No 
Notes: This table summarises the previous studies on IBs and CBs’ financial indicators and research gaps. “No” implies not being examined in the relevant research and “Yes” means the 
opposite. 
Table 2.2: Typical Prior Studies in Islamic and Conventional Banks 
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2.7 Comparison between Islamic and Conventional Banks 
2.7.1 Business Models  
The key feature differentiating Islamic from conventional financial intermediaries 
is the additional monitoring through a Shari’ah governance board, and the 
dominance of Islamic principles over the business model (i.e. the prohibition of 
interests and of speculative and uncertain trading activities) (Alandejani et al., 
2017; Farag et al., 2018; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018a). Specifically, the first 
distinguishing feature of IBs is the prohibition of the receipt and payment of 
interest (riba), regardless of its form or source, in all transactions. The rationale 
for this is that under the holy book of Islam, the credit system relating interests 
tend to result in an unfair income distribution in society. The interest may not be a 
“payment for taking risks, nor is it the rewards for a constructive activity” (Olson 
and Zoubi, 2008, p. 47). Despite this, IBs cannot charge fixed riba in advance, 
since they still obtain profits from their fund investments.  
The second differentiating function of IBs relative to CBs is the risk sharing. 
Under the CBs’ finance paradigm, a bank is likely to shift the credit risk to the 
depositor under an interest-based contractual arrangement (Safiullah and 
Shamsuddin, 2018a). Contrarily, as per Shari’ah guidelines, IBs are expected to 
perform their intermediation functions through PLS contractual agreements 
between the banks, depositors and investment account holders (IAHs) (Hearn et 
al., 2012; Saeed and Izzeldin, 2016; Farag et al., 2018; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 
2018a). Given that the concept of interest in CBs is replaced by the PLS in IBs, 
risks are primarily shared among parties under the PLS arrangement, which is 
likely to increase the additional monitoring costs of IBs to diminish the moral 
hazard of borrowers with a chance to share ex-post losses with lenders (Safiullah 
and Shamsuddin, 2018a). Specifically, the two most popular forms of PLS are 
profit sharing (Mudaraba) and profit-loss sharing (Musharaka)3. IBs are expected 
                                                          
3 Profit-sharing (or, Mudaraba) is a mode of equity-based financing of a limited partnership between the 
labour/experience provider and the fund providers where the PLS is established contractually (Elnahass et al., 
2014). Mudaraba is the riskiest type of Islamic contract which come into two categories which are 
unrestricted and restricted investment accounts (Farag et al., 2018). Unlike restricted accounts, depositors of 
unrestricted accounts allow managers of IBs to invest in any Shari’ah compliant investment. Unrestricted 
accounts are often recorded as off liabilities accounts (Farag, 2016) and in such accounts, managers of IBs 
have more chances to act in their self-interest (Safieddine, 2009). Nevertheless, restricted contracts can allow 
IAHs to have their say in how IBs employ the funds provided by them and are often recorded in the IBs’ 
balance sheet (Karim, 2001). In both forms, IAHs do not have any rights to interfere in capital management 
and they might be reliable to financial losses (Safieddine, 2009; Farag, 2016). Profit- and loss-sharing (or, 
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to receive funds from public investments on the basis of Mudaraba and find 
borrowers (i.e. entrepreneurs) to employ these funds for investments approved by 
the IBs (Musharaka). However, existing arguments indicate that in practice, IBs 
are more likely to engage in mark-up finance, replacing interest payments with 
fees and contingent payment structures (Olson and Zoubi, 2008; Mollah et al., 
2017). This tends to be driven by IBs protecting their market share, being in 
competition with conventional banking systems.  
Thirdly, according to the PLS paradigm, entrepreneurs share their profits and 
losses with IBs according to a pre-determined ratio. IBs pool all profits and losses 
from different investments and share the profits with the depositors of funds 
taking into account the relative contributions of capital and equity and the 
investment deposits (Khan and Mirakhor, 1989; Olson and Zoubi, 2008). A 
proportion of the remaining earned profits is used to pay dividends to equity 
holders, for which dividends on common equity is discretionarily allocated and 
distributed by the bank managers (Khan and Mirakhor, 1989).  
The IB dividend model is, in fact, characterised as being more constrained than 
CBs. Several structural differences do exist between two bank types, concerning 
their dividend distribution principles, motives, mechanics and techniques, and 
flexibility of payouts. These differences are expected to affect their governance 
monitoring effectiveness and the overall levels of payouts. In general terms, profit 
distribution decisions of IBs must be compliant with Shari’ah principles (Schaik, 
2001; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018; Duqi et al., 2019) and, hence, their 
payouts involve a nexus of contracts between the bank, depositors and 
shareholders (Alhabshi, 2002). Accordingly, IB managers’ motives to pay 
dividends are likely to be driven by the preferences of both investors and 
depositors, while those of their conventional counterparts tend to be driven solely 
by investors’ preference (Al-Hunnayan and Hashem, 2011). Furthermore, IB 
distributions of profits and their payouts policy are more complex and less flexible 
than that of CBs. IBs are usually challenged by liquidity management issues and 
accessing short-term borrowings from external sources (Čihák and Hesse, 2010; 
Beck et al., 2013). Subsequently, they tend to hold substantial excess free cash 
flow or other liquid assets at a low rate of return to meet expected/unexpected 
                                                          
Musharaka) is equity-based financing mode where each party contribute to a partnerships’ fund upon on a 
pre-determined PLS ratio (Elnahass et al., 2014). 
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capital challenges. These constraints can have implications on the dividend payout 
strategies in IBs, leading to low payouts ratios and less stable dividends 
distributions in the long-term (Athari et al., 2016). In contrast, CBs have quicker 
access to market sources as well as alternative financial instruments such as 
derivatives and options, and this is likely to promote greater flexibility when it 
comes to their dividend payouts strategies (Bitar et al., 2017). Moreover, the use 
of hedging by these banks, not permitted under the IB model, is associated with a 
low cost of debt (Deng et al., 2017). When compared to their Islamic counterparts, 
both the reduced cost of debt and the availability of fund sources promote more 
stable and frequent payouts of dividends at high rates. 
The fourth difference is the capital financing. While CBs employ both debt and 
equity financing for investments, IBs mostly depend on the financing of equity 
capital and the deposit accounts of customers, including current, savings and 
investment accounts (Karim and Ali, 1989). The customers’ current accounts are 
fundamentally understood as safekeeping accounts. Depositors could instantly 
access such accounts and hold the right to withdraw their capital at any time of 
their choosing. Savings accounts have fixed-term profit sharing arrangements, 
which cannot be cashed before maturity without a substantial penalty. The profit-
sharing ratio of the savings account is dependent on future profits; however, the 
expected returns of the savings-type deposits are similar to those of the CBs’ 
savings accounts of the same maturity. Secured interest-bearing loans of CBs are 
replaced by investments in IBs, which is anticipated to be riskier than the former. 
However, the arrangements of Mudaraba and Musharaka are expected to diminish 
the risks of IBs. Entrepreneurs who wish to use funds under such contracts must 
document their investment feasibility to be undertaken with these funds (Olson 
and Zoubi, 2008).  
Lastly, the fifth difference relates to the cost of capital. In CBs, this cost of capital 
represents the cost of debt and cost of equity. However, in IBs, this cost of capital 
is replaced by the PLS of depositors and shareholders. Return of equity in IBs 
might be more variable than in CBs, yet the default risk of not paying a return to 
the depositors under the IB model is reduced. However, the failure of IBs in 
compensating depositors may result in a significant withdrawal of deposits and 
cause an insolvency risk (Olson and Zoubi, 2008).  
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2.7.2 Agency Conflicts  
Agency relationships in IBs are expected to be more complex than those faced by 
CBs, including two main conflicts: the traditional conflicts and the IBs’ unique 
conflicts (Safieddine, 2009; Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Farag et al., 2018). Besides 
traditional conflicts (e.g. agent-principal, majority-minority shareholding and 
shareholders-creditors) that both types of banks might face (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a; Bowie and Freeman, 1992; La Porta et al., 1999), the IBs must encounter 
additional conflicts between the managers and depositors leading to higher agency 
costs and a greater legal liability for executives within these organisations 
(Abdelsalam et al., 2016). This is in line with the more effective competition and 
deposit insurance in CBs and the unique institutional settings of the IBs 
(Nienhaus, 2007; Archer and Karim, 2009). Thus, in IBs, the traditional agency 
conflicts are compounded by a separation between the depositors’ and IAHs’ 
control right (Safieddine, 2009; Farag et al., 2018). Since the returns of IBs are 
based on Mudaraba or Musharaka contracts, the IAHs’ returns tend to depend on 
how well an IB performs financially that is mostly dictated by the actions and 
manners of the IB managers (Farag, 2016). Subsequently, this complicated 
multiple agency problem can arise where IAHs (principals) entrust their 
investment to the IB managers (agents) appointed by another principal 
(shareholders) (Farag et al., 2018).  
Furthermore, IBs might face the increased agency costs on both sides of the 
balance sheet, in respect to depositors investing their wealth in firm loans/assets 
and where IBs perform tasks as their agent, as well as on the asset side where the 
borrowers play an agent’s role employing the depositors’ money to investment 
(Beck et al., 2013). A signed debt contract between the bank and 
depositors/borrowers with deterministic (Diamond, 1984) and stochastic 
monitoring (Townsend, 1979) is considered as the optimal choice for IBs with the 
numerous savers and entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, IBs must face the obvious 
maturity mismatch between deposits, demandable on sight and long-run loans, 
which has high probability leading to the firm runs and default (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983). Moreover, potential agency problems might arise in IBs between 
the protection of IAHs’ rights and shareholders which are unresolved (Claessens, 
2006). Profits from investments are expected to be shared between the IAHs and 
the IBs upon on mutual agreement between them regarding proportion. 
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Nonetheless, the IAHs must completely bear all losses from investments, except 
for cases of misconducting or negligence on part of the bank (Belal et al., 2015). 
They do not entitle a directly monitoring of their investment, having 
representatives seating in the BoD resulting in higher agency costs and the IAHs’ 
risk of exploitation by the firm executives (Farag et al., 2018).  
2.7.3 System of Governance  
Governance mechanism of IBs is different than that of CBs owed to the former’s 
nature and characteristics (Farag et al., 2018). In the “single-layer” CB 
governance model (which typically includes the BoD and executive/board 
subcommittees), the BoD defines appropriate CG and practices for its own work; 
more importantly, the BoD “put in place the means for such practices to be 
allowed and periodically reviewed for ongoing effectiveness” (Shibani and 
Fuentes, 2017, p. 1006). CBs thus have no religious preoccupations or an extra 
layer of governance, such as the SSB (Kettell, 2011; Mollah et al., 2017). 
Conversely, the “multi-layer” Shari’ah governance4 of IBs, argued to be a unique 
dual-board structure, comprises of the BoD, the SSB and executive/board 
subcommittees (Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Farag et al., 2018). Besides the main 
responsibilities of execution, protecting the shareholders’ interest and maximising 
their value, the BoD in IBs has additional functions regarding the introduction of 
comprehensive policies, processes and infrastructure to ensure all activities, 
transactions or policies are compliant with Shari’ah law, as well as to establish an 
appropriate Shari’ah governance framework (see Figure 2.4). This suggests that 
the BoD in CBs are more independent in their decision-making process (Alnasser 
and Muhammed, 2012; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al., 2017).  
The extended layer of IB governance (i.e. SSB) is referred to as “supra authority”, 
which protects the Islamic community and focuses on the compliance of the ethos 
of the Shari’ah on a firm’s activities and transactions, monitors and controls the 
BoD and executive management team to ensure they only execute the ex-ante 
approved products and services compliant to Shari’ah law and helps the staff in 
IBs adhere to the morality principles instead of personal interests and greed 
                                                          
4 Shari’ah governance is defined as “a set of organizational arrangements concerning how the Shari’ah board 
is directed, managed, governed, and controlled” (Malkawi, 2013, p.544). It can be viewed as one of the 
unique kinds of governance in financial architecture because it is concerned with the religious aspects of the 
overall operations of IB system in comparison with traditional concept of CG in CBs (Malkawi, 2013). It 
concerns the management, establishment, as well as affairs of the SSB.  
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(Beekun and Badawi, 2005; Shibani and Fuentes, 2017). Specifically, the SSB has 
a profound influence on the day-to-day practices of finance in providing both 
consultative and supervisory services to IBs (Mollah et al., 2017), thus providing 
an additional check, which should add value to this bank type (Mollah and 
Zaman, 2015). The SSB members endeavour to respond to any issues for a 
transaction or product confirmation with the Shari’ah and offer advice and 
recommendations to the BoD (Kettell, 2011). They should seek to enhance 
knowledge regarding IB functionings among the employees. Additionally, they 
review bank activities and processes, supervise its development of Islamic 
financial products and services, endorse and validate relevant documentations, as 
well as the internal policies, manuals and marketing advertisements (Alnasser and 
Muhammed, 2012), and determine the Shari’ah compliance of these products and 
investments (Choudhury and Alam, 2013; Elnahass et al., 2014). SSB members 
act as investigators in conducting their own independent audit to certify that 
nothing relating to the bank’s operations involves any element prohibited by 
Shari’ah (Safieddine, 2009). The SSB then issues an independent report to certify 
that all financial transactions comply with the Shari’ah principles. This is often an 
integral part of the IBs’ annual report (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006).  
In sum, the main roles of the SSB might normally involve three different areas 
including the issuance of fatwa5 (a non-binding advisory opinion to an individual 
questioner in connection with ongoing human affairs) via collective ijtihad6 (use 
of independent reasoning by qualified scholars to obtain legal rules), internal 
supervision/control mechanism (raqabah), and internal audit (mutabaah) 
(Malkawi, 2013). Within the framework of Shari’ah governance, the SSB is 
expected to restrain the BoD and managers from aggressive lending, risk-taking 
and unethical behaviours (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Contrarily, the BoD is 
expected to enforce the SSB’s authority to perform their supervisory or advisory 
roles, or both (Mollah et al., 2017). Shari’ah requirements, therefore, lead to 
unique agency relations of IBs, especially since financial turmoil can be produced 
by the Shari’ah non-compliance risk (Safieffine, 2009). Thus, the CG system of 
IBs is more complicated than that of CBs to control for their unique agency 
                                                          
5 It covers issues of mosques, intergenerational transmission of property, and marriage of children, and 
banking operations and interest (Malkawi, 2013). 
6 Being one of the sources of Islamic law, it refers to the reasoning and strict legal analogy (Malkawi, 2013). 
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conflicts (Lewis, 2008). As Mollah and Zaman (2015) claim, “the governance 
features of IBs with Shari’ah supervision as an additional mechanism suggest that 
IBs ought not to face the type of financial difficulties that have been experienced 
by their conventional counterparts. The role of SSBs in IBs means that their 
products are likely to be Shari’ah compliant and less risky. This may in turn 
influence the performance of IBs” (p. 421). 
Due to the rapid growth of the IBs’ sector, along with the recent banking crisis, 
the SSB requires an enhanced governance framework. Specifically, in performing 
its activities and fulfilling imperative tasks, this board requires a clear 
framework/structure to ensure its independence and effectiveness. The presence of 
the SSB tends to play a catalytic role in promoting public acceptance for this 
banking industry. Thus, effective SSB is vital to strengthen the creditability of the 
IBs. Alternately, the failure to provide an effective SSB is likely to inevitably 
result in serious disruptions in the financial market, leading to dire consequences 
for the IBs and the finance sector (Mollah and Zaman, 2015).  
In practice, notable governance challenges encounter the SSB’s roles (Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006) and would relatively affect their moral responsibility. Members 
of this board are appointed by shareholders at the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM) or by the BoD (Farag et al., 2018). The International Association of 
Islamic Bank points out that Shari’ah members must not be recruited by the bank 
and, especially, should not subject to the BoD’s authority. This is to ensure the 
freedom and independence of the SSB. However, in most cases, the SSB 
appointments made by the AGM are based on recommendation by the BoD (Farag 
et al., 2018). In such cases, the SSB members are allowed to attend the BoD 
meetings to discuss religious aspects of the BoD’s decisions. Furthermore, in 
numerous IBs, the BoD can directly appoint Shari’ah scholars, as in Pakistan, 
Jordan or Malaysia. This is evidenced by the survey of the International Institute 
of Islamic Thought (see Malkawi, 2013), with 80 per cent of SSB appointments 
made by the BoD. Since the assumption of SSB independence could only be 
guaranteed if the appointments of their members is by the AGM, practitioners 
claim that this assumption is not truly convincing, since the practice of 
appointments varies among the IBs. Even if the appointments are made by the 
AGM, the BoD may still influence the shareholders during the recruitment 
process. Additionally, SSB members will receive the remunerations from the IBs 
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where they are working for, and the BoD has strong power to amend and approve 
such remuneration (Gooden, 2001). Therefore, some loyalty to managers, banks 
or the BoD who proposed them in the first place is highly anticipated (Hart, 
1995). This may create some potential conflicts of interests. Moreover, the SSBs 
employment status as both advisors and supervisors breed a financial stake in the 
bank. This further generates agency costs because of the opportunities for 
compromised independence and a potential conflict.  
SSB members should be knowledgeable in Islamic commercial jurisprudence and 
equipped with relevant expertise in modern business disciplines, economic 
developments and accounting and financial practices, being armed with adequate 
training and continued education (Farag et al., 2018). In practice, very few 
religious scholars are well educated, trained and highly experienced in the 
disciplines of both, Shari’ah law and finance (Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012). 
As Nasser Mohammed bin Hussein Alshaali, appointed as a CEO of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC) Authority in November 2006, said, 
“Graduating Shari’ah scholars, who reach their status through religious rather than 
financial education, remains a challenge” (Khalaf, 2007). Bearing in mind the fact 
that audit committees are expected to monitor the managers’ financial reporting, 
their role tends to be quite limited among IBs, showing increasing agency 
problems (Safieddine, 2009). Furthermore, a survey by Mollah and Zaman (2015) 
documents that IBs only review the SSB qualifications and expertise without 
assessing the board’s performance throughout their employment. The responses 
from this survey have been mixed regarding SSB training and the understanding 
of internal controls and risk management processes.  
More importantly, a limited number of the most prominent and respected scholars 
control the IB industry and sit on multiple SSBs on a part-time basis (Khalaf, 
2007; Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Since there are 
not many scholars qualified in both Shari’ah law and finance, there is an unusual 
high concentration of positions in the hands of a few. Many of these scholars are 
highly regarded along with their opinions (i.e. having reputational capital) and 
advise several financial organisations at the same time and are hence overworked 
with multiple duties (Al-Rai, 2009). Additionally, there exists several problems 
related to the selection criteria and qualifications of SSB members among IBs. 
Their education is not properly regulated and coordinated; particularly, no specific 
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curricula for them is established (McMillen, 2006). These has led to a reduction in 
the SSB roles’ effectiveness, especially in providing solid and concrete fatwa 
rulings that require professional skills and expertise in Shari’ah and its 
compliance (Malkawi, 2013). Furthermore, as the industry grows rapidly, the 
efficacy of too-busy SSB members who are overcommitted has been called into 
question. Under this tremendous growth, one must worry that the number of 
potential conflicting fatwa among SSB members of the different SSBs may 
increase. Thus, it is imperative to examine the knowledge, experience, skills and 
time/efforts of those Shari’ah scholars. Additionally, the SSB normally meets 
weekly, monthly, semi-annually, quarterly or annually, as per the needs of the 
IBs. This signifies the large number of meetings7 of several Shari’ah scholars, 
which makes them spend much time and effort to fully be involved in the banks 
they are working for.  
Additional concerns could also be raised whether scholars are a part of the 
competing banks or if they must regulate the bank of which they are a part. Such 
scarcity and “busyness” of SSB members could undermine the confidence of 
stakeholders in the credibility of their assessments. Hence, while theory suggests 
that the additional layer of monitoring through SSBs can restrain excessive risk-
taking (e.g. Elnahass et al., 2014; Abdelsalam et al. 2016), the SSBs’ monitoring 
effectiveness depends on the time and efforts allocated by individual members. 
This represents an ultimate indicator of the activity level exercised by its members 
in advising and supervising the BoD. Academics and practitioners contend it is 
essential to have a legal provision that clearly states the restrictions on serving 
multiple SSBs of IBs at the same time, to avoid any perception of conflicts of 
interest (Malkawi, 2013). Such policy can ensure the full-time availability of the 
SSB to provide supervisory services to the IBs more effectively. A well-
functioning SSB, working with the regular BoD, routines executive and other 
operational committees, is necessary to ensure that the IBs’ noble goals are 
achieved in practice. As a result of rapid expansion of IBs, along with the 
increasing number of SSB, the issues of competency of SSB members and issues 
                                                          
7 In these meetings, the SSB will discuss issues related to the concept and structure of new and existing 
products, documentation, operations, and the investment portfolio. SSB members will receive all necessary 
documents for the respective IB prior meetings at least seven days in order to allow sufficient time to read 
and examine the documents. Those meetings normally will be chaired by the SSB chairman and all decisions 
made by the meetings must be taken by unanimity (Malkawi, 2013).  
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of conflicts of interest require a legal framework regulating the SSB qualifications 
and the ability to sit on multiple boards. 
Theoritical framework of the whole thesis is summaried and presented in the 
















Figure 2.4: Similarities and Differences in Corporate Governance Framework between IBs and CBs  
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58 
 
2.8 Summary of Methodology 
Literature in board busyness practices show that endogenous problems can be 
occurred. Thus, seeking suitable methods to solve such issues is indispensable to 
obtain reliable results. In this thesis, as banks are likely to differ in the 
opportunities and challenges that they may encounter over years, this can lead to a 
situation that disclosure of board directorships, other board characteristics and 
bank outcome measures (i.e. financial stability, market valuations and dividend 
policy) are jointly and dynamically determined by unobserved bank-specific 
variables (e.g. quality and style of management, business strategy, market 
perception and bank complexity) (Guest, 2009; Henry, 2008), which pooled 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS)8 regressions may not be able to detect (Kraatz and 
Zajac, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, given the panel nature of the data, this 
study estimates the models employing panel data estimation9 to mitigate 
endogeneity problems10 arising from potential unobserved bank-specific 
heterogeneity. This is consistent with Henry (2008) and Guest (2009).  
Furthermore, there is a likelihood that busy outside directors choose banks with 
high financial stability (study 1) or high dividend pay-out policy (study 3). 
Similarly, although better governance practices of a firm can enhance its profit, 
investors may value high profit rather than the governance attributes (study 2). 
These raise the potential causal relationships between busy boards and bank 
outcomes. To avoid misinterpreting the investors’ behaviour and the relation 
between busy boards and bank stability, market value and dividend policy, this 
study includes a comprehensive set of control variables to reduce the omitted-
variable bias and the possibility that the findings are impacted by endogeneity. 
                                                          
8 The assumption of OLS is that among others, the independent variables are truly exogenous that there is 
only one-way causation between the regressand and regressor. If this is not correct, the assumption will be 
violated and a single equation OLS technique might give biased and inconsistent estimates. To rectify this 
issue, simultaneous equation models (e.g. the robust multivariate regression procedure or 3SLS) should be 
alternatively employed (Alih and Ong, 2014). 
9 Panel data (or, longitudinal data) is the data set that combine both time series and cross sections. However, 
panel data set are likely to be more oriented toward cross-section analysis. Panel data can help enhance the 
efficiency of econometric estimates by producing more accurate inference of model parameters (Hsiao, 
2007); higher capacity for capturing the complexity of human behaviour than a single cross-section or time 
series data (e.g. controlling the influence of omitted variables); and simplifying computation and statistical 
inference (e.g. analysis of nonstationary time series can be simplified if panel data are available and 
observations among cross-sectional units are independent (see Baltagi and kao, 2000; Levin et al, 2002). 
However, the main challenge of panel data analysis is to control the influence of unobserved heterogeneity to 
obtain valid inference on the structural parameters (Hsiao, 2007). 
10 The sources of endogeneity include (1) omitted variables, (2) measurement error; and (3) simultaneity. This 
may result in bias in estimation of econometric model. 
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However, it is obvious that this study cannot completely exempt from the 
endogeneity from the busy boards. It, therefore, performs the usual and common 
solution using Three-Stage Least-Square (3SLS) estimations and instrumental 
variables (e.g. Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Chakravarty and Rutherford, 2017) to 
minimise endogeneity between busy directors and bank outcome measures. In 
brief, 3SLS is similar to 2SLS, however, it utilises the fact that these equations 
could be correlated through their error terms. Thereby, 3SLS could be considered 
as an extended 2SLS with the same first and second stages as 2SLS but add a third 
stage to compete generalised least square (GLS) estimator and construct the new 
covariance matrix. Given that the GLS can handle a wide range of unequally 
spaced panel data patterns. More details are discussed in each empirical chapter 
(Chapter 3, 4 and 5). 
Another instrumental variable approach (i.e. GMM) will be also used to examine 
the robustness of the findings. 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter provides the fundamental knowledge of main theories, which have 
been used to build the theoretical framework and research hypotheses of this 
thesis. Specifically, it discusses CG in banking, agency theory and RDT, along 
with the reputation versus busyness hypothesis built on board busyness and 
previous literature. Furthermore, existing evidence on two bank types do not focus 
on an important governance attribute such as the busyness of outside directors and 
Shari’ah advisors. This thesis therefore attempts to fill this void by implementing 
three empirical chapters (3, 4 and 5), which examine the influences of board 
busyness on financial stability, market valuations and the dividend payout policy, 
while identifying differences in the two banking models, IB and CB. The chapter 
finally reports key differences between both these types of banks. Generally, IBs 
are argued to be more complex than CBs in terms of business operations, products 
and services, CG structure and agency conflicts. 
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CHAPTER 3 STUDY 1 - BOARD BUSYNESS AND 
FINANCIAL STABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM 
ALTERNATIVE BANKING MODELS 
3.1 Abstract 
This study examines the impact of board busyness on the financial stability of 
banks in a dual banking system (IBs and CBs). It considers banks from fourteen 
countries for the period 2010-2015. Results for the whole sample provide strong 
evidence that banks with busy boards exhibit high financial stability (high 
profitability, low cost to income and low insolvency and credit risk). These 
findings are in line with the reputation hypothesis, which asserts that busy outside 
directors bring their expertise and connections, leading to better decision-making, 
the efficient utilisation of resources and effective monitoring. However, 
conditional on the bank type, those reputational benefits from busy boards are 
more pronounced for CBs. IBs’ financial stability and other indicators are 
adversely affected by the presence of busy board (both BoD and SSB) members, 
with IBs portraying low profitability, high cost to income and high risk-taking. 
This might be attributed to the IBs’ complex governance structure and the 
uniqueness of their financial products, which require additional effective 
monitoring. 
3.2 Introduction 
The complexity of banking transactions and financial instruments lead to substantial 
information asymmetries. At the same time, evidence relating to effective 
governance structures and to bank performance and stability is still developing. The 
uniqueness of governance mechanisms in banks implies the dominant role of the 
BoD in both performance and risk-taking behaviour (Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; 
Faleye and Krishnan, 2017). Theorists of resource dependence argue that 
monitoring by the BoD is vital for efficient resource allocation and for risk 
mitigation (Johnson et al., 1996). It has long been argued that holding multiple 
board seats across manys firms (i.e. busy boards) have reputational and networking 
benefits, which contribute to the corporate performance and risk control (Jiraporn et 
al., 2009; Brennan et al., 2016). Furthermore, the impact of busy outside directors 
on financial stability is driven by agency conflicts and the nature of the respective 
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banks’ business models (Chen, 2008). Ultimately, the value added by multiple 
directorships depends on the relative importance of effective monitoring and the 
structure of governance employed. Arguably, directors are unable to monitor their 
firms effectively when they are “over-boarded”, having limited time to scrutinise a 
bank’s operations and strategic decisions. This can adversely affect the banks’ 
performance, increasing risk-taking behaviour (Ferris et al., 2003) and give rise to 
agency problems (Core et al., 1999). The disadvantages of board members’ multiple 
affiliations are thus particularly severe for large and complex financial firms (Kress, 
2018; Trinh et al., 2019). 
Till date, no empirical work has investigated the effect of board busyness on 
financial stability across different types of banks (i.e. IBs and CBs). Only two 
studies exist that focus on the conventional bank setting. They include Elyasiani 
and Zhang (2015) and Kutubi et al. (2018). To the best of knowledge, empirical 
evidence on board busyness within the Islamic banking context is meagre. Thus, 
the present study fills this important gap.  
As argued earlier (Chapter 2), in principle, IBs are expected to conduct operations 
on the basis of PLS arrangements, in which contracts between banks and their 
depositors are commonly equity-based. In practice, IBs are more likely to engage 
in mark-up finance, replacing interest payments with fees and contingent payment 
structures (Olson and Zoubi 2008; Mollah et al. 2017). Thereby, IBs protect their 
market share in competition with CBs. Moreover, the governance structures of IBs 
are more complicated. Unlike the single governance layer in CBs (i.e., BoD), IBs 
are subject to a double-governance mechanism with a SSB in addition to their 
regular BoD. Thus, decisions of the BoD must accommodate additional 
supervision for Shari’ah compliance (Mollah and Zaman 2015). In both bank 
types, the BoD is responsible for the execution of strategic decisions, protection of 
the shareholders’ interest and maximisation of the bank value. Furthermore, for 
IBs, additional agency costs are likely to be associated with the IB model. This is 
due to a peculiar institutional environment in IBs, including the special bank-
depositors’ relationship. 
The nature, qualities and commitments of the regular BoD in the IB and CB 
models are different (Mollah et al., 2017). The popularity, reputation and scarcity 
of experts in Shari’ah legitimacy on a global scale have contributed substantially 
to the busyness of the BoDs’ and SSBs’ members in IBs. The greater complexities 
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in the Islamic business model imply that reputational effects might not be attained 
by appointing such busy boards. This is owed to the limited time and attention 
given by those two boards (i.e. BoD and SSB) to scrutinise the bank’s operations 
against risky (non-Shari’ah compliant) activities. Alternately, in CBs, it is possible 
that the cost of ineffective monitoring may be offset by the expected reputational 
benefits of recruiting busy boards (Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Brennan et al., 
2016). 
Due to structural differences between the CB and IB business models, this study 
comparatively assesses the impact(s) of board busyness on the financial stability 
of the two bank types. It employs performance measures (i.e. profitability ratio 
and cost to income ratio) and different risk indicators (i.e. insolvency and credit 
risks). The analysis is based on a sample of 880 bank-year observations (154 
banks) in fourteen countries for the period between 2010 and 2015. For the full 
sample (i.e. CBs and IBs together), banks with busy BoDs have a significantly 
higher financial performance and lower bank risks. Conditional on the bank type, 
board busyness exhibits a differential impact on bank performance and financial 
stability. Compared to CBs, IBs with busy boards show low performance and high 
risk-taking. These findings are intensified as the degree of board busyness 
increases. Furthermore, IBs with a less busy SSB are relatively more stable and 
have a better financial performance, when compared to IBs with a busy SSB. 
This is the first study about the impact of busy boards on a bank’s financial 
stability across different bank types. The findings contribute to the broad existing 
literature that considers the relative impacts of distinct degrees of board busyness 
on financial stability. This study thus adds to the sizeable literature on bank 
financial stability (e.g. Chan and Milne, 2014; Ashraf and Rizwan, 2016; Bitar et 
al., 2017; Arnaboldi et al., 2018). Moreover, by presenting evidence on the 
differential effects of board busyness across the two bank types, the research 
extends the Islamic and conventional banking literature (e.g. Abedifar et al., 2013; 
Beck et al., 2013; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al., 2017). Furthermore, it 
identifies the damaging effect that busy SSBs have on Islamic banking 
performance and stability, thereby extending earlier work (e.g. Field et al., 2013; 
Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Chakravarty and Rutherford, 2017).  
Findings provide valuable insights and policy implications to regulators and 
investors engaging with the two banking sectors. Regulators and market 
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participants in CBs can benefit from this empirical evidence portraying that 
busyness and networking of the BoDs are likely to enhance both bank 
performance and stability, which offers important implications for wealth creation. 
The reputational benefits associated with recruiting busy boards might not be 
invoked in the presence of unique institutional characteristics, as presented by the 
experiment of IBs. IBs, by virtue of their unique and illiquid products, require 
effective monitoring. Thus, the substantial role of effective Shari’ah monitoring 
appears to be essential for promoting financial stability in Islamic banking.  
3.3 Background and Hypotheses Development 
3.3.1 Busy Board and Bank Financial Stability 
Corporate risk-taking, risk monitoring and financial performance are central 
concerns of the BoD. The board’s role in risk management and financial stability 
has led to increased public and regulatory scrutiny of multiple directorships. 
Excessive risk-taking during the financial crisis of 2007 has brought an added 
emphasis to the relationship between board busyness and the effective monitoring 
in banks (Trinh et al., 2019).  
According to Adams and Mehran (2003), directors’ duties and obligations arise in 
two contexts: a discrete decision brought to the board for approval that increases 
directors’ legal responsibility on bank safety and soundness and their obligation to 
provide firm oversight on whose boards they serve. Alongside their advisory 
roles, outside directors are also expected to provide vigilant oversight over 
executives and perform their duties independently from insiders. Unlike inside 
directors, they should serve as monitors on inside board members and managers 
on behalf of capital providers and, therefore, are expected to mitigate agency 
conflicts (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
Prior studies suggest that investors do not usually favour the appointment of busy 
outside directors. Typically, Falato et al. (2014) find that the busyness of outside 
directors is detrimental to effectiveness of board monitoring, hence reducing both 
firm performance and shareholder value. Nguyen et al. (2015) show that the 
appointment of an executive who holds several non-executive directorships is 
associated with negative returns for US banks. Another strand of the literature is 
in favour, arguing that overcommitted board members bring reputational and 
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preferential benefits to their firms. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that a board 
member who holds multiple directorships is an indicative measure for their high 
reputation and superior managerial performance in the external labour market. In 
line with this, Harris and Shimizu (2004) show that a busy director is a valuable 
source of extensive knowledge to a firm, offering a vital supportive role to inside 
directors. Furthermore, Lei and Deng (2014) have found a positive relationship 
between multiple directorships and firm value; however, they indicate that this 
positive association is significantly lower at higher degrees of busyness. Recently, 
Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) have shown a positive (negative) relationship 
between busy directors and performance (risk), respectively, for the US bank 
holding companies. Moreover, Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017) find that busy 
directors can reduce the firm’s cost of debt.  
Considering the above evidence, the research expects that a busy BoD is more 
likely to enhance the financial performance and moderate risk-taking. This leads 
to the following hypotheses, stated in alternative forms: 
H1: Banks with a busy board of directors are financially stable. 
3.3.2 Board of Directors’ Busyness in Islamic and Conventional Banks 
With regards to IB activities and operations, the “no money for money” principle 
suggests that risk-sharing practices might be embedded on both the asset and 
liability sides of the balance sheet. This has implications on both performance and 
risk-taking. IBs operate within a young and small industry, associated with high 
operating costs and low-cost efficiency (Johnes et al., 2014; Ashraf and Rizwan, 
2016) relative to their conventional counterparts. Prior studies document that IBs 
and CBs significantly differ in their performance, financial stability and aspects of 
operations. For instance, Čihák and Hesse (2010) have found that larger IBs are 
less financially stable than CBs due to challenges in controlling credit risks. Beck 
et al. (2013) have found that better capitalisation and greater asset quality make 
IBs less vulnerable to financial distress than CBs. However, IBs are generally less 
cost efficient. Abedifar et al. (2013) highlight that IBs encounter an additional 
type of risks (generic plus unique risks)11 due to the complexity of the Islamic 
                                                          
11 Unique risks include a rate of return risk, Shari’ah non-compliance risk, displaced commercial risk and 




finance modes and imposed restrictions on their funding, investment and risk 
management activities. Overall, IBs have a distinctive survival rate as compared to 
CBs (Pappas et al., 2017). 
The different business models employed by IBs and CBs imply the monitoring 
requirements in IBs to be more complex. This can be justified by the additional 
Shari’ah governance incorporated into the business model and the peculiar 
definitions of rights and obligations for the Islamic products and contracts. 
Therefore, the characteristics and attributes of BoDs are expected to have 
differential effects on the two bank types’ financial stability.  
According to the busyness hypothesis (Jiraporn et al., 2009; Cashman et al., 
2012), outside directors who serve on multiple boards might lack time to perform 
monitoring tasks effectively. Furthermore, this study does not expect that all 
outside directors have good networks links, which could bring reputational 
benefits. Hence, a reduction in their workload is more associated with improved 
operating profits and higher market-to-book ratios (Hauser, 2018). Therefore, an 
inverse relationship is expected between the board’s busyness and the bank’s 
financial stability (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Unlike CBs, the scarcity of the 
BoD specialised in Shari’ah legitimacy alongside the nature of the business model, 
including complex monitoring mechanisms, suggest that a busy BoD in IBs would 
be less able to provide effective oversight, as justified by the busyness hypothesis. 
Although busy directors in CBs can use their networking or experience to advise 
some efficient financing sources to the firm they are serving, this is less likely to 
be obtained in IBs. This follows from the fact that IBs cannot raise funding 
through direct access to market operations (e.g. derivatives and options), which 
are impermissible under their Shari’ah governance. Moreover, IBs have a 
distinctive regulatory framework; they operate within less developed financial 
markets. As a result, CBs are expected to benefit more from the reputation and 
experience of busy directors than IBs. 
Accordingly, the study conjectures that the costs of ineffective monitoring by a 
busy BoD in IBs are expected to offset reputation benefits. This leads to the 
second hypothesis in an alternative form as the following: 
H2: Islamic banks with a busy board of directors are less financially stable 
than conventional banks. 
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3.3.3 Shari’ah Supervisory Board busyness in Islamic Banks 
Religious, social norms12 (i.e., values extracted from religious texts), should 
reduce agency costs in religiously-oriented banks (Abdelsalam et al., 2016). 
Under the assumed dominance of moral accountability and additional monitoring 
in the IB model, this study extends the assessments to identify the effect of busy 
SSB on the financial stability of IBs.  
The SSB’s role goes beyond that of a principal investigator for scrutinising bank 
activities. Depositors and investors view SSB members as the “custodians” of 
social, ethical and systemic welfare. Since a SSB has a unique role in ensuring the 
mandatory compliance of IBs to the rulings of Shari’ah, this mitigates reputational 
risk13. This risk is an indispensable element of operational risk and likely to affect 
the banks’ financial stability.  
In practice, Shari’ah scholars in IBs are very few and tend to be overcommitted 
across several banks, countries or even continents (Unal and Ley, 2011; Alnasser 
and Muhammed, 2012; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). This can have an adverse 
impact on their Shari’ah monitoring function, potentially contributing to 
additional agency costs. Furthermore, the limited availability of Shari’ah scholars 
worldwide suggests that they might be expensive to appoint, leading to higher 
charges of salaries and remunerations. This can thus lead to cost inefficiency (see 
Brick et al., 2006). Accordingly, the study conjectures that a busy SSB weakens 
the double-governance mechanism employed for IBs, leading to the following 
hypothesis stated in the alternative form: 





                                                          
12 Social norms refer to the external rules and values shared by a group of individuals. Individuals are 
expected to comply with the understandings and reactions of their peer groups to avoid sanctions associated 
with non-adherence to the common values and beliefs. Accepted attitudes are likely to be widely supported 
and socially approved by the community. 




3.4 Data and Methodology 
3.4.1 Data collection 
The consolidated financial data (in U.S. dollars) used in this study is obtained 
from Thomson One Reuters, DataStream and Bloomberg databases. Governance-
level data and data for outside directors, Shari’ah advisors and board information, 
are hand-collected from annual reports. Country macroeconomic and governance 
indicators are retrieved from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database.  
In defining busy outside directors and Shari’ah advisors, the thesis follows 
previous studies which identify a director as busy if he/she serves on at least two 
outside boards (Core et al., 1999; Perry and Peyer, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 
2006; Jiraporn et al., 2008; 2009; Cashman et al., 2012; Field et al., 2013; 
Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). This cut-off is recommended by the Council for 
Institutional Investors. The thesis follows Field et al. (2013), Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) and Chakravarty and Rutherford (2017), to count the number of 
directorships held by outside directors in all for-profit private and public firms. It, 
hence, excludes directorships related to activities in sport clubs, non-for-profit, 
trusts and charitable institutions.14 
The initial sample comprises a total of 3038 banks (196 IBs and 2842 CBs) in 36 
countries. The final sample includes unbalanced panel data of 154 banks (880 
bank year-observations) for both listed and unlisted banks, operating in 14 
countries15 over the period 2010-201516. The selection of the sample period avoids 
the potential effect of the financial crisis period of 2007-2009. The study filtered 
the sample following similar criteria applied in other banking studies (see Beck et 
al., 2013; Mollah et al., 2017). These include: (a) countries having both types of 
                                                          
14 For example, the annual report in 2014, Albarala Banking Group in Bahrain, indicates the profile of Mr 
Abdulla Saleh Kamel (Vice Chairman of the BoD) that is “…Mr. Abdulla Kamel has also been and remains 
very active in public and charitable activities through his membership of many international and local 
organizations and associations, such as Jeddah Chamber of Commerce (twice as Board Member), Young 
Presidents’ Organization, Friends of Saudi Arabia, The Centennial Fund and the Board of Trustees of the 
Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum.” (Page 11). 
15 These countries include Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Turkey, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan 




banks17 and at least four banks18; (b) banks which have full annual reports 
available from official websites, published as of the financial year of 31 
December19; (c) only commercial full-ledged banks were kept, and Islamic 
windows20 are excluded; and (d) banks having full data availability of at least 
three consecutive years21. The data collection procedure for empirical study 1 
including five screening criteria steps, are reported in Table 3.1. 








196 2842 3038 
Less:     
Countries having both types of 
banks and have at least four banks 
(at least one bank for each type of 
bank) 
39 1781 1820 
Annual reports are retrieved from 
official website and reported as of 
the financial Year 31 December 
 
60 937 997 
Classified as Commercial bank 
+Full-ledged IBs and CBs 
 
21 32 53 
At least three consecutive years’ 
full data availability 
6 8 14 
Final Sample  70 84 154 
Notes: The table presents the data collection procedure. This process comprises of five screening criteria 
steps consistent with Beck et al. (2013), Abedifar et al. (2013), Mollah and Zaman (2015), and Mollah et al. 
(2017). The initial sample includes 196 IBs and 2842 CBs in 36 countries. The final sample comprises 70 
IBs and 84 CBs in 14 countries. 
Table 3.1: Sample Determination Criteria for Empirical Study 1 
Table 3.2 below presents the sample distribution by country and bank, with 70 IBs 
(403 observations) and 84 CBs (477 observations). The percentage of bank 
representations between IBs and CBs is 46% and 54% respectively. This shows 
that the sample is representative of both bank types. The highest concentration of 
IBs is represented by Bahrain and UAE while Indonesia and Turkey report the 
highest concentration of CBs. Both IBs and CBs in the estimated sample follow 
                                                          
17 Including only countries having both bank types will allow this research to capture for any unobserved 
time-variant effect by introducing country-year dummies (see Beck et al., 2013). 
18 This is in line with the research design of Beck et al. (2013) and Mollah et al. (2017). 
19 All banks kept in the final sample reported their annual reports (including financial statements) following 
an accounting period running from January 1 to December 31. This is consistent with the study of Saghi-
Zedek and Tarazi (2015). 
20 CBs with Islamic windows refer to banks with an independent department providing Islamic products with 
an SSB (Elnahass et al., 2014). Consistent with Elnahass et al. (2014, 2018) and Johnes et al. (2014), the 
reason for excluding these banks is that supervisory issues and accountancy requirements are expected to be 
substantially different to those of full-ledged Islamic banks (Islamic Financial Service Board, 2005). 
21 The minimum requirement of 3 consecutive years helps to reliably distinguish between random noise and 
bank outcomes in the errors (Mollah et al., 2017). 
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the same accounting standard. Given that IBs worldwide adopt International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) from 2006 in line with their national 
standard (Alexakis and Tsikouras, 2009; Elnahass et al., 2014). Thus, the study 

















Bahrain 88 45 133 21.84 9.43 15.11 
Bangladesh 12 58 70 2.98 12.16 7.95 
Egypt 6 15 21 1.49 3.14 2.39 
Indonesia 42 111 153 10.42 23.27 17.39 
Jordan 18 41 59 4.47 8.60 6.70 
Kuwait 18 18 36 4.47 3.77 4.09 
Malaysia 57 24 81 14.14 5.03 9.20 
Pakistan 42 11 53 10.42 2.31 6.02 
Qatar 24 24 48 5.96 5.03 5.45 
Saudi Arabia 24 6 30 5.96 1.26 3.41 
Lebanon 6 36 42 1.49 7.55 4.77 
Turkey 6 78 84 1.49 16.35 9.55 
UAE 48 6 54 11.91 1.26 6.14 
Oman 12 4 16 2.98 0.84 1.82 
TOTAL 403 477 880 100 100 100 
Number of banks 70 84 154 - - - 
Notes: This table presents the sample distribution of the study 1. The study sample comprises of 154 banks (880 
observations) with 70 IBs (403 observations) and 84 CBs (477 observations) in 14 countries for the period from 2010 
to 2015. The country-wise distribution (observations and percentage) of each types of bank and full sample is shown 
in collums 2-7. 
Table 3.2: Sample Distributions of Empirical Study 1 
The data collection process of board busyness for the two bank types, revealed 
that there is a shortage of Shari’ah scholars (i.e. a small group of reputable 
Shari’ah advisors) who tend to dominate the Shari’ah assurance process across 
various Islamic institutions worldwide. Therefore, multiple directorships of SSBs 
have been observed operating in several individual Islamic financial institutions 
within the MENA region, GCC region countries and globally. Unal and Ley 
(2011) document that around 121 Shari'ah scholars are acting for IBs located in 17 
different countries22. Appendix 1A presents the multiple directorships of top 20 
Shari’ah scholars and the respective ranking based on their total number of 
directorships across different countries during the year of 2011. According to 
Unal and Ley (2011), the top 20 Shari’ah scholars, statistically, hold about 341 
SSB positions constituting about 17 positions per scholar. On the contrary, a total 
of 121 scholars, who are less popular, hold about 498 board positions; with 4 
                                                          
22 These include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE/Abu Dhabi/Dubai, Malaysia, Sudan, Iran, 
Pakistan, Yemen, Jordan, Tunisia, Lebanon, Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia, and the UK 
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board positions per scholar. These numbers indicate that around 16.5% of the 
active scholars tends to dominate 69% of the total Shari’ah advisors sitting on 
boards of IBs operating globally. Appendices 1B, 1C and 1D provide illustrative 
examples on cross-country directorships of the top three most popular Shari’ah 
scholars, who, together, make up about 26% of the total share of SSB 
memberships worldwide. 
3.4.2 Measures for Bank Financial Stability 
This study captures bank financial stability by estimating several accounting-
based indicators, which include operating performance (i.e. profitability and cost 
to income) and risks (i.e. insolvency risk and credit risk).  
First, to examine whether corporate controls via busy boards influence the bank 
financial performance, this study uses the accounting-based performance measure 
return on average equity (ROAE), defined as the ratio of net come to average total 
equity, to gauge the outcome of busy directors’ profitable (unprofitable) decisions. 
The higher the reported ROAE, the better the profitability performance of a bank. 
The ROAE serves as a robust and inclusive measure of the bank financial 
performance by gauging the extent of operational efficiency and capturing the 
nuances of banks’ diversifying earnings through non-interest income activities 
and management of their costs (see Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Elyasiani and 
Zhang, 2015). Moreover, to measure bank operating efficiency, the study uses the 
cost-to-income ratio (COST/INCOME) which measures overhead costs relative to 
gross revenues. A higher COST/INCOME ratio suggests lower levels of a bank 
operating efficiency (Beck et al., 2013).  
Second, the study investigates the effect of busy outside directors on two 
alternative risk measures: insolvency risk and credit risk. It measures insolvency 
risk by the bank Z-score as a measure of individual bank probability to default. 
This popular measure of bank soundness has widely adopted by most of the prior 
empirical studies (e.g. Pathan, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beck et al., 2013; 
Abedifar et al., 2013; Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi, 2015; Mollah et al., 2017). Its 
popularity stems from the fact that Z-score is inversely associated with the 
probability of an individual bank’s defaultness, i.e. the probability that the total 
assets’ value of the bank becomes smaller than the debt value. It is calculated as a 
sum of return on assets and capital assets ratio, scaled by the standard deviation of 
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return on assets (i.e. return volatility). Capital assets ratio equals the subtraction of 
total assets and total liabilities divided by total assets (Bhagat et al., 2015). A high 
value of Z-score implies a good solvency position or lower probability of default 
risk, and hence, a high stability for the bank (Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi, 2015). The 
study uses the natural logarithm of Z-score (LogZscore) to control for outliers if 
any and highly skewness of distribution (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Abedifar et 
al., 2013). 
The second risk measure is credit risk which is used to proxy for the quality of 
bank loans portfolio (Abedifar et al., 2013). Despite the behest of non-interest 
payments, IBs still must face credit risk that alludes the incapacity of a debtor in 
complying with their commitments in the contract. For instance, a debtor can fail 
to repay their loan to the bank, resulting in bank’s loss or risk (Aggarwal and 
Yousef, 2000; Elnahass et al., 2014). Literature contends that credit risks of IBs 
should be lower than that of CBs due to contractual arrangement (Adbedifar et al., 
2013; Beck et al., 2013). Credit risk is measured by the ratio of loan loss reserves 
to gross loans (LLR/GR) in line with Abedifar et al. (2013). The higher the ratio, 
the higher the credit risk for a bank. This proxy is widely employed by many prior 
studies including Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), Angbazo (1997), Lepetit et al. 
(2008), Abedifar et al. (2013). 
3.4.3 Measures for Boards Busyness 
As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, this thesis including the current study identifies an 
outside director as busy if he/she serves in two or more outside boards (e.g. 
Jiraporn et al., 2009; Cashman et al., 2012; Field et al., 2013; Elyasiani and 
Zhang, 2015). This cut-off is recommended by the Council for Institutional 
Investors. The research follows prior literature to measure the number of 
directorships held by directors in all for-profit private and public firms. It 
excludes directorships related to activities in sport clubs, non-for-profit, trusts and 
charitable institutions. 
Based on the above classifications, this study uses alternatively two most popular 
traditional proxies of board busyness. First, busy BoD and busy SSB are measured 
as the ratio of outside directorships per outside director (ABOD) and outside 
directorships per Shari’ah advisors (ASSB), respectively, representing the 
average number of other outside board seats held by each outside 
72 
 
director/Shari’ah advisor. It is computed as the total number of outside boards 
occupied by outside directors/Shari’ah advisors divided by the number of outside 
directors/Shari’ah advisors on the board (Ferris et al., 2003).  
Second, the study also measures busy BoD and busy SSB by the percentage of 
busy outside directors (%BBOD) and the percentage of busy Shari’ah advisors 
(%BSSB), respectively. The former (%BBOD) is the percentage of busy outside 
directors on the board, calculated as the number of outside directors serving on 
two or more outside firms divided by the number of outside directors on the 
board. The latter (%BSSB) is the percentage of busy Shari’ah advisors on the 
board, estimated as the number of Shari’ah advisors serving on at least two 
outside organisations divided by the number of Shari’ah advisors on the board. 
The greater percentage of busy outside directors/Shari’ah advisors reflects higher 
busyness of BoD/SSB which influences the monitoring quality of overall board 
(Ferris et al., 2003; Chakravarty and Rutherford, 2017). Utilising the percentage 
of directors’ busyness provides a plausible assessment of the board advising and 
monitoring intensity under the assumption of high independence, substantial 
contributions in the firm strategic decisions and their sound reputation maintained 
in the industry (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
3.4.4 Methodology and Empirical Models 
The empirical analyses employ a panel data analysis, and the estimations account 
for the unobservable and constant heterogeneity (i.e. management style, business 
strategy or other bank-specific features). However, some independent variables in 
the model (e.g. board structure, composition and functioning) are determined 
simultaneously with dependent variables, leading to possible simultaneity bias. To 
mitigate potential endogeneity between busy boards and financial 
performance/risk (Field et al., 2013; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015), this study 
utilises the Three-Stage Least-Square (3SLS) estimations and instrumental 
variables (Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Mollah and Zaman, 2015).  
3SLS is regarded as a system technique, which could be applied to all equations 
of the empirical models at the same time; it provides simultaneously estimates of 
all the parameters (Zellner and Theil, 1962). This method is thus viewed as a 
logical extension of two stage least square (2SLS) or specifically, the combination 
of 2SLS and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). This method is employed 
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in a system of simultaneous endogenous equations. It involves the application of 
the method of least square in three successive stages (Koutsoyiannis, 2001). The 
first two stages are the same as 2SLS except the reduced form of all the equations 
of the system and hence, they refer to the first 2SLS part. In each equation, there 
are endogenous variables on both the left- and right-hand sides. However, the 
error terms in each equation can be correlated to each other, and thus the method 
should take this consideration into account to obtain an efficient estimation. This 
part is the SUR. This third stage theoretically involves the application of the 
generalised least square (GLS), which is seen as the application of least squares to 
a set of transformed equations, where the transformation required might be 
obtained from the reduced form residuals of the previous stage. Therefore, 3SLS 
is a convenient technique when the analyst aims at estimating simultaneous 
equation models in the presence of dynamic random effects (Zellner and Theil, 
1962; Arellano, 1990). By taking into considerations the cross-equation 
correlation, this method can yield more efficient estimates for simultaneous 
equation system than both 2SLS and single equation OLS while accounting for 
the possible endogeneity issues. Additionally, 3SLS is argued to have desirable 
features of leaving the auto covariance matrix of errors unrestricted; thus, the 
approach does not require the normal distribution of errors (Zellner and Theil, 
1962). This technique might be robust to the residual autocorrelation of an 
arbitrage form. Consequently, it renders unbiased coefficients (Tamirisa and Igan, 
2008).23  
The study selects two main Instrumental Variables (IVs) for BoD and SSB 
busyness.24 The first IV follows from Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), which is the 
number of public firms headquartered in the same country of the bank (source: 
World Bank). It is argued that outside directors and Shari’ah advisors of the bank 
headquartered in countries with more public firms tend to find more jobs in other 
institutions and might also work in different cities across the country. It, thereby, 
                                                          
23 This thesis including the current study uses the command reg3 with option 3sls, in STATA 15 to estimate a 
system of structural equations, where some equations contain endogenous variables (i.e. busy boards) among 
the independent variables. Estimation will be via 3SLS and the endogenous regressors will be dependent 
variables from other equations in the system. The reg3 can estimate systems of structural equations by 2SLS 
and SUR. 
24 Across all models, this study performs Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test (Hausman, 1978; 
Wooldridge, 2008). The unreported statistics of the test indicate the presence of endogeneity bias. The null 
hypothesis is that the specified endogenous independent variable can actually be treated as endogenous. The 
test assumes two selected IVs are valid instruments for board busyness. The F-statistics report that p-values of 
all models are less than 1%, 5% or 10% rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore, busy board variables are 
endogenous and need to be solved.  
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predicts that the number of busy outside directors and busy Shari’ah advisors are 
positively associated with the number of public firms headquartered in the same 
country. Another IV for busy directors is the country-level income generating 
category (recorded in World Bank), which is a dummy variable taking a value of 
one if the “home” bank is in a country classified as a middle and high-income 
generating25 nation, and zero otherwise. The research argues that a developed 
economic system with high-income levels is likely to feature skilled and high-
paying job opportunities for directors (World Bank, 2016). Highly skilled and 
reputable directors with professional knowledge in those nations, therefore, can 
easily find job opportunities through accessing open labour markets. The study, 
therefore, expects that directors of banks headquartered in high-income countries 
with more skill-job opportunities are more likely to find director positions in other 
companies. This might positively influence the number of directorships they hold. 
Both IVs are correlated with possible endogenous variables26 (i.e. BoD and SSB 
busyness) and should predict bank performance/risk only indirectly, through their 
effects on endogenous variables (see Black et al., 2006). Indeed, in this study 
setting and sampled banks, those IVs can indirectly affect bank performance/risk 
because the country-level indicators are less likely to influence individual banks’ 
performance and risk-taking endogenously.   
To test the hypothesis for the possible impact of busy BoD on bank financial 
performance, this study treats both busy outside directors and bank performance 
as endogenous variables and build simultaneous equations models, eq.3.1 and 
eq.3.2. The first equation, eq.3.1, estimates the impact of busy BoD on bank 
financial performance measured by ROAE and COST/INCOME while the second 
equation, eq.3.2, estimates the influence of the financial performance indicators 
on the busy BoD. Accordingly, simultaneous equations models estimated for 
banks are specified as: 
                                                          
25 Middle and high-income nations are classified by World Bank (2015). If As of 1 July 2015, countries are 
defined as low-income if their Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is equal to or less than $1,045 or less 
in 2014; as middle-income countries if GNI per capita is between $1,045 -$12,736; and as high-income 
countries if GNI per capita is $12,736 or more. 
26 In line with Elyasiani and Jia (2008), an appropriate IV must be correlated with that endogenous variable 
(predicting reasonably the endogenous variable) and uncorrelated with the error term. This study performed 
two diagnostic tests to identify the validity of both the IVs and the specification of the system equations, the 
Sargan test and the Breusch and Pagan LM test. Both IVs theoretically and statistically satisfy the necessary 





𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (eq.3.1) 
𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (eq.3.2) 
Where, Performanceit represents {ROAE, COST/INCOME}; BBODit represents 
{ABOD; %BBOD}; ϕP is a vector of control variables in the performance model. 
Year effects and Country effects capture the year-fixed and country-fixed effects; 
εit is the error term. 
Similarly, bank risk and busy BoD are expected to be mutually interdependent 
since busy outside directors may have responsibilities to control bank risk. Thus, 
the study also constructs a simultaneous equations model for banks which treats 
risks and busy BoD as endogenous variables (eq.3.3 and eq.3.4). These models 
are specified as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (eq.3.3) 
𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦  𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (eq.3.4) 
Where, Riskit represents {LogZscore, LLR/GR}. Year effects and Country effects 
capture the year-fixed and country-fixed effects; εit is the error term. 
3.5 Control Variables Measurements 
3.5.1 Corporate Governance Variables 
This study first includes three main aspects of the corporate governance including 
BoD size, BoD independence and CEO duality, as they are expected to affect the 
bank’s quality of decision-making and in turn, bank financial stability. 
Specifically, the study includes board size (LogBSIZE) to capture the boards’ role 
and effectiveness, calculated by the natural logarithm of the total number of board 
members at the end of each fiscal year (e.g. Pathan, 2009; Minton et al., 2014; 
Brown et al., 2015; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Farag et al., 2018); board 
independence (%INDEP) measured by the percentage of independent non-
executive directors on BoD (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Mollah and Zaman, 
2015; Farag et al., 2018); and CEO duality (DUAL) taking a value of one if CEO 
is also a Chairman and zero otherwise (e.g. Brown et al., 2015; Mollah et al., 





3.5.2 Bank-level Characteristics Variables 
Moving to the bank-level characteristics variables reflecting a bank’s control 
environment, complexity and experience, the study controls for bank size 
(LogTA) which is computed by the natural logarithm of total assets measured in 
thousands of USD of a bank at the end of the fiscal year in the sample period (e.g. 
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi, 2015; Brown et al, 2015). 
The research also includes bank age (LogAge) which reflects the bank experience 
and informational advantages, measured by the natural logarithm of the difference 
between the sample year and the bank establishment year (Pathan and Skully, 
2010; Bhagat et al., 2015). It additionally adds Big4 auditor (BIG4) by employing 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bank is audited by Big 4 audit 
firm, and zero otherwise (Mollah and Zaman, 2015); and subsidiaries dummy 
variable (SUB) to control for bank ownership structure (Abedifar et al., 2013). 
The study also captures the bank listing status of banks through a dummy variable 
(LISTED) taking the value of 1 is the bank is listed and 0 if it is unlisted (e.g. 
Liang et al., 2013; Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi, 2015; Elnahass et al., 2018).  
Following Mollah et al. (2017), Liu et al. (2018) and Arnaboldi et al. (2018), the 
study uses Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to capture the possible effect of 
banking sector concentration (activity diversification) on performance and risks. 
In other words, including the HHI in the models can account for cross-country 
differences in financial stability which is caused by variations in market 
concentration (Čihák and Hesse, 2010). This indicator is calculated by the square 
of the sum of the ratio of total assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks 
each year. It has a value between zero and one. Higher value shows the more 
concentration (Mollah et al., 2017). Total assets used to calculate HHI are 
collected from Bloomberg, Datastream and bank websites. Although these sources 
are not entirely comprehensive in its coverage, omitted banks tend to be small and 
thus HHI computed on this basis might adequately reflect the competitive 
environment. This is consistent with the study of Johnes et al. (2014). Because the 
existing research provides opposite views27 on the association between the HHI 
                                                          
27 While Allen and Gale (2004) argued that more concentrated markets tend to be higher financially stable, 
Mishkin (1999) put forth arguments why more concentrated systems are likely to be characterised by higher 
risks by banks. 
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and firm financial stability, this study does not have a strong prior on the effect of 
the index. 
Moreover, the study includes the inverse of log (Z-score) (1/z) in all the 
profitability models to capture the positive effect of risk-taking on bank 
profitability (see Mollah and Zaman, 2015). It also includes the bank financial 
leverage (LEV) which is measured by total liability divided by Equity (Elyasiani 
and Zhang, 2015). The study also includes the COST/INCOME in all the bank 
risk models to capture for bank operational efficiency (see Čihák and Hesse, 
2010; Abedifar et al., 2013; Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi, 2015). Lower cost efficiency 
(higher value of COST/INCOME) is expected to increase bank risks because 
inefficiency illustrates a poorly-run bank which has more risk-taking incentives 
(Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Barry et al., 2011).  
3.5.3 Country-level Characteristics Variables 
Country-specific control variables are used to control for differences in economic 
development and institutions across countries and adjust for the influences of the 
macroeconomic cycle (Čihák and Hesse, 2010). The study uses the real annual 
growth rate in the gross domestic product (GDP_GROWTH) and the annual rate 
of inflation (INFL) to capture the macroeconomic environment and economic 
development of the region/country (e.g. John et al., 2008; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; 
Borisova et al., 2012; Mollah et al., 2017; Alqahtani et al., 2017). These variables 
take the same value for all IBs and CBs in a given country. In addition, following 
Abedifar et al. (2013), the study captures for the degree of religiosity through an 
index representing legal system of the country (LEGAL). The index takes value of 
zero for countries not using Shari’ah law to define their legal system, the value of 
one for countries combining both Shari’ah law and others to define their legal 
system, and the value of two for countries, such as Saudi Arabia, only using 
Shari’ah law to define their legal system.  
Finally, the research controls for differences in the national quality of governance 
across countries by including Control of Corruption (Barth et al., 2013; Kutubi et 
al., 2018). According to the World Bank (2016), this variable reflects the 
perceptions of petty/grand forms of corruption and capture of the state by elites 
and private interests. It ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) 
governance performance. Higher values infer better control of corruption (Barth et 
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al., 2013). Prior studies documented the impact of country’s level of corruption on 
bank performance/risk (see Barth et al., 2013).  
3.5.4 Type of Bank Variables 
For the full sample (pooled IBs and CBs), the study controls for the type of banks 
by constructing a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if it is classified as IBs 
and otherwise zero (see Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Beck et al, 2013; Mollah et al., 
2017; Alqahtani et al., 2017; Elnahass et al., 2018). This variable reflects the 
difference in the financial stability between these two banking models. In other 
words, including the variable allows the study to distinguish the influence of bank 
type on the firm stability (i.e. ROAE; COST/INCOME; LogZscore and LLR/GR) 
(see Čihák and Hesse, 2010). For instance, if IBs are relatively financially weaker 
than CBs, the Islamic banking dummy variable would have negative signs in the 
regressions explaining ROAE and LogZscore and positive signs in the regressions 
explaining COST/INCOME and LLR/GR.  
Table 3.3 presents the summary of controls used in the study 1. Appendix 2 
provides definitions of all variables used in all tested models. 
Variable Control variables Abbreviations 
 
Corporate Governance 
Board of Directors Size LogBSIZE 
Board Independence %INDEP 







Bank Size LogTA 
Bank Age LogAge 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI 
Bank Leverage LEV 
Big 4 Audited BIG4 
Subsidiaries dummy SUB 
Listed Bank LISTED 
Bank Risk-Taking 1/z 
Cost Efficiency COST/INCOME 
Country-level 
characteristics 
GDP Growth rate GDP_GROWTH 
Inflation rate INFL 
Legal system LEGAL 
Control of corruption CORRUPTION 
Type of bank Islamic banking dummy ISLAMIC 





3.6 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics of all tested variables for the full sample 
(pooled IBs and CBs) and the subsamples of IBs and CBs.
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FULL SAMPLE IBs Sample 
Mean 
CBs Sample  
Mean 
Two-Sample t-Test 
(two-tailed) Variables/ Ratios N Mean Median Std. Min Max 
ROAE 880 0.098 0.112 0.123 -1.272 0.476 0.067 0.124 7.034*** 
COST/INCOME 880 0.637 0.502 0.803 0.005 12.442 0.787 0.51 -4.958*** 
LogZscore 878 3.509 3.549 1.009 -1.714 5.941 3.301 3.683 5.619*** 
LLR/GR 830 0.041 0.032 0.056 0 1 0.047 0.036 -2.617*** 
ABOD 778 2.587 2 2.270 0 11 2.999 2.251 -4.582*** 
%BBOD 778 51.870 50 0.388 0 100 57.87 47 -3.946*** 
ASSB 394 12.308 11 9.744 0 40.667 12.308 - - 
%BSSB 394 81.130 100 0.286 0 100 81.130 - - 
BSIZE 868 8.578 9 3.055 2 23 8.445 8.688 2.292** 
%INDEP 823 40.2 40 0.241 0 100 42.3 38.2 -2.421** 
LogTA 880 15.22 15.127 1.684 8.938 18.586 14.837 15.544 6.332*** 
LogAge 880 3.106 3.367 0.961 0 5.220 2.655 3.488 13.756*** 
LEV 880 0.795 0.773 0.403 0.005 2.757 0.764 0.821 2.057** 
HHI 880 0.127 0.105 0.088 0.051 0.672 0.139 0.116  
GDP_GROWTH 880 0.047 0.047 0.026 -0.024 0.196    
INFL 880 0.044 0.043 0.031 -0.037 0.139    
LEGAL 880 0.545 1 0.563 0 2    
CORRUPTION 880 -0.079 0.055 0.666 -1.071 1.569    
Dummy Variable Count Percent 
DUAL (full sample, IBs, CBs) 22 (4; 18) 2.50% (0.99%; 3.77%) 
BIG4 (Full sample, IBs, CBs) 743 (351; 392) 84% (87%; 82%) 
SUB (Full sample, IBs, CBs) 233 (148; 85) 27% (37%; 18%) 
LISTED (Full sample, IBs, CBs) 538 (207; 331) 61% (51%; 69%) 
ISLAMIC 403  45.80%  
Table 3.4: Study 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
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3.6.1 Financial Stability 
According to Table 3.4, IBs report a lower average profitability relative to CBs; 
with lower means for ROAE. IBs have a higher average cost (lower operating 
efficiency) than CBs; with higher means for COST/INCOME ratio. IBs also 
report a riskier profile than CBs; with a lower mean of LogZscore (higher 
insolvency risk) and as higher mean of LLR/GR (higher credit risk). The 
significant two-sample t-test for all these variables shows that CBs are likely to 
perform better and tend to be less risky than IBs. 
3.6.2 Boards Busyness 
Table 3.4 also reports the descriptive statistics of board busyness factor (i.e. 
ABOD; %BBOD; ASSB; %BSSB) that determines bank financial stability. 
Specifically, IBs show higher average busyness (ABOD) for their BoD compared 
to CBs; with higher means of 2.999 (2.251) for IBs (CBs) respectively. These 
average numbers of outside directorships hold by a BoD is similar to those 
reported in previous literature including Ferris et al. (2003), Elyasiani and Zhang 
(2015). This variable is significantly different between the two bank types. 
Similarly, IBs show higher percentage of busyness (%BBOD) for their BoD 
compared to CBs; with higher means of 58% (47%) for IBs (CBs) respectively. 
The variable is also significantly different between IBs and CBs. Moreover, each 
member of SSB hold about 12.308 outside directorships (ASSB). In addition, 
results indicate that the percentage of busy Shari’ah advisors serving on the SSB 
(%BSSB), on average, is substantially high with a mean of 81.13%. This result 
can be explained by the scarcity of experts in Shari’ah law on a global basis. 
The Figure 3.1 presents the mean distribution of ABOD in IBs and CBs across 
countries. It shows that the countries having highest average number of outside 
directorships hold by a BoD for IBs (CBs) include Bahrain: 4.2, Malaysia: 4.19 
and Kuwait: 4.01 (Jordan: 5.21, UAE: 3.5 and Malaysia: 3.23) whilst the 
countries having lowest average number of outside directorships hold by a BoD of 
IBs (CBs) compose of Turkey: 0.67, Qatar: 0.77, Bangladesh: 1.0 and Indonesia: 




Figure 3.1: Mean Distribution of ABOD in IBs and CBs across Countries 
Furthermore, Figure 3.2 presents the mean distribution of ASSB in IBs across 
countries. It shows that the average number of outside directorships hold by a SSB 
is much higher than the number of outside directorships hold by a BoD. 
Specifically, Jordan (27 outside directorships) and Bahrain (22.69 outside 
directorships) are two countries revealing the highest ASSB. By contrast, SSBs in 
Bangladesh (0 outside directorships) and Turkey (1 outside directorships) are 
likely to have lowest average numbers of outside directorships.  
 






















































3.6.3 Corporate Governance Variables 
Table 3.4 shows that the mean of BoD size (BSIZE) of the whole sample is 8.578 
with the median of 9 directors. The smaller mean of this variable comparing to 
median suggests its positively skewed distribution. As this is a control variable in 
the multivariate estimating models, a natural logarithm form of BoD size 
(LogBSIZE) is used to tackle such skewness. Results from descriptive table 
indicate that CBs have higher means of BoD size (BSIZE: 8.578) but the lower 
mean of the percentage of independent directors on board (%INDEP: 38.2%) than 
IBs (8.445 and 42.3%, respectively). Moreover, the CEO duality variable for full 
sample (IBs, CBs) contains roughly 2.5% (0.99%; 3.77%) of all of the 
observations showing that CEO and Chairman are the same persons, and hence, 
the majority of 97.5% (99.01%; 96.23%) of observations exhibits that CEO and 
Chairman are two different individuals. 
3.6.4 Bank-level Variables 
Table 3.4 next provides the descriptive statistics of bank-level characteristics 
variables. Following previous studies (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Abedifar et 
al., 2013; Bhagat et al., 2015; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al., 2017), the 
variables measuring bank size and bank age are measured in logarithm form to 
solve their potential skewness and outliers. Results show that IBs appear to be 
smaller and younger than their conventional counterparts, with the means of 
LogTA and LogAge of 14.837 and 2.655 (compared to 15.544 and 3.388 in CBs, 
respectively). These findings are supported by two-sample t-test significant 
coefficients and in line with previous studies (e.g. Abedifar et al., 2013). In 
addition, IBs (0.764) appear to be lower leveraged (0.821) than CBs. The mean of 
HHI index for IBs and CBs are 0.139 and 0.116, respectively. The Big 4 auditor 
(BIG4) variable in full sample (IBs, CBs) contains about 84% (87%; 82%) of all 
observations which are audited by Big 4 companies and hence, 16% (13%; 18%) 
of all observations audited by non-Big4 companies. The next variable 
representing for bank ownership in full sample (IBs, CBs), i.e. subsidiaries 
dummy (SUB), indicates that the bank is classified as subsidiaries for 27% (37%; 
18%) of all observations. Finally, the full sample (IBs, CBs) comprises a larger 
portion of 61% (51%; 69%) of listed firms who are traded on stock markets than 
non-listed counterparts (39%; 49% and 31%, respectively).  
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3.6.5 Country-level Variables and Type of Bank Variable  
Table 3.4 demonstrates that the average annual GDP growth rate (and inflation) of 
each country is 4.7% (4.4%) with the median of 4.7% (4.3%). Furthermore, the 
median value of one of LEGAL index for the full sample implies the majority of 
all observations combining both Shari’ah law and others to define their legal 
system. Finally, the indicator of control for corruption in each country shows the 
average score ranged from (-1.071) to 1.569, with the mean of (-0.079) and 
median of 0.055.  
The count of ISLAMIC dummy variable indicates that 403 bank-year 
observations represents for IBs and hence, 477 bank-year observations represents 
for CBs. This reveals that full sample includes a smaller percentage of IBs 
(45.8%) than that of CBs (54.2%).  
3.6.6 Correlation Matrix of All Independent Variables 
The study uses both, the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix and VIFs, to test for 
multicollinearity between each independent variable and the others. The 
coefficients of Pearson correlation are reported in Table 3.5 (full sample and CBs) 
and Table 3.6 (IBs), in which pairs of independent variables with significant 
correlation coefficient are marked in bold, and the VIF values are shown in Table 
3.8 and Table 3.10. Based on the guidelines of Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), 
Pearson correlation results for full sample (CBs; IBs) show that most of 
significantly correlated coefficients are in the weak correlation range (/r/ < 0.3) 
except from 13 (10; 19) pairs of independent variables with absolute correlation 
coefficients are higher than 0.3. However, most of those correlation pairs above 
are in the moderate range, their absolute correlation coefficients are within 
acceptable limits (0.8) and raise no serious concerns on multicollinearity 
(Kennedy, 2008). This is supported by the low individual VIF values (<10), low 
means of VIFs (<6) and low condition numbers (<15) (Section 3.7). Some 
exceptional pairs such as %BBOD and ABOD (full sample, CBs and IBs) are 
highly correlated; however, this study do not include them into the same empirical 
models, so multicollinearity might not a concern.
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
1. ABOD 1 0.815 0.296 0.018 0.042 -0.060 0.143 0.037 -0.084 0.064 -0.038 0.166 0.008 -0.024 -0.115 -0.157 0.240 0.199 - 
2. %BBOD 0.825 1 0.305 0.031 0.045 -0.108 0.107 -0.017 -0.086 0.141 -0.047 0.146 -0.076 -0.003 -0.055 -0.147 0.277 0.252 - 
3. LogBSIZE 0.237 0.251 1 -0.425 0.073 0.019 0.324 0.017 -0.137 -0.048 -0.289 0.115 0.121 0.213 -0.160 0.084 0.206 0.141 - 
4. %INDEP 0.156 0.161 -0.357 1 -0.109 0.054 0.014 -0.052 -0.017 0.079 0.177 -0.098 0.067 -0.165 0.136 -0.100 -0.231 -0.033 - 
5. DUAL 0.021 0.042 0.027 -0.080 1 0.010 -0.029 0.050 -0.069 -0.052 -0.064 0.182 0.054 0.060 -0.137 0.185 0.246 -0.055 - 
6. 1/z 0.011 -0.039 -0.010 0.043 -0.004 1 0.153 0.066 -0.690 -0.059 0.033 0.004 0.120 0.068 -0.006 0.057 -0.076 -0.080 - 
7. LogTA 0.044 0.032 0.286 0.010 -0.013 0.017 1 0.358 -0.381 0.346 -0.167 -0.060 0.104 0.296 -0.055 -0.009 0.038 0.332 - 
8. LogAge -0.048 -0.030 0.076 -0.092 0.077 -0.021 0.377 1 -0.073 0.293 -0.047 -0.137 -0.026 0.020 -0.159 0.014 -0.118 0.075 - 
9. COST/INCOME 0.065 0.053 -0.049 0.022 -0.046 0.059 -0.338 -0.218 1 -0.076 0.075 -0.052 -0.032 -0.087 0.035 0.078 -0.104 -0.142 - 
10. BIG4 0.145 0.157 0.015 0.102* -0.032 -0.021 0.215 0.075 0.033 1 0.102 0.065 -0.393 -0.036 -0.143 -0.275 0.187 0.421 - 
11. SUB 0.122 0.075 -0.192 0.135 -0.031 0.016 -0.063 -0.120 -0.062 0.036 1 -0.053 -0.142 -0.154 0.055 0.065 -0.101 -0.117 - 
12. HHI -0.022 -0.027 0.137 -0.191 0.076 -0.007 -0.007 -0.076 -0.002 0.023 -0.040 1 0.189 0.087 -0.077 -0.168 0.558 0.172 - 
13. LEV -0.016 -0.052 -0.038 -0.007 0.016 0.014 0.212 0.164 -0.206 -0.383 0.159 -0.134 1 -0.053 0.060 0.284 -0.42 -0.431 - 
14. LISTED -0.097 -0.080 0.304 -0.166 0.023 -0.003 0.374 0.301 -0.159 -0.092 -0.254 0.137 0.008 1 0.071 0.032 0.196 0.169 - 
15. GDP_GROWTH -0.121 -0.077 -0.119 0.098 -0.097 -0.015 -0.024 -0.118 -0.047 -0.091 0.053 -0.071 0.027 0.002 1 0.028 -0.232 0.099 - 
16. INFL -0.241 -0.210 0.018 -0.220 0.134 -0.005 -0.029 0.166 -0.073 -0.334 0.049 0.145 0.285 0.070 -0.032 1 -0.398 -0.448 - 
17. LEGAL 0.162 0.164 0.255 -0.148 0.130 -0.006 0.058 -0.142 0.085 0.205 0.138 0.485 -0.389 0.239 -0.210 -0.326 1 0.529 - 
18. CORRUPTION 0.235 0.222 0.126 0.082 -0.050 -0.017 0.232 -0.162 0.008 0.416 -0.070 -0.035 -0.377 0.048 0.108 -0.626 0.436 1 - 
19. ISLAMIC 0.164 0.139 -0.026 0.085 -0.089 0.088 -0.209 -0.432 0.172 0.068 0.219 0.135 -0.071 -0.184 -0.045 -0.256 0.342 0.271 1 
Notes: The table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix among all independent variables used in the regression analysis for the Full sample (lower-left triangle) and CBs subsamples (higher-right 
triangle) from 2010-2015. Bold figures are significant at the 5% level. See Appendix 2 for all variable definitions. 
Table 3.5: Pearson Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix for Full Sample (N = 880) and Conventional Banks (N = 477)
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
1. ABOD 1                    
2. %BBOD 0.835 1                   
3. ASSB 0.284 0.284 1                   
4. %BSSB 0.220 0.200 0.564 1                 
5. LogBSIZE 0.180 0.185 0.270 0.136 1                
6. %INDEP 0.254 0.278 -0.034 0.015 -0.302  1               
7. DUAL 0.034 0.086 0.030 -0.022 -0.087 -0.028  1              
8. 1/z 0.116 0.082 0.182 0.077 -0.075 0.014 -0.024  1             
9. LogTA 0.013 0.007 -0.127 -0.159 0.241 0.039 -0.046  -0.222 1            
10. LogAge 0.013 0.075 0.075 0.018 0.122 -0.067 0.048  -0.048 0.309 1           
11. COST/INCOME 0.074 0.072 0.201 0.129 -0.031 0.013 -0.038 0.552 -0.368 -0.194 1          
12. BIG4 0.234 0.170 0.128 -0.010 -0.058 0.119 0.039  0.055 0.091 -0.041 0.060 1         
13. SUB 0.205 0.154 -0.123 -0.142 -0.078 0.071 0.079 -0.075 0.117 -0.017 -0.159 -0.079 1        
14. HHI -0.198 -0.214 -0.080 0.002 0.170 -0.266 -0.007 -0.059 0.082 0.038 -0.024 -0.026 -0.086  1       
15. LEV -0.022 -0.019 -0.348 -0.224 -0.046 -0.045 -0.064 -0.151 0.290 0.255 -0.257 -0.384 0.413 -0.093 1      
16. LISTED -0.100 -0.105 0.059 0.180 0.414 -0.142 -0.103 -0.100 0.405 0.427 -0.170 -0.138 -0.281 0.225 0.035 1     
17. GDP_GROWTH -0.118 -0.097 -0.117 -0.090 -0.069 0.069 -0.030 -0.026 -0.010 -0.153 -0.072 -0.012 0.076 -0.060 -0.008 -0.094  1    
18. INFL -0.277 -0.237 -0.301 -0.174 -0.086 -0.297 -0.012 -0.062 -0.172 0.101 -0.064 -0.399 0.159 0.435 0.274 0.016 -0.128  1   
19. LEGAL 0.005 -0.039 0.295 0.205 0.368 -0.146 0.045  0.035 0.250 0.101 0.067 0.204 -0.355 0.429 -0.363 0.458 -0.181 -0.125 1  
20. CORRUPTION 0.208 0.125 0.315 0.196 0.140 0.137 0.024  0.024 0.283 -0.141 -0.024 0.414 -0.163 -0.234 -0.328 0.041 0.154 -0.743 0.237 1 
Notes: The table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix among all independent variables used in the regression analysis for the IBs subsample from 2010-2015. Bold figures are significant at the 5% level. See 
Appendix 2 for all variable definitions. 




3.7 Empirical Results 
3.7.1 Tests for Board of Directors’ Busyness 
In Table 3.7, the study reports the 3SLS estimations for financial performance for 
the full sample, IBs and CBs sub-samples. Panel (A) shows the full-sample results 
while Panel (B) and (C) present the results for IBs and CBs respectively.  
In Table 3.7 (Panel A), the research finds that the coefficient of BoD busyness 
(i.e. ABOD, %BBOD) is positively related to ROAE and negatively related to 
COST/INCOME for the full sample. These results indicate that having BoD with 
multiple directorships significantly increases both profitability performance and 
operating efficiency. Concerning the control variables, results for independent 
non-executive directors (%INDEP) indicate that a high representation of those 
directors in boards tends to significantly reduce both bank profitability and cost 
efficiency, consistent with findings of Wintoki et al. (2012) and Elyasiani and 
Zhang (2015). In contrast, DUAL has a significant and negative impact on 
COST/INCOME, indicating that banks with the separation between the Chairman 
and the CEO tend to enjoy higher cost efficiency. Moreover, the study finds that 
large banks (LogTA) and higher levered banks (LEV) are likely to experience 
higher operating performance as well as high-cost efficiency. Also, banks audited 
by Big4 companies have lower financial performance. This might be attributable 
to their higher audit fees, leading to reduced profitability. Furthermore, listed 
banks (LISTED) tend to exhibit better financial performance (ROAE) than non-
listed banks (Mollah and Zaman, 2015), whereas subsidiary banks (SUB) exhibit 
lower ROAE. In addition, higher value of HHI is related to higher profitability 
and cost efficiency. With regards to macro-economic factors, GDP_GROWTH is 
associated with higher bank performance. Finally, the ISLAMIC dummy variable 
indicates a negative association with ROAE and a positive association with the 
COST/INCOME ratio; which imply a lower financial performance and cost 
efficiency of IBs compared to their conventional counterparts (Beck et al., 2013). 
When examining the effect of BoD busyness across the two bank types, in Panels 
B and C of Table 3.7, the results indicate that IBs with busy BoD (i.e. ABOD, 
%BBOD) report low profitability and poor cost efficiency. This is evident by the 
significant and negative (positive) coefficient on ROAE (COST/INCOME) 
respectively. In contrast, CBs having busy BoD show significantly high 
88 
 
profitability and cost efficiency; implying higher bank performance than IBs. For 
other board characteristics across the two banking sectors, the study finds that IBs 
with large BoD report significantly higher cost efficiency (COST/INCOME) 
whilst CBs show opposite. Also, similar to results obtained for full sample, CBs 
with more independent directors are likely to have lower profitability (ROAE). 
Regarding DUAL and LogTA, results for both IBs and CBs are the same to those 
for full sample. Matured IBs (LogAge) shows higher profitability, whereas 
matured CBs exhibit lower ROAE. Furthermore, SUB in IBs is positively linked 
to ROAE and negatively related to COST/INCOME; however, such findings are 
opposite for the sample of CBs. By controlling for risky bank activities as 
measured by the inverse of Z-score (1/z), the results show that IBs exhibiting a 
risk-taking behaviour show lower performance while CBs engaging with higher 
risk-taking behaviour report better financial performance (Mollah and Zaman, 
2015).  
Results for examining bank risk indicators are reported in Table 3.9: full sample 
(Panel A), IBs (Panel B); and CBs (Panel C). For the full sample, the coefficient 
of busy BoD (i.e. ABOD, %BBOD) is significantly and positively associated with 
logZscore while negatively associated with LLR/GR ratios. These findings 
suggest that banks with busy BoD have, on average, lower risk profile; exhibiting 
lower insolvency risk and lower credit risk. Those boards engage more frequently 
across many banks and review different risk-management strategies. Therefore, 
they are likely to have better expertise in credit risk management than less busy 
boards. For example, busy outside directors can provide more effective 
monitoring and advising services to indentify quality borrowers leading to greater 
quality loans and lower loan losses (see Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). These 
findings are in accord with the ealier results for bank operating performance, 
indicating that banks with busy boards exhibit superior profitability and cost 
efficiency. The coefficient signs of other control factors for bank insolvency and 
credit risks are relatively consistent with the existing research (e.g. Bai and 
Elyasiani, 2013; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Mollah et al., 2017). Comparing 
between IBs and CBs (in Panels B and C) shows that IBs with busy BoD have 
significantly high insolvency risk; with a significant and negative coefficient on 
LogZcore. Moreover, IBs exhibit significant and positive association between 
busy BoD and LLR/GR, implying high credit risk. Contrary, the study finds that 
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CBs with busy BoD have a low-risk profile; with significantly low insolvency and 
credit risks. Results on controls relatively remain consistent.  
Overall, the findings of Table 3.7 and Table 3.9 support the hypothesis H1, 
indicating the positive impact of busy BoD on bank performance and financial 
stability. Busy BoDs seem to possess valuable knowledge and proficiency that 
permit them to contribute positively to the bank operational activities. These 
findings are in line with those of Field et al. (2013). However, conditional on the 
bank type, board busyness shows a differential effect on financial stability; busy 
BoD reduces IBs’ financial stability relative to CBs which is consistent with the 
H2 hypothesis. The positive effect of board busyness on CBs financial stability 
indicates that reputational benefits dominate their business model and hence, busy 
BoD is likely to facilitate CBs’ access to market sources in addition to promoting 
greater expertise, skills/knowledge in profitability management (Zahra and Pearce 
II, 1989). In contrast, IBs operating on a complex business model appear to 
benefit less from their busy boards. Table 3.8 and 3.10 report very low individual 
(<10) and mean VIFs (<6) results, in addition to low condition index (<15), for all 
tested performance and risk models. This confirms that multicollinearity might 
not be a serious concern.
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ABOD 0.031***  -0.102***  -0.026**  0.073***  0.034***  -0.067***  
%BBOD  0.198***  -0.945***  -0.101**  0.610***  0.181***  -0.581*** 
Controls included YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept -0.250*** -0.211*** 2.511*** 2.133*** -0.156** -0.153** 5.220*** 5.626*** -0.003 0.024 0.648** 0.430 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 770 770 772 772 342 342 343 343 428 428 429 429 
Adj. R-Square 0.065 0.017 0.130 0.005 0.307 0.455 0.405 0.398 0.002 0.019 0.341 0.202 
Wald Chi2 430*** 417*** 337*** 274*** 401*** 443*** 251*** 250*** 169*** 169*** 349*** 294*** 
LM Statistics  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test  0.100 0.107 0.723 0.070 0.110 0.332 0.115 0.237 0.056 0.055 0.220 0.439 
Notes: The table presents the results of the 3SLS estimations of the system of simultaneous equations (eq.3.1)-(eq.3.2) for the full sample (Panel A; models 1-4), IB subsample (Panel B; models 5-8) 
and CB subsample (Panel C; models 9-12) identifying the impact of busy BoD on a bank’s operating performance. The study treats both over-boarded directors and performance as endogenous variables 
and builds simultaneous equations models. The return on average assets (ROAE) and the ratio of cost to income (COST/INCOME) are dependent variables which represent for bank operating 
performance, profitability and cost efficiency, respectively. The average outside directorships of outside directors (ABOD) and the percentage of busy outside directors on board (%BBOD) are two 
alternative main variables of interest for busy BoD. Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study controls for year and country fixed effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p 
< 0.05, ***p < 0.01. LM and Sargan test show that all models are correctly identified, and the selected IVs are valid. See full table in Appendix 3A. 
Table 3.7: 3SLS: Busy Board of Directors and Financial Performance - Within Islamic and Conventional Banks 
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ABOD 1.29  1.29  1.46  1.44  1.24  1.23  
%BBOD  1.28  1.27  1.46  1.44  1.28  1.26 
LogBSIZE 1.61 1.64 1.61 1.64 1.70 1.75 1.69 1.74 1.80 1.87 1.80 1.86 
%INDEP 1.34 1.35 1.34 1.36 1.34 1.39 1.34 1.38 1.43 1.46 1.43 1.46 
DUAL 1.11 1.16 1.11 1.11 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 
LogTA 1.81 1.81 1.80 1.81 1.94 1.92 1.88 1.86 1.91 1.92 1.86 1.87 
LogAge 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.49 1.43 1.45 1.42 1.44 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.26 
BIG4 1.58 1.58 1.57 1.58 1.40 1.38 1.40 1.38 1.79 1.79 1.78 1.77 
SUB 1.23 1.22 1.23 1.22 1.59 1.53 1.59 1.54 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.22 
HHI 1.58 1.58 1.58 1.58 1.87 1.87 1.86 1.87 1.52 1.51 1.50 1.50 
LISTED 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 2.11 2.14 2.11 2.13 1.31 1.30 1.30 1.30 
GDP_GROWTH 1.25 1.23 1.25 1.23 1.18 1.17 1.18 1.17 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 
INFL 1.92 1.91 1.92 1.91 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.42 1.67 1.66 1.67 1.66 
LEGAL 2.70 2.71 2.70 2.71 2.50 2.50 2.49 2.48 3.13 3.16 3.14 3.16 
CORRUPTION 2.42 2.41 2.42 2.41 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.43 2.57 2.57 2.56 2.56 
LEV 1.73 1.72 1.73 1.72 1.98 1.97 1.97 1.96 1.82 1.81 1.83 1.82 
1/Z 1.02 1.01   1.11 1.10   1.08 1.09   
ISLAMIC 1.58 1.58 1.56 1.56         
Mean VIF 1.60 1.60 1.64 1.64 1.72 1.72 1.75 1.76 1.65 1.66 1.68 1.69 
Conditional Index 3.44 3.44 3.43 3.44 3.54 3.52 4.54 3.51 3.91 3.94 3.91 3.94 
Table 3.8: VIFs in Bank Financial Performance Models – For Full sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel B) and CBs (Panel C) Sub-samples 
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ABOD 0.290***  -0.493***  -0.090***  0.172**  0.136***  -0.099***  
%BBOD  0.678***  -0.239**  -0.480**  1.220**  0.891***  -0.599*** 
Controls included YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept 1.145** 0.663 -5.399*** -5.023*** -0.338 -1.218 -4.571*** -4.780*** 2.368*** 2.531*** -5.176*** -5.062*** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 770 770 725 725 342 342 307 307 428 428 418 418 
Adj. R-Square 0.168 0.353 0.588 0.329 0.312 0.343 0.242 0.261 0.583 0.560 0.537 0.517 
Wald Chi2 470*** 476*** 301*** 387*** 184*** 187*** 230*** 232*** 669*** 618*** 523*** 498*** 
LM Statistics  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test  0.154 0.377 0.177 0.100 0.192 0.591 0.103 0.070 0.873 0.928 0.692 0.124 
Notes: The table presents the results of the 3SLS estimations of the system of simultaneous equations (eq.3.3)-(eq.3.4) for the full sample (Panel A; models 1-4), IB subsample (Panel B; models 5-8) 
and CB subsample (Panel C; models 9-12) identifying the impact of busy BoD on a bank’s risks. The study treats both over-boarded directors and risks as endogenous variables and builds simultaneous 
equations models. The log of Z-score (LogZscore) and the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLR/GR) are dependent variables which represent for bank risks, insolvency and credit risks, 
respectively. The average outside directorships of outside directors (ABOD) and the percentage of busy outside directors on board (%BBOD) are two alternative main variables of interest for busy BoD. 
Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study controls for year and country fixed effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. LM and Sargan test show that 
the models are correctly identified, and the selected IVs are valid. See full table in Appendix 3B. 






























ABOD 1.28  1.28  1.43  1.43  1.23  1.23  
%BBOD  1.27  1.27  1.45  1.45  1.26  1.26 
LogBSIZE 1.61 1.64 1.61 1.64 1.69 1.74 1.69 1.74 1.76 1.82 1.76 1.82 
%INDEP 1.34 1.36 1.34 1.36 1.31 1.36 1.31 1.36 1.42 1.44 1.42 1.44 
DUAL 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 
LogTA 1.67 1.68 1.67 1.68 1.70 1.69 1.70 1.69 2.03 2.04 2.03 2.04 
LogAge 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.49 1.41 1.43 1.41 1.43 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 
COST/INCOME 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 
BIG4 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.29 1.28 1.29 1.28 1.62 1.61 1.62 1.61 
SUB 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.23 1.55 1.49 1.55 1.49 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 
HHI 1.58 1.59 1.58 1.59 1.85 1.86 1.85 1.86 1.50 1.49 1.50 1.49 
LISTED 1.61 1.61 1.61 1.61 2.12 2.15 2.12 2.15 1.30 1.29 1.30 1.29 
GDP_GROWTH 1.25 1.24 1.25 1.24 1.18 1.17 1.18 1.17 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 
INFL 1.92 1.91 1.92 1.91 2.44 2.45 2.44 2.45 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.68 
LEGAL 2.52 2.53 2.52 2.53 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.93 2.95 2.93 2.95 
CORRUPTION 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.48 2.49 2.48 2.49 
ISLAMIC 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50         
Mean VIF 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.62 1.63 1.62 1.63 
Conditional Index 3.29 3.28 3.29 3.28 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.83 3.84 3.83 3.84 




3.7.2 Tests for the classifications of Degrees of Board of Directors’ Busyness  
Based on the findings above, board busyness could bring either reputational 
benefits or detrimental effects depending on the bank type. According to Jiraporn 
et al. (2009), the link between directorships and bank stability might not be fully 
captured using a simple linear regression28. At lower degrees of board 
memberships, directors’ reputation and expertise might not be yet established. 
However, at higher degrees, directors with a greater number of board seats can 
observe that the reputation benefits tend to outweigh the cost of the busyness 
effect. 
To test the impact of the different degrees of busyness on bank financial stability, 
this study defines four different classifications for the degree of board busyness: 
“Non-busy”, “Less-busy”, “More-busy” and “Super-busy” across the two bank 
types. The study follows Field et al. (2013) to define the degrees of busyness for 
BoD by employing quantiles which are based on the average number of 
directorships held by each BoD. BoD in the top quantile 4 is classified as “Super-
busy”; BoD in the middle quantile 3 and 2 are defined as “More-busy” and “Less 
busy” respectively; and otherwise “Non-busy” BoD29. Based on these, the study 
creates four dummy variables (super-busy BoD dummy, more-busy BoD dummy, 
less-busy BoD dummy and non-busy BoD dummy) and then consider separate 
tests for the sub-samples of the different classifications of board busyness. 
Table 3.11 presents the results for bank performance and risk for IBs (Panel A) 
and CBs (Panel B). In Panel A, the study finds that within IBs, when BoD is 
characterised as being “Less-busy”, “More-busy” and “Super-busy” BoD, this 
significantly reduces bank profitability performance and promotes higher 
insolvency and credit risks. In contrast to the busy boards’ findings in IBs, results 
for the “Non-busy” BoD show significant positive effects on IBs financial 
stability. The study finds significantly positive coefficients on, both, ROAE (i.e. 
higher profitability) and LogZscore (i.e. lower insolvency risk) with negative 
                                                          
28 At lower degrees of board directorship, board busyness is expected to increase more than proportionally as 
the board seats increase. This effect is associated with the learning curve effects, and once this learning curve 
is mature, board busyness may increase only proportionally or even less with board seats. However, at higher 
degrees of board directorship, the reputation effect may grow more than proportionately with an increase in 
board seats (Jiraporn et al., 2009). 
29 The cut-off for the quantile 75 in IBs (CBs) is 4.5 (3.33) directorships; cut-off for the quantile 50 in IBs 
(CBs) is 2.75 (2) directorships, and the cut-off for the quantile 25 in IBs (CBs) is 1 (0.5) directorships. 
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coefficients on COST/INCOME (i.e. better operating efficiency) and LLR/GR 
(i.e. lower credit risk).  
In Panel B, the study finds that CBs with “More-busy” and “Super-busy” BoD 
tend to significantly enhance the bank financial performance and reduce bank risk, 
consistent with the reputation hypothesis and prior studies (e.g. Elyasiani and 
Zhang, 2015).  Nonetheless, “Less-busy” and “Non-busy” BoDs are associated 
with low financial performance as well as high risk-taking. This suggests that due 
to the higher advisory demand of CBs, BoD with a small degree of busyness may 
not have superior advising capacities, enough valuable experience and resource 
connections to benefit their banks.  
In sum, findings for the BoD classifications suggest that the adverse effects of 
busy BoD on IBs financial stability are more pronounced as the degree of 
busyness increases. Extremely busy BoD within IBs tend to fail in effectively 
monitoring risk-taking activities. These findings support the distinctiveness of the 
roles played and value added from BoD in both CBs and IBs. They also support 
the main findings for the preferential impacts of board busyness on CBs financial 
stability. Unlike IBs, the reputation effects within CBs seem to increase 
proportionally as the board multiple directorship increases. Hence, the reputation 












Table 3.11: Sensitivity Tests for the Board of Directors’ Degrees of Busyness - Within Islamic and Conventional banks 
Panel A: Islamic Banks Panel B: Conventional banks 














































ROAE 0.125*** -0.079*** -0.322*** -0.184*** -0.407** -0.329*** 1.616*** 0.547** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.049) 
COST/INCOME -0.557*** 2.075*** 0.987*** 0.590*** 0.681*** 1.235*** -1.654*** -1.178** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.044) 
LogZscore 0.665*** -2.366*** -6.844*** -0.658*** -0.863*** -2.190*** 4.320*** 0.773*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LLR/GR -0.649** 1.427*** 6.107*** 1.212*** 4.441*** 1.307*** -2.200*** -0.452*** 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) 
Notes: This table presents comparative analysis when BoDs are characterised as “non-busy”, “less busy”, “more-busy” and “super-busy” across IBs and CBs. This study follows 
the design of Field et al. (2013) to define BoD as “super-busy” if the average number of directorships of BoD is in the top quantile 4 (75-100), “more-busy” if the average 
number of directorships of BoD is in the quantile 3 (50-75), “less-busy” if the average number of directorships of BoD is in the quantile 2 (25-50), otherwise “Less-busy” BoD. 
P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  Control variables are included but not reported. 
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3.7.3 SSB Busyness within Islamic Banks 
In this section, the study extends the base models in Equations (3.1) – (3.4) to 
further explore the association between busy SSB and IB financial stability. 
Specifically, it tests H3 to identify whether a busy SSB contributes 
positively/negatively to the IB financial stability.  
Table 3.12 (Panel A) reports the results for bank performance and (Panel B) 
shows the results of the bank risk. Table 3.13 shows low values of VIFs across all 
tested models, confirming no multicollinearity concerns. In Panel A, the results 
show that busy SSB (ASSB; %BSSB) significantly reduces financial 
performance, with a negative coefficient on ROAE and a positive coefficient on 
the COST/INCOME ratio. Results in Panel B report a considerably high bank 
risk; with a significant and negative coefficient on logZscore (i.e. high insolvency 
risk) as well as a significant and positive coefficient on LLR/GR ratio (i.e. high 
credit risk). Overall findings support H3 and suggest that SSB busyness 
significantly damages an IB financial stability. Busy SSB may fail to ensure the 
mandatory compliance of IBs to the rulings of Shari’ah, which promotes a 
reputation risk and hence, could trigger the failure of IBs and cause systematic 
risk30.  
The study further observes that busy BoD, consistently, shows an adverse impact 
on IBs financial stability. To examine whether there is a significant difference 
between the two-board busyness (BoD versus SSB), the study compares the 
coefficients on ABOD and ASSB, as well as %BBOD and %BSSB. The reported 
F-test (i.e. Wald test) (see Wald, 1943; Pathan and Skully, 2010) indicates that the 
two coefficients are statistically different.  
                                                          
30 In unreported sensitivities, this study captured cross-country variations in governance perceptions for the 
sample. It followed Čihák and Hesse (2010) to develop a country governance index (COUNTRY_GOV) as 
an additional control variable. This variable is estimated as the average of six key country-governance 
measures: corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, and regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
voice and accountability. The study relatively obtained consistent results to the main findings across all 
estimated models. Tables will be provided upon request. 
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ABOD -0.024**  0.158***  -0.092***  0.068***  
ASSB -0.008***  0.092***  -0.091***  0.029***  
%BBOD  -0.093**  0.491***  -1.323**  0.333** 
%BSSB  -0.179**  0.303***  -1.997***  1.410*** 
Controls included YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept 0.187 -0.108 1.821 5.534*** 1.639 -0.883 -5.422*** -5.165*** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 336 336 337 337 336 336 301 301 
Adj. R-Square 0.138 0.352 0.027 0.397 0.059 0.022 0.363 0.329 
Wald Chi2 325*** 340*** 241*** 265*** 364*** 191*** 410*** 310*** 
LM Statistics  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test  0.210 0.100 0.468 0.489 0.560 0.172 0.083 0.405 
ABOD = ASSB (F-Test) 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test)  0.000  0.000   0.000  
Notes: The table presents 3SLS estimations for the IB subsample identifying the impact of busy BoD or busy SSB on a bank’s profitability (models 1-2), cost efficiency (models 3-4), insolvency risk 
(models 5-6) and credit risk (models 7-8). The study treats both over-boarded boards and risks as endogenous variables and builds simultaneous equations models. The return on average assets (ROAE), 
the ratio of cost to income (COST/INCOME), the log of Z-score (LogZscore) and the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLR/GR) are dependent variables which represent for bank profitability, 
cost efficiency, insolvency risk and credit risk, respectively. The average outside directorships of outside directors/Shariah advisors (ABOD; ASSB) and the percentage of busy outside directors/Shariah 
advisors on board (%BBOD; %BSSB) are alternative main variables of interest for busy BoD/SSB. Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study controls for year and country fixed 
effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. LM and Sargan test show that all models are correctly identified, and the selected IVs are valid. The reported F-test (i.e. Wald test) in 
all models indicates that the two coefficients are statistically different. See full table in Appendix 3C. 






















ABOD 1.52  1.50  1.48  1.48  
ASSB 1.70  1.69  1.63  1.63  
%BBOD  1.56  1.55  1.55  1.55 
%BSSB  1.40  1.40  1.38  1.38 
LogBSIZE 1.85 1.83 1.83 1.82 1.82 1.81 1.82 1.81 
%INDEP 1.33 1.39 1.33 1.39 1.29 1.35 1.29 1.35 
DUAL 1.09 1.10 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.10 1.08 1.10 
LogTA 2.03 2.10 1.99 2.04 1.88 1.94 1.88 1.94 
LogAge 1.56 1.49 1.55 1.48 1.53 1.48 1.53 1.48 
BIG4 1.36 1.39 1.36 1.39 1.20 1.24 1.20 1.24 
SUB 1.58 1.53 1.58 1.53 1.52 1.46 1.52 1.46 
HHI 1.91 1.89 1.90 1.89 1.88 1.87 1.88 1.87 
LISTED 2.16 2.36 2.15 2.35 2.16 2.35 2.16 2.35 
GDP_GROWTH 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.18 1.20 1.18 
INFL 2.36 2.35 2.36 2.35 2.38 2.37 2.38 2.37 
LEGAL 2.72 2.62 2.70 2.60 2.55 2.39 2.55 2.39 
CORRUPTION 2.46 2.42 2.46 2.42 2.40 2.34 2.40 2.34 
1/Z 1.13 1.11       
LEV 2.14 2.07 2.14 2.06     
COST/INCOME     1.27 1.26 1.27 1.26 
Mean VIF 1.77 1.75 1.80 1.78 1.70 1.69 1.70 1.69 
Conditional Index 3.77 3.67 3.77 3.65 3.60 3.52 3.60 3.52 
Table 3.13: VIFs in Bank Performance/Risk Models – Within Islamic Banks 
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3.7.4 Tests for the Classifications of the Degree of Shariah Board Busyness 
In this section, the study additionally examines the influence of different 
classifications of the SSB busyness (i.e. characterised as “Non-busy”, “Less-
busy”, “More-busy” and “Super-busy”) on IBs’ financial stability31. It creates four 
dummy variables (super-busy SSBs dummy, more-busy SSBs dummy, less-busy 
SSBs dummy and non-busy SSBs dummy) and then tests them in separate 
models.  
Table 3.14 reports the results and show that only “More-busy” and “Super-busy” 
SSBs significantly reduce bank performance and increase bank risk across all 
models. These results support the main findings and highlight the detrimental 
effect of employing busy SSB on IBs’ financial stability. Meanwhile, “Less-busy” 
and “Non-busy” SSBs report significantly longer financial stability. Overall 
findings indicate that as the degree of SSB busyness increases, this board might 
inversely jeopardise the IBs’ financial stability due to substantial lax screening.  
























ROAE 0.767*** 0.782*** -1.203*** -0.068*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) 
COST/INCOME -0.691*** -1.068*** 2.718*** 0.963*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
LogZscore 0.652** 0.861*** -3.172*** -0.835*** 
 (0.046) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) 
LLR/GR -0.755*** -0.600*** 0.906*** 0.627*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Notes: This table presents comparative analysis when SSBs are characterised as “non-busy”, “less 
busy”, “more-busy” and “super-busy” within IBs. The study follows the design of Field et al. 
(2013) to define SSBs as “super-busy” if the average number of directorships of SSB is in the top 
quantile 4 (75-100), “more-busy” if the average number of directorships of SSB is in the quantile 
3 (50-75), “less-busy” if the average number of directorships of SSB is in the quantile 2 (25-50), 
otherwise “Less-busy” SSB. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Control 
variables are included but not reported. 
Table 3.14: Sensitivity Tests for the Shari’ah Supervisory Boards’ Degrees of 
Busyness - Within Islamic Banks 
                                                          
31 The study classified the levels of busyness for SSBs using quantiles which are based on the average 
number of directorships held by each SSB. SSBs in the top quantile 4 are categorised as “Super-busy”; SSBs 
in the quantile 3 and 2 are categorised as “More-busy” and “Less-busy” respectively; otherwise SSBs in the 
bottom quantile 1 are categorised as “Non-busy” SSBs. The cut-off for the quantile 75 is 19.083 
directorships; cut-off for the quantile 50 is 11 directorships; and cut-off for the quantile 25 is 4 directorships. 
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3.8 Robustness Checks 
This study further tests the robustness of the main findings employing Two-step 
system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as adopted by Arellano and 
Bover (1995); Blundell and Bond (1998). The strength of GMM is that it can 
solve autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity through the function of robust 
standard error. This method controls for the unobserved effects by transforming 
the variables into first-differences to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity and 
omitted variable bias. It also allows us to treat all bank characteristics variables as 
endogenous and orthogonally employs the lag values of endogenous variables as 
IVs. In this research, GMM estimation32 procedures employ lagged values as IVs 
for the endogenous variables such as board busyness (see Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al., 2017). The logic is that 
these factors in earlier years could not have resulted from bank financial stability 
in subsequent years, hence, endogeneity problem is unlikely (Liang et al., 2013). 
Country and macroeconomics control variables are treated as strictly exogenous.  
The results for GMM are reported in Table 3.15 (Panel A and B) and Table 3.16 
(Panel A and B). Table 3.15 presents the comparison results of the effects of busy 
boards (i.e. BoD and SSB) on performance between IBs and CBs while Table 
3.16 presents the regression results of these two boards’ busyness on risks 
between IBs and CBs. The dianostics tests reported in those tables indicate that all 
models are well-fitted with stastistically insignificant test statistics results for both 
second-order autocorrelation (AR (2) p-values>10%, implying that the residuals 
in the second-difference are serially uncorrelated by way of construction) and 
Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions (p-values>10%). Results for 
first-order autocorrelation (AR (1) p-values<10%) indicate that the residuals in the 
first-difference are serially correlated. The Hansen test examines the null 
hypothesis of the IVs validity and reports the statistically insignificant J-statistics 
for all models suggesting that the IVs are valid in two-step dynamic GMM 
estimations. Main GMM findings are found to be consistent with main findings 
identified through 3SLS. It can be seen that the final story remains unchanged 
such that IBs with busy BoD (i.e. ABOD; %BBOD) exhibit lower financial 
performance and higher risks whilst CBs with busy BoD show their better 
                                                          
32 The GMM estimates are obtained by employing Roodman’s (2009) xtabond2 module (with robust standard 
errors) in STATA 15. 
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financial stability. Furthermore, for IBs, busy SSB (i.e. ASSB; %BSSB) 
significantly reduce IBs operating performance and significantly induce a high 
risk-taking behaviour for this bank type. Overall results identify the negative 
effect of SSB busyness on IB financial stability. This robustness check indicates 
that main findings continue to hold after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. 
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ABOD 0.002  0.037**  0.013**  -0.013*  
ASSB -0.007**  0.015*      
%BBOD  -0.221***  0.220**  0.225**  -0.067* 
%BSSB  -0.436***  0.281*     
Controls included YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept -0.094* -0.562*** 1.543 0.476 0.978 -0.370** -1.304* -0.408 
Performancet-1 0.244* -0.363* 0.373*** 0.447*** -0.106*** -0.007*** 0.759*** 0.678*** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 285 285 285 285 357 357 357 357 
Wald Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (1) 0.023 0.047 0.047 0.052 0.040 0.058 0.005 0.004 
AR (2)  0.891 0.941 0.319 0.305 0.306 0.862 0.420 0.462 
Hansen test  0.148 0.425 0.998 0.241 0.755 0.942 0.245 0.657 
Notes: The table presents the robustness test results of the GMM estimations for the IB subsample (Panel A; models 1-4) and CB subsample (Panel B; models 5-8) identifying the impact of busy BoD/SSB 
on a bank’s operating performance. All right-hand side factors are assumed as endogenous variables except strictly exogenous country-level variables and dummies. The return on average assets (ROAE) 
and the ratio of cost to income (COST/INCOME) are dependent variables. The average outside directorships of outside directors/Shariah advisors (ABOD; ASSB) and the percentage of busy outside 
directors/Shariah advisors on board (%BBOD; %BSSB) are alternative main variables of interest for busy BoD/SSB. Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study controls for year 
and country fixed effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (1) and AR (2) are dianogtic tests for no serial correlation of first-order and second-order, respectively, in the 
first-differenced standard errors. Hansen is the test of over-identifying restrictions. See full table in Appendix 3D. 
Table 3.15: Robustness Check: GMM regression - Busy Boards and Financial Performance - Within Islamic and Conventional Banks 
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ABOD -0.092**  -0.138  0.020***  -0.507*  
ASSB -0.060**  0.097***      
%BBOD  -0.332***  0.496***  0.174***  -0.532** 
%BSSB  -0.975***  0.955***     
Controls included YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept -0.442 -2.784 -0.336 -4.318*** 0.307 2.099*** 4.036 -2.138 
Risket-1 0.433** 0.886*** -0.891*** -0.674*** 0.592*** 0.589*** 0.957*** 0.542*** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 284 284 301 301 356 356 347 347 
Wald Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (1) 0.043 0.033 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.045 0.000 
AR (2)  0.968 0.996 0.607 0.995 0.440 0.409 0.849 0.339 
Hansen test  0.223 0.966 0.529 0.816 0.736 0.934 0.333 0.909 
Notes: The table presents the robustness test results of the GMM estimations for the IB subsample (Panel A; models 1-4) and CB subsample (Panel B; models 5-8) identifying the impact of busy BoD/SSB 
on a bank’s risks. All right-hand side factors are assumed as endogenous variables except strictly exogenous country-level variables and dummies. The log of Z-score (LogZscore) and the ratio of loan 
loss reserves to gross loans (LLR/GR) are dependent variables. The average outside directorships of outside directors/Shariah advisors (ABOD; ASSB) and the percentage of busy outside directors/Shariah 
advisors on board (%BBOD; %BSSB) are alternative main variables of interest for busy BoD/SSB. Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study controls for year and country fixed 
effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (1) and AR (2) are dianogtic tests for no serial correlation of first-order and second-order, respectively, in the first-differenced 
standard errors. Hansen is the test of over-identifying restrictions. See full table in Appendix 3E.  




3.9 Summary  
Motivated by the long ongoing controversy regarding multiple directorships, this 
study investigates whether board busyness affects firm performance and risk-
taking behaviours. The analysis is novel in two respects. This study is the first to 
identify the impact of institutional bank characteristics on board busyness. This 
institutional context is particularly interesting under, both, the ongoing debate of 
the influence of bank type on financial stability and the growing arguments around 
the Islamic banking model. Moreover, this study is among first attempts to 
recognise that different degrees of board busyness might correspond to distinctive 
performance and risk profiles across the two banking sectors. In addition to 
examining busy BoDs in both IBs and CBs, the research takes a step ahead to 
analyse if busy Shari’ah boards can affect IBs’ stability.  
Consistent with the expectations, findings indicate that a busy BoD generally 
promotes high financial performance and lower risk. However, differential effects 
of board busyness do exist and are conditioned to the bank type. For CBs, the 
study finds strong evidence for the beneficial effect of the busy board on financial 
stability. Contrarily, IBs exhibit poor financial performance and a high overall risk 
profile. These findings provide strong evidence supporting for the first two 
hypotheses of this study which show that banks with a busy BoD are financially 
stable (H1), and IBs with a busy BoD are less financially stable than CBs (H2). 
Additionally, the study finds that as the degree of the BoD busyness increases, IB 
financial stability deteriorates. However, the opposite finding applies to CBs. 
Furthermore, the results show that within IBs, lax monitoring by busy Shari’ah 
scholars has an adverse effect on their financial stability, consistent with the third 
hypothesis (H3). Results can be briefly justified by the complexity of IBs in terms 
of business model, agency conflicts and CG structure than CBs, which requires 
more effective monitoring from both BoD and SSB within this bank type. 
Findings imply that although the IBs’ multi-layer governance model creates a 
certain level of comfort, convenience and trust for stakeholders, these objectives 
may be lost with the limited availability of outside board members. This new 
insight contributes to an ongoing debate about the need to reconsider double 
mechanisms of governance in mitigating risky activities in global banking 
business models. IBs might learn from their conventional counterparts on how to 
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utilise the reputational, expertise and preferential resources that can accrue from 
employing a busy BoD. Moreover, the study sheds lights on the scarcity of 
scholars experienced in the considerations of Shari’ah-compliant banking. 
Furthermore, the findings raise a call to regulators and policymakers for the need 
to develop stricter criteria and guidelines to govern multiple directorships by the 
SSB. Finally, the comparative research of banking business models between 
Islamic and conventional sectors can investigate the busyness issue under the 
consideration of financial expertise, professional training and continued education 
of the different boards. 
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CHAPTER 4. STUDY 2 - MARKET VALUATIONS OF 
BUSY BOARDS: EVIDENCE FROM ALTERNATIVE 
BANKING MODELS 
4.1 Abstract 
This study comparatively assesses the influence of board busyness on stock 
market valuations of both IBs and CBs. For a sample of listed banks from eleven 
countries for the period 2010–2015, results show that board busyness, depending 
on the type of bank, is differentially priced by investors. In CBs, board busyness 
is significantly and positively valued by the stock market, suggesting that 
investors perceive some reputational benefits arising from a busy board (e.g. 
extended industry knowledge, established external networks or facilitation of 
external market sources). In contrast, the study finds no supporting evidence for 
the market valuations of board busyness in IBs. This result might be attributed to 
its complex governance structure and the uniqueness of its business model, which 
require additional and effective monitoring relative to that employed in 
conventional banking. Moreover, as the results also indicate, investors provide 
significantly low market valuations for a busy SSB, which acts as an additional 
layer of governance in IBs.  
4.2 Introduction 
Regulators and market participants in capital markets have long emphasised the 
critical role of the BoD as a core CG mechanism in promoting a country’s 
economic growth and financial stability. A weak system of governance tends to 
offer substantial managerial opportunities to engage in risk-taking activities and 
fraudulent acts. Extant literature (e.g. Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Faleye et al., 
2018; Lu and Boateng, 2018) documents that an effective BoD can monitor the 
top management on behalf of the shareholders to reduce information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders and, thereby, lessen agency costs. Resource 
dependence theorists assert that a BoD is "a provider of resources, such as 
legitimacy, advice and council links to other organizations" (Hillman and Dalziel 
2003, p. 383). Therefore, the quality of board monitoring and their engagements 
in managerial decision-making can have direct implications on firm value 
(Yermack, 1996; Lin and Liu, 2009; Liu, 2015; Meng et al., 2018).  
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Moreover, the uniqueness of governance in banking alongside the opacity related 
to several banking transactions imply a dominant impact of effective monitoring 
by the BoD on investors’ trust and optimism (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Faleye 
and Krishnan, 2017). Appointing an outside busy board member (i.e. holding 
multiple directorships) can, hence, affect investors’ perceptions of their firm 
value. Furthermore, in line with the agency theory, investors are likely to pay 
more for bank equity when their interests are aligned with those of directors and 
managers. In other words, a bank market value is likely to increase as the agency 
conflicts diminish because such lower agency costs can effectively protect 
investors’ wealth. From this perspective, board busyness can influence the bank 
market value by either restricting or encouraging managers from expropriating 
bank resources. This depends on the levels of agency costs and the complexity of 
a bank’s business model (Elnahass et al., 2019). 
Arguably, busy boards can offer reputational benefits (e.g. extended business 
networking/connections and quick access to market resources) to their firms, 
benefits that might enhance the quality of long-term decision-making and, hence, 
they might lead to favourable implications on the firm value (Field et al., 2013; 
Muravyev et al., 2016; Chou and Feng, 2018). In contrast, other prior studies 
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Falato et al., 2014; Chou and Feng, 2018) still 
suggest that board busyness can result in over-commitment and the limited 
availability of boards, rendering them unable to fulfil their fiduciary duties and 
scrutinise risk-taking activities, leading to adverse impact(s) on firm valuation. 
Evidence on the market valuations of busy BoDs is limited (e.g. Ferris et al., 
2003; Cashman et al., 2012) and is focused on non-financial firms (i.e. the 
industrial sector) and provided mixed findings. Within the banking setting, 
examining stock market valuations (see Caprio et al. 2007; Belkhir 2009; Zulkafli 
et al. 2010) is restricted to focus only on other CG mechanism and characteristics 
(e.g., ownership structure, shareholder protection laws, board size, and CEO 
duality). Therefore, relatively little is known about whether board busyness can 
improve or detriment the bank market value. Moreover, none of the prior studies 
in banking has given attention to the possible systematic differences of stock 
market valuations for busy boards across alternative bank types. An ideal setting 
for such an investigation would be the unique systems of governance and business 
models employed by the IB versus CB. Recall that IBs conduct operations based 
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primarily on profit-loss sharing (PLS) arrangements, in which contracts between 
the banks and their depositors are equity-based (Mollah et al. 2017). 
As mentioned earlier, the governance structure employed by IBs is likely to be 
more complicated than that of CBs (Safieddine, 2009; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 
In both bank types, the BoD is responsible for the implementation of strategic 
decisions, protection of the shareholders’ interest and maximisation of the bank 
value. However, for IBs, under the constrained banking model and the nature of 
the products/services offered, BoD has additional responsibilities related to the 
establishment of the appropriate Shari’ah governance framework besides the 
development of relevant policies to ensure that all activities are conducted in 
compliance with the Shari’ah law (Quttainah et al., 2013). Furthermore, for IBs, 
additional agency costs are likely to be associated with the Islamic banking 
model. This is due to a peculiar institutional environment in IBs including the 
special bank-depositors’ relationship. Moreover, unlike the single governance-
layer in CBs (i.e., BoD), IBs are subject to a double-governance mechanism by a 
SSB in addition to their regular BoD. Decisions by the BoD depend much on the 
supervision effectiveness of SSB for Shari’ah compliance (Mollah and Zaman 
2015). SSB is hence referred as “supra authority” which monitors the BoD’ 
decisions to ensure that they execute the ex-ante approved products/services 
(Mollah et al., 2017). Finally, the structure and features of IB governance indicate 
that the popularity and scarcity of experts in Shari’ah legitimacy on a global basis 
for both BoD and SSB have contributed to the busyness of the two boards in IBs.  
Accordingly, the nature, qualities and commitments of the BoD in the two bank 
types are dissimilar (Mollah et al., 2017) and can have implications on investors’ 
valuation of board busyness. Under the presence of structural differences between 
the business models of CBs and IBs, the premise is that differential stock market 
valuations of board busyness across the two bank types is plausible. Depending on 
the banking business model employed and the structure of governance, including 
the need for additional monitoring, such as Shari’ah governance, investors within 
the two banking sectors may hold different perceptions of the oversight and 
resource-creation roles of outside boards. When compared to their conventional 
counterparts, a lower firm valuation of board busyness in IBs is predicted. The 
extended agency conflicts and the unique business model of IBs, requiring 
effective scrutiny from two different boards (BoD and SSB), justify this.  
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This study empirically examines whether board busyness is differently valued by 
investors engaging with the IB versus CB sectors. It uses an international sample 
of 386 bank-year observations for listed IBs and CBs operating in eleven 
countries between years 2010–2015. Moreover, busy SSBs are also examined in 
this study because the impressive growth rate of IB industry has been 
accompanied by growing pains in the ear of human capital management. This is 
particularly true of the training and preparation of SSB scholars, who are often 
criticised due to the lack of uniformity in their decision rulings. In addition, 
Shari’ah requirements can lead to unique agency relations of IBs which can result 
in Shari’ah non-compliance risk and in turn, financial turmoil. Therefore, we can 
expect that in theory, SSBs should play an important role in matters related 
Shari’ah law and their existence may have significant effects on financial stability 
of IBs. Accordingly, we can also predict that this religious board might be valued 
by market participants because of its possible impact of risks and profitability.  
For the full sample (i.e. IBs and CBs together), results indicate that a busy BoD is 
significantly associated with a high bank value. Conditional on the bank type, the 
research finds strong evidence for differential market valuations of busy boards 
between IBs and CBs. Unlike the investors in IBs, where insignificant results are 
reported, the CBs investors tend to perceive board busyness as a significant 
indicator of increasing bank value. Moreover, IBs with a busy SSB exhibit a 
significantly low market value. 
This study is the first to offer comparative assessments between IB and CB 
market valuations by utilising an important board attribute such as busyness. The 
findings of the study are timely to the current debate of the complexity of CG of 
Islamic versus conventional banking (e.g. Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al., 
2017; Lassoued et al., 2018; Alandejani et al., 2017; Alqahtani et al., 2017; 
Elnahass et al., 2018). The study extends prior literature studies by highlighting 
the influence of institutional characteristics and governance structures on having 
distinct firm valuations for busy boards within the two banking sectors. The study 
also contributes to the stream of banking valuation studies in CBs (e.g. Caprio et 
al., 2007; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015) and identifies the possible preferential 
impacts of having a busy board. Moreover, results highlighting the adverse effects 
of SSB busyness on an IB bank value also add to a sizeable body of literature on 
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CG in IBs that discuss the importance of this board (e.g. Quttainah et al., 2013; 
Abdelsalam et al., 2016).  
The findings of this study provide valuable policy implications to regulators and 
market participants who are involved in the two banking sectors. For CBs, board 
busyness offers reputational benefits to banks which tend to contribute to 
shareholder wealth maximisation. However, such reputational benefits of busy 
boards tend not to hold in complex agency environments and constrained business 
models such as IBs. Furthermore, findings suggest that effective Shari’ah 
monitoring is an essential determinant in enhancing the market valuations of this 
banking sector. The market participants who engage with the IB sector are also 
suggested to be more sensitive to the SSB busyness than BoD busyness. A busy 
SSB seems to be negatively perceived by investors, probably due to concerns 
related to the effectiveness of Shari’ah governance and the moral accountability of 
the bank. The overall findings raise a call to regulators and policymakers for the 
need to develop stricter criteria and guidelines to govern outside board 
directorships. The study also provides valuable insights to inform the debates 
raised by several external organisations regarding the restrictions on the board 
multiple-directorship (e.g. National Association of Corporate Directors-NACD, 
1996; Council of Institutional Investors-CII, 2003). 
4.3 Background and Related Studies 
Strong governance implies a board’s active role in monitoring top managers, 
mitigating risks and enhancing long-term resilience, all of which should, in 
principle, be positively priced by investors. This argument is in line with the Slack 
Resource theory, which suggests that firms with higher market valuation tend to 
have more slack economic resources to invest in long-term improvements of their 
governance mechanisms and board monitoring quality, which will lead to future 
higher firm valuation, thus creating a virtuous circle (Pae and Choi, 2011). 
However, entrenched managers may have incentives to divert slack resources or 
free cash flows for their private interests (e.g. building an empire, increasing their 
compensation) (Jensen, 1986). In such cases, those managers are less likely to use 
slack resources to invest in strengthening different governance mechanisms. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of the outside directors assigned to those managers 
becomes indispensable. Any reputational damage to the BoD, thus, could 
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constitute a severe threat to the survival of the firm and, hence, hurt market 
valuations. 
From an agency theory perspective, ineffective boards, by encouraging 
managerial perquisites and private control benefits, can exacerbate agency 
conflicts between investors and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Being 
financially independent of insiders, a board should be capable of withstanding 
pressure from their bank to manipulate earnings and monitor the operating 
process. Hence, appointing outside directors should, in principle, strengthen CG to 
alleviate the shareholder/manager and controlling-shareholders/minority-
shareholders agency conflicts (Choi et al., 2007; Machuga and Teitel, 2009).  
Previous studies on firm valuation and value relevance33 (e.g. Ball et al., 2003; 
Goncalves et al., 2017) document that the value relevance of accounting 
information, since it offers useful insights into several accounting issues, is 
essential not only for investors but also for standard-setters. Moreover, 
information on non-financial indicators, such as CG mechanisms, can still 
influence the ability of investors to price their firms and forecast future stock 
performance (Bose, 2014).  
Empirical research on the relationship between governance and firm value 
suggests that well-governed firms are associated with a higher stock market 
valuation (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; Sami et al., 2011; de Haan 
and Vlahu, 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015). Other sets of studies show that investors 
are likely to reward firms with effective governance by assigning a high firm 
value (e.g. Epstein et al., 1994; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith, 2007; Choi and Jung, 2008; Baek et al., 2009). Pae and Choi (2011) also 
state that investors often require a lower cost of equity for well-governed firms as 
these factors can mitigate agency costs and enhance disclosure transparency 
within firms. Caprio et al. (2007) study the effects of governance (i.e. ownership 
structure, shareholder protection laws, cash flow rights and empowering official 
supervisory and regulatory agencies) on the market valuations of banks. Similarly, 
Belkhir (2009) and Zulkafli et al. (2010) provide evidence on the relationship 
                                                          
33 Value relevance is defined as the ability of an accounting measure to capture and summarise information 
that affects the firm value. This measure is significantly associated with a set of information used by investors 
in a firm’s valuation such as share prices, stock returns, or market capitalization (Barth et al., 2001). 
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between bank value and governance (i.e. board characteristics, board size and 
CEO duality).  
With the growing opaqueness surrounding the banking industry, studies 
investigating the association between firm valuation and board busyness are still 
scarce. Only within the non-financial sector, studies (e.g. Ferris et al., 2003; Perry 
and Peyer, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Cashman et al., 2012) have provided 
mixed evidence for the relationship between board busyness and firm value. For 
example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show for a sample of large US industrial 
firms (i.e., Forbes 500) that busy outside directors might not be effective monitors 
on any board, and hence, negatively affect market-to-book ratios and governance. 
Cashman et al. (2012) also find that the presence of busy directors has a negative 
impact on market value, but only of large firms (i.e., S&P 500). Contrary, Perry 
and Peyer (2005) find that outside directorships for executives are likely to 
enhance firm value, possibly through either external networking opportunities or 
through signalling of high quality for the managerial decision-making process. 
They argue that outside directorships only negatively affect market valuations 
when the firm has high agency problems. Furthermore, Ferris et al. (2003) find no 
evidence that multiple directorships can shirk their responsibilities to serve on 
board committees and suggest an insignificant linkage between multiple 
directorships and the likelihood of securities fraud litigation. 
Investigating the board busyness attribute emerges from two opposing 
perspectives. In brief, the first one is the busyness view, which contends that board 
busyness is associated with weak governance structures (Core et al., 1999). A 
weak governance structure is perceived by market participants as leading to low 
market valuations, and they are more likely to penalise their firms for poor 
monitoring (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). The second view is the reputational 
benefits that emerge from appointing a busy board. Busy directors can be assessed 
as valuable assets for their firms, given their extensive and updated industry-
specific knowledge. This board can, hence, offer a vital supportive role to inside 
directors (Clifford et al., 2018) as well as established outside networks that could 
facilitate access to market sources and other strategic benefits. These reputational 
benefits can be positively priced by investors, and board busyness can be 
perceived as value-enhancing for a firm (Muravyev et al., 2016). 
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Moreover, in line with the signalling theory, by holding the information content 
constant, firm valuations may depend on how information is categorised and 
presented (Peng and Xiong, 2006). The extent of disclosure, reporting 
transparency and news outcomes signal good news on the favourable aspects 
related to financial and corporate information, which in turn might lead to stock 
price over-valuing. Under a transactional setting, when an investor is considering 
purchasing stock from a listed firm, this firm might be interested in signalling the 
hidden value of the equity investment (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989), or reporting 
extended corporate information relating to strong governance mechanisms, 
including effective BoDs (Higgins and Gulati, 2006). Conveying information 
about strong CG to stakeholders eliminates the information asymmetry between 
firm managers and investors (e.g. Ballas et al., 2012; Bergh et al., 2014). 
4.4 Hypotheses Development 
With the lack of evidence related to the possible effect of board busyness on stock 
market valuations of banks in general terms, additional research gaps emerge, 
which particularly pertain to studying this effect within different bank types (i.e. 
IBs and CBs). Based on the two distinct and contradicting views of busy boards 
discussed above (i.e. the busyness versus reputational effects) and the limited 
evidence available within the banking setting, the study conjectures that board 
busyness can have either positive or negative implications on stock market 
valuations. However, the direction of the association will be ultimately 
conditional on the system of CG employed, the levels of the agency costs and the 
banking business model, all of which could vary depending on the bank type. 
4.4.1 Market Valuations of Busy Board of Directors in Islamic and 
Conventional Banks 
As mentioned earlier, IBs are distinguished from CBs by several aspects of their 
business models. Unlike CBs, depositors/investors in IBs have no right to 
intervene in the financial and operating management of their funds (Abdel Karim, 
2001). Therefore, managers in IBs have full control of the investment process of 
depositors’ funds. This offers them several opportunities to pursue their own 
benefits at the expense of their investors, which can result in investors carrying 
additional agency costs (Abdelsalam et al., 2016). Moreover, additional agency 
costs arise in IBs, given that outside directors, who are expert in Shari’ah 
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legitimacy, are scarce worldwide, and there are only a few prominent and expert 
outside directors who dominate the IB industry.  
Under such complex agency-principle relationship in IBs, board busyness can 
reduce the monitoring ability of the outside board and effectively mitigate and 
prevent management wealth expropriation from minority shareholders, which 
occurs due to the limited time and attention given by outside directors to 
scrutinise the bank’s operations against risky and opportunistic 
activities/transactions – strictly impermissible according to the Shari’ah 
governance in this banking sector. Furthermore, operating on a constrained 
banking model might result in investors’ uncertainty regarding the streams of 
future cash flows that must be invested in compliance with the Shari’ah rules. 
Poor monitoring by busy boards can further destroy the trust of investors with 
regards to managers’ discretion and expropriation of rents (e.g. Caprio et al., 
2007). Therefore, investors may anticipate that additional cash flow might be 
diverted, and a smaller portion of the firm’s profits will be paid off as dividends 
(La Porta et al., 2002).  
In contrast, CBs operate on a relatively less complex business model that 
facilitates alternative investment channels, quick access to market sources and risk 
diversifications through trading in financial instruments which are prohibited from 
selling by IBs (e.g. derivatives and options). Therefore, when compared to IBs, 
the various reputational benefits associated with board busyness are more likely to 
be available and pervasive for CBs to enhance the bank equity value. Signalling 
such reputational effects to the stock market is expected to positively affect 
investors’ perceptions of board busyness.34  
Accordingly, due to high information risk, published information on board 
busyness in IBs is expected to signal weak systems of governance and/or 
increased cost of equity to the stock market. Investors are expected to perceive 
board busyness as leading to ineffective monitoring quality and may request 
higher rewards for the possibly arising risks, suggesting lower stock price 
                                                          
34 Moreover, in line with the representativeness heuristic theory, individuals are likely to overestimate “the 
probability of an event based on the similarity between its properties and the parent population’s properties”; 
for example, comparing the firm position with its competitors using several benchmark indicators (Chan et 
al., 2004, p. 5). For a CB that appoints outside directors who serve in many banks, investors may 
overestimate the probability that these directors are more knowledgeable/reputable and might also 
overestimate the fact that busy independent directors are certified as effective monitors of the banking 
operations and, hence, investors could anticipate subsequently high returns and high firm value.   
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multiples in IBs when compared to their conventional counterparts.35 This leads to 
the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
H4: Busy board of directors are more valued by conventional bank investors than 
by Islamic bank investors. 
4.4.2 Market Valuations of Busy SSB in Islamic banks 
IBs operate on a double governance mechanism (i.e., BoDs and SSB). The 
presence of an extra layer of governance (i.e., SSB) could serve as an effective 
mechanism to monitor IBs’ prioritisation of religious norms. The SSB’s primary 
role is to ensure Shari’ah compliance and minimise reputation risk, which may 
result in capital erosion among IBs as well as in lawsuits by fund providers 
(Archer and Karim, 2007; Godlewski et al., 2016). Members of this board also 
serve as counterparts of conventional internal auditors who enhance the 
creditability and reliability of published financial and non-financial information in 
the stock market (Godlewski et al., 2016). Therefore, the Shari’ah governance is 
expected to promote investors’ trust and confidence about the quality of published 
information by IBs, who are presumably targeting investments and trades that 
incorporate ethical and moral criteria (O’Sullivan, 1996; Pomeranz, 1997). 
Therefore, investment choices and stock price valuations are likely to be 
influenced by the outcomes of the screening process as well as decisions made by 
the SSB on the quality and sufficiency of the corporate information published by 
IBs in compliance with the Shari’ah laws (Elnahass et al., 2019). 
To date, a limited number of Shari’ah advisors engage excessively in IBs’ 
activities by sitting on many SSBs for banks operating globally (Wilson 2009; 
Godlewski et al. 2016). Reuters (2012) reports that the top 20 Shari’ah scholars 
hold about 55% of all board positions worldwide, and some scholars are much 
more in demand than others. As such, a busy SSB can adversely affect IB 
investors’ valuation in two ways. First, given the high concentration of the 
workload undertaken by a small group of Shari’ah experts and the fact that SSBs’ 
performance is not regularly evaluated by the BoDs (Mollah and Zaman, 2015), 
SSB is expected to be less effective in their Shari’ah monitoring as a result of 
                                                          
35 This prediction is in line with the good management theory (Jamali et al., 2008; Pae and Choi, 2011), 
which states that a positive relationship between low-quality monitoring by boards and the provision of low-
quality corporate-level information. This relation is likely to be pervasive when operating under 
opaque/complex business models. 
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such board busyness. This might signal a weak Shari’ah governance to the stock 
market and, hence, reduce the bank value. Second, the scarcity and high 
reputation of Shari’ah scholars suggest that they might be expensive to appoint 
because their appointment reflects higher charges of salaries and remunerations 
which will have substantial implications on the bank financial performance 
leading to lower investor valuations. Prior studies suggest that expensive 
appointments of boards imply low-cost efficiency and poor firm performance (see 
Linn and Park, 2005; Brick et al., 2006). This will, in fact, directly affect the cost 
of equity and relative firm valuations in stock markets (Renneboog and Zhao, 
2011)36.  
Accordingly, this study conjectures that SSB busyness is likely to signal of weak 
Shari’ah governance and low bank performance to the stock market leading to low 
market valuations for IBs. This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative form: 
H5: Busy SSB is negatively valued by Islamic bank investors 
4.5 Data and Methodology 
4.5.1 Data Collection 
Due to the research objectives, this study focuses on listed IBs and CBs in global 
stock markets for the period 2010-2015. Because of the small number of listed 
commercial banks in countries including both bank types, this study changed the 
first criteria of the sampling procedure to obtain a comprehensive database. 
Indeed, in line with prior banking studies (e.g. Beck et al., 2013; Alqahtani et al., 
2017; Mollah et al., 2017), this research applied four criteria to filter the sample: 
(1) countries with both types of banks and at least two listed banks; (2) banks 
which have annual reports (official websites) which are published as of 31 
December; (3) full-service investment banks and banks with Islamic windows 
were dropped from the sample; (4) banks must have at least three consecutive 
years’ full data availability. The final sample is an unbalanced panel data set 
covering 70 listed commercial banks (386 bank-year observations) operating in 11 
                                                          
36 In line with the equity theory (Dah and Frye, 2017), multiple directorships is associated with the board 
entrenchment caused by the over-payment for those members. The equity theory anticipates the reaction of 
individuals towards over- or under-reward situations. Specifically, directors make subjective assessments of 
the ratio of their efforts (input) and compensation (output) to those of other referents. They may experience 
dissonance if their perceived ratio is unequal to that of referents. Consequently, they often reduce their efforts 
or try to push their compensation to obtain the similar ratio to salient other referents. 
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countries.37 Countries such as Malaysia and Turkey, where IBs have a significant 
share of the total banking industry, have been excluded from the sample as most 
IBs are not listed as separated entities on the stock markets (Saeed and Izzeldin, 
2016). Table 4.1 reports the sample determination criteria for the full sample and 
each subsamples of this study.  






Initial Sample 196 2842 3038 
Less:    
Countries having both types of banks 
and have at least two listed banks (at 
least one bank for each type of bank) 
125 2189 2314 
Annual reports are retrieved from 
official website and reported as of the 
financial Year 31 December 
27 481 508 
Classified as Commercial bank + Full-
ledged IBs and CBs 
9 127 136 
At least three consecutive years’ full 
data availability 
8 2 10 
Final Sample 27 43 70 
Notes: The table presents the data collection procedure. This process comprises of five 
screening criteria steps consistent with Beck et al. (2013), Abedifar et al. (2013), Mollah 
and Zaman (2015), Mollah et al. (2017), and Elnahass et al. (2018). The initial sample 
includes 196 IBs and 2842 CBs in 36 countries. The final sample comprises of 27 listed IBs 
and 43 listed CBs in 11 countries from 2010-2015. 
Table 4.1: Sample Determination Criteria for Empirical Study 2 and 3 
Table 4.2 presents the sample distribution by country and bank, with 27 listed IBs 
(150 observations) and 43 listed CBs (236 observations). The percentage of bank 
representations between IBs and CBs is approximately 40% to 60% respectively. 
The highest concentration of IBs is represented by Bahrain and Bangladesh whilst 
















Bahrain 30 30 60 20.00 12.71 15.54 
Bangladesh 36 44 80 24.00 18.64 20.73 
Egypt 3 9 12 2.00 3.81 3.11 
Indonesia 6 66 72 4.00 27.97 18.65 
Jordan 12 29 41 8.00 12.29 10.62 
Kuwait 3 12 15 2.00 5.09 3.89 
Pakistan 24 6 30 16.00 2.54 7.77 
Qatar 18 24 42 12.00 10.17 10.88 
Saudi Arabia 6 6 12 4.00 2.54 3.11 
                                                          




UAE 6 6 12 4.00 2.54 3.11 
Oman 6 4 10 4.00 1.70 2.59 
TOTAL 150 236 386 100 100 100 
Number of banks 27 43 70 - - - 
Notes: This table presents the sample distribution of the study 2 and 3. The study sample comprises of 70 
listed banks (386 observations) with 27 IBs (150 observations) and 43 CBs (236 observations) in 11 countries 
for the period from 2010 to 2015. The country-wise distribution (observations and percentage) of each types 
of bank and full sample is shown in collums 2-7. 
Table 4.2: Sample Distributions of Empirical Study 2 and 3 
4.5.2 Measures for Market Valuation and Boards Busyness 
Consistent with prior literature, this study measures the bank market value using a 
firm-level market measure, which is the Tobin’s Q (e.g. Cheng et al., 2008; 
Ammann et al., 2011; Cashman et al., 2012; Black et al., 2015; Gyapong et al., 
2016; Muravyev et al., 2016). Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking approximation (i.e. 
incorporating all the current and expected future information) of firm value that 
captures the value of intangible corporate resources (e.g. goodwill and trust from 
good board structure). It is theoretically estimated as the sum of a bank year-end 
book value of debt and market value of equity, divided by its year-end book value 
of total assets. The market value of equity is computed as the end-year number of 
outstanding shares multiplied by the stock prices (e.g. Coles et al., 2008; Güner et 
al., 2008; Faleye et al., 2011; Busch and Hoffmann, 2011; Cashman et al., 2012; 
Gyapong et al., 2016). As this measure combines market value with book values, 
distortion of tax laws and accounting conventions are minimised (Wernerfelt and 
Montgomery, 1988). This calculation explains about 97 per cent of the variance of 
Tobin’s Q (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). 
Though previous studies have often used Tobin’s Q as a measure for market 
valuation, it has faced criticism. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) argues that 
capital in the denominator of this measure may be endogenous because 
entrenched managers could enjoy a quiet life and underinvest. Companies which 
underinvest may operate below their company’s profit-maximising scale. In spite 
of mitigating the NPV of a firm, underinvestment tends to increase the value of 
Tobin’s Q. In addition, an active board governance may either reduce Tobin’s Q 
by diminishing underinvestment or increase it by decreasing costs, thus possibly 
rendering it ambiguous (Dybvig and Warachka, 2010).  
However, the selection of this measure is justified for several reasons. First, the 
aim of this current research is to investigate the long-term firm valuations of 
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boards’ busyness. Therefore, whereas Tobin’s Q measures long-term market 
valuations (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 2001; Thomas and Eden, 2004; Sami et al., 
2011), using other short-term accounting performance measures, such as return on 
assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE), are not feasible to the current research 
context. Second, relative to Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE are likely to be subject to 
many short-run earnings manipulation activities (Gyapong et al., 2016). Finally, 
its drawbacks notwithstanding (e.g. potential measurement errors), Tobin’s Q is 
still known today as one of the standard dependent variables in firm value 
research within the context of CG (e.g. Yermark, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006; Black et al., 2012; Black et al., 2014) and hence, this is still 
a sensible variable to include. As other things are equal, if CG (i.e. board 
structure) influences the firm market value, this should be reflected in this 
measure (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Black et al., 2012; Black et al., 2014). 
Following previous studies (e.g. Black et al., 2012; Black and Kim, 2012), the 
research takes the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q (lnQ hereafter) to mitigate the 
impact of high-q outlier banks.  
This study employs the same measurements for busy BoD (ABOD; %BBOD) and 
busy SSB (ASSB; %BSSB) as the study 1. Details are presented in Section 3.4.3. 
4.5.3 Methodology and Empirical Models 
Banks are likely to differ in the opportunities and challenges that they may 
encounter over the years due to the peculiar nature of their sector. This can lead to 
a situation where disclosure of board directorships, other board characteristics and 
bank market value are jointly and dynamically determined by unobserved bank-
specific variables (e.g. quality and style of management, business strategy, market 
perception and bank complexity) (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), which pooled 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation may detect and control (Kraatz and 
Zajac, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, like study 1, this current research also 
employs panel data estimations to mitigate endogeneity problems arising from 
potential unobserved bank-specific heterogeneity (e.g. Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009). 
Although better governance practices of a firm can enhance its profitability 
position, investors’ valuation may only be capturing the high profitability 
performance rather than perceiving the specific board busyness attribute. To 
overcome possible misinterpretations of the investors’ firm valuations, the study 
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includes a comprehensive set of control variables to mitigate omitted-variable bias 
as well as utilised Three-Stage Least-Square (3SLS) estimations with instrumental 
variables (IVs) (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 2001; Coles et al., 2008; Faleye et al., 
2011) to mitigate the endogeneity between busy boards and bank valuation38.  
The choice of valid IVs implies a correlation with the endogenous variable, and 
not with the error terms of the dependent variable39 (Elyasiani and Jia, 2008). 
Consistent with study 1, this research uses the same IVs which include the number 
of public firms headquartered in the same country of the bank, and the country-
level income generating category. Discussion about IVs selection is presented in 
Section 3.4.4 in Chapter 3.  
Both IVs are correlated with possible endogenous variables (i.e. board busyness) 
and should predict stock market valuations only indirectly, through their effects 
on endogenous variables (see Black et al., 2006). Indeed, in this study setting and 
sampled banks, those IVs can indirectly affect bank valuations because the 
country-level indicators are less likely to influence Tobin’s Q endogenously. The 
research, accordingly, specify the simultaneous models as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (eq.4.1) 
𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (eq.4.2) 
Where, lnQit represents the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q for bank i at time t; 
BBODit represents {ABOD; %BBOD}; ϕP is a vector of control variables in the 
bank valuation model. Year effects and Country effects capture the year-fixed and 
country-fixed effects; εit is the error term. 
4.6 Control Variables Measurements 
4.6.1 Corporate Governance Variables 
In line with prior firm valuation literature, the CG variables include BoD size 
(LogBSIZE) and independence (%INDEP) to control for firm governance 
characteristics, which is measured by the number of directors on board and the 
                                                          
38 The Wu-Hausman endogeneity test (e.g. Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) statistics reveal the presence of 
endogeneity biases. 
39 Two diagnostic tests, Sargan test and Breusch and Pagan LM, suggest that both IVs theoretically and 
statistically satisfy the necessary conditions for validity and relevance. 
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percentage of outside non-executive directors on board, respectively (e.g. Faleye, 
2007; Erkens et al., 2012; Black and Kim, 2012; Cashman et al., 2012; Li, 2014).  
4.6.2 Bank-level Characteristics Variables 
Bank-specific variables consist of bank size (LogTA) as measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets measured in thousands of USD of a bank at the end of the 
fiscal year (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Black et al., 2012; Black et al., 2015), 
bank age (LogAge) measured by natural logarithm of the difference between the 
sample year and the year that bank’s first appearance (e.g. Ahn and Shrestha, 
2013; Bhagat et al., 2015). In addition, the research includes financial leverage 
(LEV), measured by the ratio of total liability over total equity since it can impact 
on lnQ by providing tax benefits and mitigating free cash flow problems (Black et 
al., 2012; Black and Kim, 2012). It also controls for Big4 auditor (BIG4) taking a 
value of 1 when the bank has a big4 auditor and 0 otherwise (Mollah and Zaman, 
2015). Furthermore, subsidiaries dummy variable (SUB) is used to control for 
bank ownership structure. It takes a value of 1 if it is subsidiary of a parent 
company and 0 otherwise. In accordance to Mollah et al. (2017), the research 
controls for the possible effect of banking sector concentration on value by using 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
This study additionally follows the prior firm valuation research on governance 
(e.g. Aggarwal et al., 2009; Ammann et al., 2011; Cashman et al., 2012) to control 
for the depreciation expense over sales (DEP/SALES), the ratio of property, 
plants and equipment to sales (PPE/SALES), the ratio of capital expenditure to 
total assets (CAPEX/ASSETS) and the ratio of cash to total assets 
(CASH/ASSETS). The first variable, i.e. DEP/SALES, is included to capture for 
the bank growth opportunities, which is estimated by the ratio of depreciation 
expense and total sales (Cashman et al., 2012). The second variable, i.e. 
PPE/SALES, is added into the empirical models because firms operating with 
greater (lower) portions of fixed (intangible) assets can consider it less optimal to 
adopt a strict practice of firm governance because of less scope to waste assets 
(Ammann et al., 2011). The last two control factors, i.e. CAPEX/ASSETS and 
CASH/ASSETS, are also included to capture for the market valuations towards 




4.6.3 Country-level Characteristics Variables and Type of Bank Variables 
The country-level characteristics variables include the annual growth in the GDP 
(GDP_GROWTH), annual rate of inflation (INFL) and an index representing the 
legal system of the country (LEGAL). Moreover, the study also includes one of 
country governance indicators which is the political stability and absence of 
violence (POLITICAL). According to World Bank (2016), it is measured by the 
quality of governance performance that reflects perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. It is 
estimated by ranging from -2.5 (weak) to +2.5 (strong). Against the expectation 
that political stability affects economic growth, stock markets, the profitability of 
banks, and investment, the study predicts that investors are more likely to invest 
their capital into the stock market in countries with higher political stability. In 
other words, the higher the likelihood political instability is, the lower the bank 
value. Moreover, for the whole sample, the study includes the type of banks 
variable (ISLAMIC) which is a dummy taking value of 1 if it is classified as IBs 
and 0 otherwise. This variable reflects the difference in the market valuations 
between these two banking models.  
Table 4.3 summarises all control variables employed in this study. Appendix 2 
provides definitions of all variables used in all tested models. 
Group Control variables Abbreviations 
Corporate 
Governance 
Board of Directors Size LogBSIZE 







Bank Size LogTA 
Bank Age LogAge 
Bank Leverage LEV 
Big 4 Audited BIG4 
Subsidiaries dummy SUB 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI 
Depreciation over sales DEP/SALES 
Property, plants and equipment over sales PPE/SALES 
Capital expenditure to total assets CAPEX/ASSETS 
Cash to total assets CASH/ASSETS 
Country-level 
characteristics 
GDP Growth rate GDP_GROWTH 
Inflation rate INFL 
Legal system LEGAL 
Political stability and absence of violence POLITICAL 
Type of bank Islamic banking dummy ISLAMIC 
Table 4.3: Study 2 - Content of Each Group of Independent Variables 
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4.7 Descriptive Statistics 
This section describes the data sample of this study by presenting the descriptive 




FULL SAMPLE IBs Sample 
Mean 
CBs Sample  
Mean 
Two-Sample t-Test 
(two-tailed) Variables/ Ratios N Mean Median Std. Min Max 
lnQ 386 0.235 0.029 1.028 -0.219 6.558 0.258 0.220 -0.342 
ABOD 386 2.257 1.8 2.046 0 11 2.071 2.374 1.419* 
%BBOD 386 47.9 50 0.377 0 100 43.4 50.9 1.908* 
ASSB 150 10.789 11.7 7.284 0.538 33.667 10.789   
%BSSB 150 77.8 100 0.299 11.1 100 77.8   
BSIZE 386 9.544 9 3.705 3 25 10.647 8.843 -4.512*** 
%INDEP 386 34.8 33.3 0.237 0 100 32.7 36.2 1.322 
LogTA 386 15.407 15.427 1.287 11.999 18.047 15.228 15.522 2.196** 
LogAge 386 3.234 3.500 0.750 0 4.771 3.066 3.341 3.438*** 
DEP/SALES 386 0.027 0.019 0.037 0 0.352 0.038 0.019 -4.064*** 
PPE/SALES 386 0.111 0.084 0.116 0 0.461 0.005 0.178 26.249*** 
CAPEX/ASSETS 386 0.316 0.207 0.418 0 3.685 0.300 0.327 0.616 
CASH/ASSETS 386 0.091 0.080 0.059 0.004 0.420 0.102 0.084 -2.701*** 
LEV 386 8.039 7.775 3.774 -4.210 19.998 8.283 7.883 -0.945 
HHI 386 0.142 0.109 0.095 0.058 0.672 0.159 0.131 -2.573** 
GDP_GROWTH 386 0.049 0.048 0.029 -0.024 0.196    
INFL 386 0.047 0.048 0.032 -0.024 0.139    
LEGAL 386 0.637 1 0.542 0 2    
POLITICS 386 -0.662 -0.765 0.964 -2.812 1.211    
Dummy Variables Count Percent 
BIG4 (Full sample, IBs, CBs) 277 (93; 184) 72% (62%; 78%) 
SUB (Full sample, IBs, CBs) 64 (30; 34) 17% (20%; 14%) 
ISLAMIC 150 39% 
Table 4.4: Study 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
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4.7.1 Market Valuations 
This study puts Tobin’s Q in the logarithm form (lnQ) to solve the skewness issue 
and mitigate the impact of high-q outlier banks but achieve similar results if we do 
not take logs. This is supported by previous studies (e.g. Black et al., 2012). As 
can be seen from Table 4.4, IBs report a higher mean of lnQ (0.258) than that of 
CBs (0.220). However, the two-sample t-test shows an insignificant difference 
between these two sub-samples.  
4.7.2 Boards Busyness 
Table 4.4 reports that (listed) IBs reveals lower average busyness (ABOD) for 
their BoD compared to (listed) CBs; with lower means of 2.071 (2.374) for IBs 
(CBs) respectively. This figure is similar to those in previous studies including 
Ferris et al. (2003) and Elyasiani and Zhang (2015). In addition, (listed) IBs also 
show lower percentage of busyness (%BBOD) for their BoD compared to (listed) 
CBs; with lower mean of 43% (51%) for IBs (CBs) respectively. This variable is 
significantly different between the two bank types, supported by significant 
coefficient of the two-sample t test. Regarding busy SSB, the table shows that 
each Shari’ah advisor averagely hold about 11 outside directorships (ASSB). 
Also, SSB serving in IBs shows a substantially high level of busyness with a 
mean of 77.8% for %BSSB. 
4.7.3 Corporate Governance Variables  
Table 4.4 also presents the descriptive statistics of CG variables including BoD 
size (BSIZE) and BoD independence (%INDEP). For full sample (IBs and CBs 
together), the table presents an average of 10 directors on BoD and a median of 9 
directors. Furthermore, (listed) IBs show the larger size of the BoD (11 directors) 
compared to CBs (9 directors), supported by significant coefficient of two-sample 
t-test. Following previous studies, BSIZE is transformed into logarithm form 
(LogBSIZE) which can help to mitigate the skewness of this variable. The 
statistics for independent non-executive directors show that, on average, the BoD 




4.7.4 Bank-level Variables  
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2013; Elnahass et al., 2018), the 
findings of Table 4.4 suggest that IBs (15.2; 3.07) are significantly smaller in firm 
size (LogTA) and younger in age (LogAge) than CBs (15.5; 3.34). Together with 
unreported findings for market capitalisation across the two banking types, the 
study argues that CBs appear to have either higher market value in size or higher 
book value in size, compared to their Islamic counterparts. The study also finds 
that IBs subsample shows significantly and statistically higher CASH/ASSETS 
(0.102), DEP/SALES (0.038) but lower PPE/SALES (0.005) than CBs subsample 
(0.084; 0.019; 0.178, respectively). HHI mean value of IBs (0.159) is higher than 
that of CBs subsample (0.131). Regarding two dummies, BIG4 and SUB, the table 
shows that 72% (62%; 78%) of listed banks in full sample (IBs, CBs) is audited 
by Big 4 auditor companies, and similarly, 17% (20%; 14%) of listed banks in full 
sample (IBs, CBs) is subsidiaries. 
4.7.5 Country-level Variables and Type of Banks Variable  
Table 4.4 shows that the average annual GDP growth rate (and inflation) of each 
country is 4.9% (4.7%) with the median of 4.8% (4.8%). The indicator of political 
stability and absence of violence in each country shows the mean of (-0.662) and 
median of (-0.765). Furthermore, the median value of one of LEGAL index for 
the full sample implies the majority of all observations combining both Shari’ah 
law and others to define their legal system. The count of ISLAMIC dummy 
variable indicates that 150 bank-year observations represents for IBs and hence, 
236 bank-year observations represents for CBs. This reveals that full sample 
includes a smaller percentage of IBs (40%) than that of CBs (60%).  
4.7.6 Correlation Matrix of All Independent Variables 
This study also tests for multicollinearity between each independent variable and 
the others by employing both the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix and VIFs. 
As can be seen from Table 4.5 (full sample and CBs) and Table 4.6 (IBs), pairs of 
independent variables with significant correlation coefficients are marked in bold. 
According to Nunnally and Bernstein’s guidelines (1994), most of significantly 
correlated independent variables are in the weak range (/r/ < 0.3). Meanwhile, the 
rest of pairs of correlated variables have coefficients which are higher than 30%. 
Nonetheless, the majority of these correlation pairs are in the moderate range, 
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their absolute correlation coefficients are still within acceptable limits (0.8) and 
raise no concerns on multicollinearity, which is further supported by the low 
individual VIF values (<10), low means of VIFs (<6) and low condition numbers 
(<15) (Section 4.8). Some exceptional pairs including %BBOD and ABOD (full 
sample, CBs and IBs) and ASSB and %BSSB (IBs sub-sample) are highly 
correlated; however, they are alternative proxies for busy BoD and busy SSB, 
respectively, and therefore, will not be included in the same empirical models. As 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
1. ABOD 1 0.792 0.267 -0.073 -0.063 0.002 0.175 0.072 0.005 0.060 -0.034 0.042 0.061 0.183 -0.095 -0.182 0.298 -0.057 - 
2. %BBOD 0.813 1 0.311 0.020 -0.015 -0.003 0.126 0.064 -0.042 -0.012 -0.119 0.166 -0.063 0.181 -0.034 -0.197 0.350 -0.010 - 
3. LogBSIZE 0.128 0.191 1 -0.497 0.000 0.051 -0.033 0.052 -0.008 -0.038 0.022 -0.083 -0.126 0.149 -0.139 0.018 0.291 -0.192 - 
4. %INDEP 0.165 0.201 -0.403 1 0.141 0.034 -0.001 -0.063 -0.027 -0.076 -0.095 0.230 0.209 -0.077 0.129 -0.137 -0.128 0.193 - 
5. LogTA -0.038 0.005 -0.039 0.218 1 0.135 -0.170 -0.321 -0.418 -0.133 -0.185 0.426 -0.157 0.096 -0.062 -0.315 0.318 0.487 - 
6. LogAge 0.102 0.073 -0.073 0.045 0.239 1 0.104 0.071 -0.284 0.045 -0.005 0.186 -0.165 -0.068 -0.234 -0.176 0.130 0.186 - 
7. DEP/SALES 0.025 -0.042 -0.156 0.041 -0.386 -0.211 1 0.443 0.046 0.375 0.040 -0.006 0.109 0.276 -0.029 0.021 0.119 -0.008 - 
8. PPE/SALES 0.097 0.108 -0.147 0.023 -0.097 0.167 -0.082 1 0.282 0.157 -0.047 -0.091 -0.059 0.177 -0.035 -0.071 0.051 0.053 - 
9. CAPEX/ASSETS 0.029 -0.004 0.004 0.024 -0.297 -0.249 0.096 0.174 1 0.061 -0.109 -0.143 0.075 -0.096 0.052 0.135 -0.195 -0.241 - 
10. CASH/ASSETS 0.055 0.061 0.209 -0.081 -0.045 0.035 -0.038 -0.037 0.087 1 0.294 -0.237 -0.021 -0.095 0.117 0.213 -0.374 -0.101 - 
11. LEV -0.080 -0.053 0.153 -0.170 0.042 0.061 -0.271 -0.072 -0.084 0.329 1 -0.540 -0.174 -0.287 0.075 0.489 -0.469 -0.373 - 
12. BIG4 0.185 0.216 -0.248 0.387 0.466 0.219 -0.074 0.082 -0.080 -0.268 -0.457 1 0.043 0.319 -0.176 -0.456 0.489 0.367 - 
13. SUB 0.079 0.029 -0.070 0.169 0.014 -0.039 -0.107 -0.089 0.050 -0.041 -0.028 0.048 1 0.023 -0.005 0.103 -0.067 -0.219 - 
14. HHI 0.022 0.011 -0.024 -0.115 0.071 -0.051 0.028 -0.033 -0.001 0.010 -0.115 0.166 0.111 1 -0.029 -0.139 0.588 0.213 - 
15. GDP_GROWTH -0.138 -0.094 -0.036 0.047 -0.020 -0.155 -0.064 -0.009 0.059 -0.022 -0.020 -0.127 0.010 -0.074 1 -0.076 -0.268 0.173 - 
16. INFL -0.194 -0.178 0.063 -0.313 -0.313 -0.044 -0.020 -0.044 0.090 0.140 0.396 -0.516 0.162 0.128 -0.110 1 -0.514 -0.620 - 
17. LEGAL 0.250 0.263 0.049 0.048 0.310 0.037 0.059 -0.104 -0.122 -0.180 -0.267 0.483 -0.010 0.482 -0.252 -0.450 1 0.304 - 
18. POLITICAL -0.031 -0.018 -0.114 0.263 0.432 0.078 -0.102 0.126 -0.106 -0.135 -0.400 0.421 -0.192 -0.009 0.207 -0.657 0.217 1 - 
19. ISLAMIC -0.072 -0.097 0.233 -0.071 -0.111 -0.179 0.246 -0.731 -0.031 0.148 0.052 -0.173 0.073 0.144 -0.018 0.014 0.181 -0.141 1 
Notes: The table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix among all independent variables used in the regression analysis for the Full sample (lower-left triangle) and CBs subsamples (higher-right triangle) from 
2010-2015. Bold numbers are significant at the 5% level. See Appendix 2 for all variable definitions. 
Table 4.5: Pearson Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix for Full Sample (N = 386) and Conventional Banks (N = 236) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
1. ABOD 1                    
2. %BBOD 0.847 1                   
3. ASSB 0.222 0.183 1                  
4. %BSSB 0.275 0.124 0.707 1                 
5. LogBSIZE -0.051 0.076 -0.333 -0.692 1                
6. %INDEP 0.481 0.418 0.277 0.306 -0.285 1               
7. LogTA -0.019 0.008 0.162 0.213 -0.032 0.296 1              
8. LogAge 0.223 0.139 -0.228 0.097 -0.141 0.030 0.337 1             
9. DEP/SALES 0.009 -0.078 0.099 0.215 -0.363 0.089 -0.543 -0.297 1            
10. PPE/SALES 0.188 0.104 0.127 0.179 -0.117 0.010 -0.436 0.039 0.385 1           
11. CAPEX/ASSETS 0.061 0.043 0.014 0.027 0.038 0.077 -0.146 -0.229 0.154 0.220 1          
12. CASH/ASSETS 0.078 0.176 -0.169 -0.136 0.420 -0.067 0.075 0.081 -0.200 0.094 0.125 1         
13. LEV -0.134 0.031 -0.299 -0.222 0.288 -0.231 0.298 0.145 -0.421 -0.396 -0.057 0.350 1        
14. BIG4 0.376 0.256 0.548 0.592 -0.396 0.540 0.496 0.204 -0.049 -0.002 -0.017 -0.263 -0.378 1       
15. SUB 0.121 0.175 -0.135 -0.112 -0.040 0.140 0.258 0.137 -0.236 -0.187 0.025 -0.083 0.108 0.082 1      
16. HHI -0.122 -0.125 0.110 0.238 -0.261 -0.130 0.085 0.009 -0.071 0.005 0.093 0.042 -0.012 0.099 0.171 1     
17. GDP_GROWTH -0.217 -0.194 -0.033 -0.206 0.131 -0.054 0.037 -0.067 -0.090 -0.122 0.069 -0.162 -0.124 -0.075 0.032 -0.116 1    
18. INFL -0.217 -0.158 -0.612 -0.392 0.114 -0.478 -0.315 0.094 -0.041 0.000 0.043 0.080 0.315 -0.591 0.225 0.325 -0.151 1   
19. LEGAL 0.215 0.178 0.658 0.637 -0.462 0.312 0.370 -0.011 -0.020 0.028 -0.002 -0.040 -0.068 0.599 0.039 0.383 -0.231 -0.404 1  
20. POLITICAL -0.024 -0.059 0.498 0.192 0.034 0.313 0.363 -0.073 -0.096 -0.026 0.021 -0.129 -0.418 0.448 -0.150 -0.128 0.249 -0.699 0.191 1 
Notes: The table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix among all independent variables used in the regression analysis for the IBs subsamples from 2010-2015. Bold numbers are significant at the 5% level. See 
Appendix 2 for all variable definitions. 
Table 4.6: Pearson Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix for Islamic Banks (N = 150) 
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4.8 Empirical Results 
4.8.1 Market Valuations of Busy Boards of Directors in Islamic and 
Conventional Banks 
Table 4.7 reports the 3SLS estimations examining the effect of board busyness on 
market valuations for the full sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel B, BOD: column 1; 
and SSB: column 2) and CBs (Panel C) subsamples. Table 4.8 reports very low 
individual (<10) and mean VIFs (<6) results, in addition to low condition index 
(<15), suggesting no concern with multicollinearity. 
In Table 4.7 (Panel A), for the full sample, the coefficient on BoD busyness 
(ABOD; %BBOD) is significantly and positively associated with lnQ. This 
implies that investors, on average, perceive board busyness as value-enhancing 
board attribute that increases bank valuations. This result is in line with, both, the 
resource dependence and signalling theories suggesting that outside directors 
serving on many boards can promote strong governance and bring strategic 
resources (e.g. extended industry knowledge, expertise and access to market 
sources) to their firms, and hence, positively valued by investors.  
With respect to the control variables, board size (LogBSIZE) shows a negative 
and significant coefficient, which is consistent with prior evidence predicting that 
small boards tend to perform more effectively than large boards (e.g. Yermack, 
1996; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Gyapong et al., 2016). Having a small board 
associated with high financial ratios (e.g. profitability and operating efficiency) 
and better CEO compensation. As a result, some empirical evidence (e.g. Kini et 
al., 1995; Yermack, 1996) indicate that small boards are preferred by institutional 
investors, dissident directors and corporate raiders. The coefficient on board 
independence (%INDEP) is negative and significant which suggests that more 
outside directors serving on many boards are associated with lower firm 
valuations. This is in line with conventional firm studies of Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), Ararat et al. (2010), Black et al. (2012), and Elyasiani and Zhang (2015). 
The coefficients of bank age (LogAge) are always significantly positive across 
models 1 and 2, which suggests that the advantages of mature banks, in average, 
are positively valued by the investors. Moreover, higher capital expenditure are 
associated with lower market valuations, as represented by the negative and 
significant coefficients on CAPEX/ASSETS ratio. These findings for both 
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variables, LogAge and CAPEX/ASSETS, are in line with Ammann et al. (2011). 
Results further show negative associations between lnQ and, both of, the LEV and 
BIG4. The negative LEV coefficient is consistent with the existing studies (e.g. 
Woidtke, 2002; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Gyapong et al., 2016), which indicate 
that investors adversely price firms operating on high leverages. Moreover, the 
low valuation for Big4 firms might be attributable to investors’ perception that 
those firms are either more expensive to appoint (Craswell et al., 2002) or offer 
similar quality of assurance services to those provided by non-Big4 firms 
(Lawrence et al., 2011). Finally, the significantly positive coefficients on 
DEP/SALES and SUB suggest that the banks having higher depreciation ratio, 
and banks classified as subsidiaries are higher valued by investors which is in line 
with prediction.  
When examining the effect of the BoD busyness across the two bank types, in 
Table 4.7 (i.e. Panels B and C), the study finds insignificant evidence for the 
effect of busy outside directors on market valuations for IBs. This implies that 
investors in IBs seem not to price board busyness. For CBs (Panel C), the research 
finds a positive and significant association between busy BoD (ABOD; %BBOD) 
and lnQ, suggesting that investors in CBs tend to price board multiple 
directorships as increasing the firm value. Results for control indicators across the 
two bank types are generally consistent with the main findings for the full sample. 
However, the study finds the positive coefficients of bank age (LogAge) for IBs 
only, implying that the higher pricing towards matured banks of investors in full 
sample tends to be driven by IBs. Moreover, CAPEX/ASSET is negatively valued 
in CBs, with no significant evidence for IBs. As acknowledged that CBs are 
relatively older than their Islamic counterparts (Abedifar et al., 2013), investors 
may under-price high capital expenditure caused by the replacement of old 
physical assets, such as property and equipment, which might either not be well 
supported in terms of reasoning or not generating additional investment 
opportunities, from an investor point of view. Furthermore, higher cash reserves 
are related to higher market valuations on IBs, as represented by the positive and 
significant coefficients of CASH/ASSETS. This is in line with Ammann et al. 
(2011). Findings of LogAge, BIG4 and DEP/SALES obtained in full sample are 
only found for IBs subsample. 
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Taken together, the findings show that board busyness has a differential effect on 
the market valuations across both bank types. Having a busy board increases the 
market valuations for CBs with no significant evidence for IBs, which is in line 
with our prediction and supports the hypothesis H4. The positive effect of board 
busyness on the market valuations of CBs indicates that some reputational 
benefits are likely to dominate investors’ expectations. The emerging reputational 
benefits from board busyness seem to alleviate investors’ uncertainty related to 
ineffective monitoring and agency conflicts between investors and bank 
managers. This, in turn, leads to high market valuations. The finding is consistent 
with prior literature within the industrial sector settings (e.g. Ammann et al., 2011; 
Field et al., 2013; Clifford et al., 2018). The absence of market valuations for IBs 
can be justified through the signalling theory. Investors in IBs seem to be well 
informed about the importance of effective monitoring as well as the relative 
implications of poor Shari’ah governance. These findings suggest that investors 
seem to be sceptical of board busyness and penalise IBs by not valuing busy 





 Panel A:  
Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
Panel B:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel C: 

















ABOD 0.329***  0.030  0.016  0.294***  
ASSB     -0.138***    
%BBOD  2.063***  -0.093  -0.011  1.765*** 
%BSSB      -2.225***   
Controls included YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept 1.989** 1.846** 0.449 1.555 7.034*** 3.837** 3.658*** 5.542*** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 386 386 150 150 150 150 236 236 
Adj. R-Square 0.068 0.034 0.786 0.787 0.658 0.643 0.013 0.118 
Wald Chi2 269*** 242*** 557*** 566*** 400*** 540*** 186*** 147*** 
LM Statistics  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test  0.422 0.107 0.364 0.328 0.110 0.110 0.108 0.100 
ABOD = ASSB (F-Test)     0.000    
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test)      0.000   
Notes: The table presents the results of the 3SLS estimations of the system of simultaneous equations (eq.4.1)-(eq.4.2) for the full sample (Panel A; models 1-2), IB subsample (Panel B; models 3-6) and 
CB subsample (Panel C; models 7-8) identifying the impact of busy BoD or busy SSB on a bank’s market value. The study treats both over-boarded boards and bank market value as endogenous variables 
and builds simultaneous equations models. The log of Tobin’s Q (lnQ) is the dependent variable. The average outside directorships of outside directors/ Shari’ah advisors (ABOD; ASSB) and the 
percentage of busy outside directors/ Shari’ah advisors on board (%BBOD; %BSSB) are alternative main variables of interest for busy BoD/SSB, respectively. Models are tested for the period of six-
year from 2010. The study controls for year and country fixed effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. LM and Sargan test show that all models are correctly identified and 
the selected IVs are valid. The reported F-test (i.e. Wald test) in models 5-6 indicates that the two coefficients are statistically different. See full table in Appendix 4A. 
Table 4.7: 3SLS - Board of Directors Busyness and Bank Valuation - Within Islamic and Conventional Banks 
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 Panel A: Full Sample  
(IBs and CBs) 
Panel B: Islamic banks  
(IBs) 


















ABOD 1.32  2.16  2.32  1.30  
ASSB     3.57    
%BBOD  1.42  1.88  1.94  1.41 
%BSSB      3.72   
LogBSIZE 1.52 1.61 2.64 2.64 2.80 4.13 1.66 1.76 
%INDEP 1.63 1.70 2.20 2.14 2.34 2.25 1.56 1.65 
LogTA 2.30 2.32 4.75 4.74 4.83 4.76 2.04 2.08 
LogAge 1.29 1.28 1.97 1.84 2.27 1.86 1.35 1.37 
DEP/SALES 1.55 1.55 2.22 2.22 2.23 2.24 1.74 1.74 
PPE/SALES 2.66 2.66 1.80 1.80 1.85 1.85 1.62 1.61 
CAPEX/ASSETS 1.24 1.25 1.27 1.27 1.29 1.27 1.53 1.54 
CASH/ASSETS 1.31 1.31 1.86 1.88 1.87 1.95 1.61 1.61 
LEV 1.97 1.97 3.32 3.40 3.44 3.46 2.08 2.06 
BIG4 2.64 2.68 4.85 4.79 4.95 5.13 2.08 2.10 
SUB 1.22 1.21 1.43 1.46 1.43 1.51 1.33 1.34 
HHI 1.93 1.94 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.18 2.13 2.14 
GDP_GROWTH 1.29 1.29 1.38 1.37 1.38 1.38 1.39 1.39 
INFL 3.28 3.24 4.80 4.78 4.92 4.87 2.72 2.63 
LEGAL 2.98 3.07 3.18 3.19 3.69 3.20 3.88 3.99 
POLITICAL 2.63 2.63 3.50 3.45 4.07 3.47 2.61 2.61 
ISLAMIC 2.99 3.00       
Mean VIF 1.99 2.01 2.68 2.65 2.86 2.84 1.92 1.94 
Conditional Index 4.76 4.81 6.22 6.23 6.88 6.72 4.88 4.98 
Table 4.8: VIFs in Bank Market Valuation Models – For Full Sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel B) and CBs (Panel C) Sub-Samples 
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4.8.2 Market Valuations of Busy SSB in Islamic Banks 
This study extends the analyses to test H5, expecting negative market valuations 
for a busy SSB in IBs. In Table 4.7 (Panel B, models 5 and 6), results show a 
negative and significant coefficient on SSB busyness (ASSB; %BSSB) which 
suggests that SSB busyness reduces bank value40. This finding implies that 
investors seem to discount the value for banks appointing busy SSBs as such level 
of busyness can be perceived as a potential risk for their banks. This is because a 
lax involvement of the busy SSB may lead to a failure in ensuring the mandatory 
compliance of IBs to the rulings of Shari’ah, which promotes a reputation risk 
and, hence, could trigger the collapse of IBs and cause systematic risk. Moreover, 
busy SSB members might have limited time to review and offer advice on 
contractual arrangements/transactions which might incorporate high uncertainty 
and risk-taking. Results for other control variables remain qualitatively 
unchanged. The overall finding supports H5.  
The study further observes that busy BoDs show consistently an insignificant 
impact on IBs valuations 41. To examine whether there is a significant difference 
between the two-board busyness (BoD versus SSB) results, we compare the 
coefficients on ABOD and ASSB, as well as %BBOD and %BSSB. The reported 
F-test (i.e. Wald test) (see Wald, 1943; Pathan and Skully, 2010) indicates that the 
two coefficients are statistically different. These findings suggest that investors 
seem to significantly perceive busyness of SSB and BoD differently, placing 
substantial valuation for busy SSB. This might be justified by the relative high 
trust and confidence that effective Shari’ah monitoring could have in preserving 
the religious/ethical orientation of this banking sector (Elnahass et al., 2018).  
 
 
                                                          
40 In unreported sensitivities, Tobin’s Q was used to replace for its logarithm function (lnQ) (see Ammann et 
al., 2011; Cashman et al., 2012) across all models in Table 4.7, but the main findings remains qualitatively 
unchanged. Tables will be provided upon request. 
41 In unreported sensitivities, like study 1, this second study also captured cross-country variations in 
governance perceptions for our sample by developing a country governance index (COUNTRY_GOV) as an 





4.9 Robustness Checks  
4.9.1 Using Alternative Measures for Bank Market Valuation 
To address potential measurement errors of lnQ, as a sensitivity, this research uses 
an alternative proxy for market value which is the market capitalisation 
(lnMARCAP). This variable is defined as the natural logarithm form of the bank’s 
market capitalisation (i.e. the stock price per share multiplied by the number of 
common shares outstanding (Badenhorst and Brümmer, 2015)42.  
The study examines the two hypotheses (H4 and H5) across both bank types using 
lnMARCAP. Results in Table 4.9 report that findings for both bank types 
generally remain the same. For IBs, results show no evidence on the firm 
valuation of busy BoD and a significantly high negative firm valuation of busy 
SSB. In contrast, CBs report a positive association between busy board and 
lnMARCAP. These results suggest that the main findings are not driven by 
potential measurement errors or model misspecifications when using lnQ. 
                                                          
42 Unreported descriptive statistics show that IBs have a significantly lower average market capitalisation of 
13.501 relative to their conventional counterparts (13.883). 
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 Panel A:  
Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
Panel B:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel C: 

















ABOD 0.787**  0.518  0.291  0.790***  
ASSB     -0.478***    
%BBOD  4.450***  3.114  1.303  4.074*** 
%BSSB      -1.955***   
Controls included YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept 0.758 0.153 -3.911 -5.266 15.710*** 0.766 6.029*** 4.364** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 386 386 150 150 150 150 236 236 
Adj. R-Square 0.011 0.077 0.685 0.599 0.141 0.626 0.041 0.264 
Wald Chi2 461*** 469*** 377*** 225*** 290*** 369*** 304*** 308*** 
LM Statistics  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test  0.111 0.071 0.140 0.336 0.251 0.178 0.258 0.120 
ABOD = ASSB (F-Test)     0.000    
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test)      0.020   
Notes: The table presents the robustness test which uses the log of market capitalisation as the alternative proxy for bank market value. It reports 3SLS results for the full sample (Panel A; models 1-2), IB 
subsample (Panel B; models 3-6) and CB subsample (Panel C; models 7-8) identifying the effect of busy BoD or busy SSB on a bank’s firm value. The study treats both over-boarded boards and bank market 
value as endogenous variables and builds simultaneous equations models. The log of market capitalisation (lnMARCAP) is the dependent variable. The average outside directorships of outside 
directors/Shari’ah advisors (ABOD; ASSB) and the percentage of busy outside directors/ Shari’ah advisors on board (%BBOD; %BSSB) are alternative variables of interest for busy BoD/SSB, respectively. 
Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study controls for year and country fixed effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. LM and Sargan test show that all 
models are correctly identified and the selected IVs are valid. The reported F-test (i.e. Wald test) in models 5-6 indicates that the two coefficients are statistically different. See full table in Appendix 4B. 
Table 4.9: Alternative Firm Valuation Measure – Boards Busyness and Firm Value within Islamic and Conventional Banks 
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4.9.2 Two-step System Generalized Method of Moments  
Like study 1, this research further tests the robustness of the results using a GMM 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) which can address the 
crucial issue of endogeneity in examining the impacts of corporate governance on 
firm value. In brief, GMM approach can control for a dynamic endogeneity (i.e. 
current actions of a bank influence future firm governance and performance, 
which might in turn influence the banks’ future actions), unobservable 
heterogeneity, and simultaneity. More details are provided in Section 3.8, Chapter 
3. 
The dianostics tests (see Table 4.10) report that all models are well-fitted with 
stastistically insignificant test statistics for both second-order autocorrelation (AR 
(2) p-values>10%, implying that the residuals in the second-difference are serially 
uncorrelated by way of construction) and Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying 
restrictions (p-values>10%). Results for first-order autocorrelation (AR (1) p-
values<10%) indicate that the residuals in the first-difference are serially 
correlated. The Hansen test examines the null hypothesis of the IVs validity and 
shows the statistically insignificant J-statistics for all tested models suggesting 
that the IVs are valid in the respective estimations. 
Results in Table 4.10 are consistent with main findings identified through 3SLS. 
Busy BoD is positively valued in CBs with no significant evidence for IBs. SSB 
busyness still shows a detrimental impact on market valuations. These results 
show that the main findings remain the same after capturing for unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity, and provide empirical 










  Panel A:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel B:  









ABOD 0.005  0.096**  
ASSB -0.008***    
%BBOD  0.034  0.469*** 
%BSSB  -0.312*   
Controls included YES YES YES YES 
Intercept 0.411 -0.549 -0.895** -0.415 
lnQt-1 0.978*** 1.021*** 0.413* 0.712*** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 123 123 193 193 
Wald Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (1) 0.022 0.038 0.070 0.095 
AR (2)  0.936 0.332 0.656 0.582 
Hansen test  0.621 0.179 0.475 0.197 
Notes: The table presents the robustness test results of the GMM estimations for the IB subsample 
(Panel A; models 1-2) and CB subsample (Panel B; models 3-4) identifying the impact of busy 
BoD/SSB on a bank’s market value. The log of Tobin’s Q (lnQ) is dependent variable. The average 
outside directorships of outside directors/Shariah advisors (ABOD; ASSB) and the percentage of 
busy outside directors/Shariah advisors on board (%BBOD; %BSSB) are the main variables of 
interest for busy BoD/SSB. Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study 
controls for year and country fixed effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 
0.01. AR (1) and AR (2) are dianogtic tests for no serial correlation of first-order and second-order, 
respectively, in the first-differenced standard errors. Hansen is the test of over-identifying 
restrictions. See full table in Appendix 4C.  
Table 4.10: Robustness Check – GMM – Boards Busyness and Bank Valuation – 
Within Islamic Banks and Conventional Banks 
4.10 Summary  
This study extends previous research on firm valuations and CG by examining a 
specific board’s attribute: busyness (i.e. multiple directorships). It offers new 
insights on the stock market valuations of banks by identifying the possible 
influence of distinct bank institutional characteristics and business models. The 
study comparatively and empirically assesses the cases of CBs and IBs. The 
results indicate that a busy BoD generally promotes high market valuations in 
support of additional preferential benefits that a busy board can generate for their 
firms. However, investors across the two bank types showed differential pricing 
for appointing a busy BoD. The study finds that in CBs, investors assign a high 
valuation for a busy board while IB investors do not value such an attribute. This 
is consistent with the fourth hypothesis (H4) that busy BoDs are more valued by 
CB investors than by IB investors. The researcher takes a step further to examine 
the effect of busy SSBs within IBs. The results show that having busy Shari’ah 
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advisors significantly lower their banks’ market valuations, supporting for the 
fifth hypothesis (H5). Investors in IBs consistently perceive busy SSBs as 
damaging the bank value, but there is no evidence for such perception for a busy 
BoD.  
The overall findings suggest that, unlike their conventional counterparts, stock 
markets engaging with IBs tend to be more sensitive to the busyness level of SSB 
and not that for outside directors. These results imply that despite the importance 
of having a double-layer governance mechanism in an IB system, enhancing the 
credibility and trust in this banking business model might not hold in the presence 
of lax monitoring, particularly for a Shari’ah governance. Having busy SSBs 
might affect the moral accountability for IBs and substantially lowers investors’ 
long-term confidence in this type of bank. Results showing the positive influence 
of board busyness on increasing CBs valuations can partially alleviate the concern 
that busy outside directors must be priced as over-boarded or less effective in 
general terms. These findings reinforce those of Conyon and Read (2006), 
indicating that limiting the number of directorships of the BoD is not necessarily 
an ideal regulatory response. Moreover, IBs can learn from CBs on how to 
effectively exploit the possible reputation effects of busy outside directors and 
how to successfully signal such information to stock markets and enhance equity 
valuations. 
Findings in this study contribute to the continuous debate on the need to 
reconsider different mechanisms of board governance in increasing firm value in 
the global banking sector. Results can also inform both investors’ investment 
choices and regulator governance reforms for the two bank types. Moreover, the 
listed banks in dual banking countries should consider providing detailed and 
transparent disclosure on the related board directorships information alongside 
assessing the stock market responsiveness to this information within different 
banking settings. Future research in this financial arena may extend the busyness 
issue and focus on evaluating the economic consequences of extending 
governance structures to include additional boards with sufficient and relevant 
accounting and financial expertise, appropriate training and continuing education 




CHAPTER 5. STUDY 3 - BOARD BUSYNESS AND 
DIVIDEND PAYOUTS: EVIDENCE FROM 
ALTERNATIVE BANKING MODELS 
5.1 Abstract 
The study investigates the effect of a busy BoD on dividend policy across two 
alternative banking models (i.e. Islamic and conventional) for eleven countries 
from 2010 to 2015. Results for the full sample show that a busy BoD has a 
significantly positive impact on the bank’s dividend payout ratio (dividends over 
net income), and this positive influence is more pronounced in CBs. IBs which 
employ a busy BoD report lower levels of cash payouts. These results highlight a 
potential challenge for the severe agency conflicts arising from the complex 
dividend payout model of IBs, which is subject to greater scrutiny and additional 
rulings when compared to the conventional model.  
5.2 Introduction 
Although dividend payout strategies have been investigated over more than 50 
years, since Modigliani and Miller’s seminal work (1958, 1961), it remains a 
‘puzzle’ from an agency perspective. Prior studies (e.g. Easterbrook, 1984; Ben-
Nasr, 2015; Firth et al., 2016; Mulyani et al., 2016; Saeed and Sameer, 2017) 
suggest that dividend payouts play an important role in reducing agency conflicts 
by controlling the amount of free cash flow, which is likely to be exploited by 
managers for their self-interests (e.g. perquisites, risk aversion, and empire 
building). However, few empirical research studies (e.g. Dickens et al., 2002; 
Basse et al., 2014; Lepetit et al., 2018) analyse the dividend payouts for the 
banking industry, despite being of great importance for both regulators and 
policymakers. Earlier studies support that payouts decisions play a significant role 
in lessening severe agency problems in the banking sector (Onali et al., 2016). 
Restrictions imposed on cash fund when dividends are distributed to shareholders 
is likely to force bank managers to access market sources to raise outside funds 
and provide timely and credible information about the bank performance to stock 
markets. This can diminish asymmetric information and agency costs and support 
shareholders to scrutinise/discipline managers (Basse et al., 2014; Tran and 
Ashraf, 2018).  
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Accordingly, dividend payouts strategy in the banking industry constitutes a 
crucial pillar for their rigorous and prudent risk management (Kanas, 2013); and it 
has recently moved into the regulatory spotlight (Lepetit et al., 2018). An 
ineffective bank dividend strategy can lead to adverse implications on a bank’s 
future performance and financial stability, causing long-term detrimental 
economic consequences (Kupiec and Ramirez, 2013). Agency and governance 
problems are more complicated in banking due to the high level of opacity in 
contractual and financial reporting practices (Mülbert, 2009), the generation of 
information asymmetries (Morgan, 2002) and the high levels of risk-taking and 
the complex leverage cost structures (Mehran et al., 2011). These interrelated 
qualities make a bank dividend payout policy more difficult to scrutinise than 
other industries (Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013).  
The uniqueness of governance mechanisms in banks implies a dominant influence 
by the BoDs on their firms’ dividend payouts (Onali et al., 2016). This board has 
the final say on a firm’s dividend payout ratios and, hence, can effectively 
mitigate possible agency issues that arise. Therefore, the quality of the BoDs’ 
supervision and their engagements in managerial decision-making can have direct 
implications on the payout level (Sharma, 2011; John et al., 2015). Appointing 
busy outside directors (i.e. holding multiple board seats across many firms) can 
hence influence bank dividend policies and tend to be related to the extent of 
agency conflicts and/or the complication of a bank business model.  
In line with the resource dependence theory, effective monitoring by a BoD is 
vital for efficient resource allocation and risk mitigation (Meng et al., 2018). 
Employing a busy BoD where outside directors hold multiple board seats across 
several firms is expected to bring some reputational benefits to firms (e.g. 
promoting extended business networking/connections and quick access to market 
resources) (Jiraporn et al., 2009; Brennan et al., 2016). As such, banks employing 
busy outside directors can positively influence their dividends policy through 
flexible access to capital markets to raise funds at lower costs. However, an 
accumulation of multiple directorships by outside directors can imply negative 
implications on bank governance and dividend strategy. Outside directors may 
ineffectively monitor their firms when they are ‘‘over-boarded’’ or busy. Such 
busy boards may not be able to fulfil their monitoring and advising role to 
managers due to their time and effort constraints and event conflicts (Fich and 
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Shivdasani, 2006; Ahn et al., 2010). Accordingly, board busyness can lead to 
higher agency costs related to free cash flow and promote adverse impacts on a 
bank’s dividend policy (Sharma, 2011; Chou and Feng, 2018). 
Till date, relatively little is known about the impact of effective systems of 
governance and the influence of busy boards on the dividend policy within the 
banking sector. In conventional banking, studies provide mixed evidence (e.g. 
Akhigbe and Whyte, 2012; Srivastav et al., 2014; Ashraf and Zheng, 2015; Onali 
et al., 2016; Kutubi et al., 2018). Prior studies highlighting the effect of busy 
boards on dividend payouts are mainly focused on industrial firms (i.e. Sharma, 
2011; Chou and Feng, 2018) and also show inconsistent findings. To the best of 
my knowledge, studies in Islamic banking is scare. Investigating the influence of 
busy boards across IBs and CBs will contribute to the ongoing debate identifying 
the possible impacts of different institutional characteristics and governance 
system on the dividend strategies.  
Prior theoretical studies highlight the presence of distinct differences in the 
governance as well as the dividend policies of IBs and CBs (e.g. Athari et al., 
2016; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018a). IBs operate on a non-interested based 
model which is governed by Shariah rulings and promote profit-loss sharing 
between the bank and depositors. Governance structures adopted by IBs tend to be 
more complicated compared to CBs (Mollah and Zaman, 2015) (see Chapter 2). 
Besides, the IB dividend model is characterised as being more constrained than 
conventional banking. Several structural differences do exist between the two 
bank types, concerning their dividend distribution principles, motives, mechanics 
and techniques and the flexibility of payouts. These differences are expected to 
influence the effectiveness of their governance monitoring and the overall levels 
of payouts. In general terms, the profit distribution decisions of IBs must be 
compliant with Shari’ah principles (Schaik, 2001; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 
2018a) and, hence, their payouts involve a nexus of contracts between the bank, 
depositors and shareholders (Alhabshi, 2002). Accordingly, IBs managers’ 
motives to pay dividends are likely to be driven by the preferences of both 
investors and depositors, while those of their conventional counterparts tend to be 
driven solely by investors’ preference (Al-Hunnayan and Hashem, 2011).  
Furthermore, IBs distributions of profits and their payouts policy are more 
complex and less flexible than that of CBs. IBs are usually challenged by liquidity 
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management issues and accessing short-term borrowings from external sources 
(Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Beck et al., 2013). Subsequently, they tend to hold 
substantial excess free cash flow or other liquid assets at a low rate of return to 
meet expected/unexpected capital challenges. These constraints can have 
implications on the dividend payout strategies in IBs, leading to low payouts 
ratios and less stable dividends distributions in the long-term (Athari et al., 2016). 
In contrast, CBs have quicker access to market sources as well as alternative 
financial instruments such as derivatives and options, and this is likely to promote 
greater flexibility when it comes to their dividend payouts strategies (Bitar et al., 
2017). Moreover, the use of hedging by these banks, not permitted under the IB 
model, is associated with a low cost of debt but also with higher credit risk (Deng 
et al., 2017). When compared to their Islamic counterparts, both the reduced cost 
of debt and the availability of fund sources promote more stable and frequent 
payouts of dividends at high rates.  
Under the IB dividend model and complex governance structure, employing busy 
outside directors can have adverse implications on their monitoring abilities. It 
might encourage managers to ex-post deviate from the payout policy and engage 
in poor or risky investment decisions. The negative impact of board busyness is 
likely to be more pronounced as the BoD in this banking sector, generally, relied 
heavily on the effectiveness of the Shari’ah governance by SSB in scrutinising the 
risky banking activities (see Farag et al., 2018). Weak monitoring by the busy 
board can thus result in adverse selection and moral hazard problems on both 
sides of the IB balance sheet (Nienhaus, 2007; Visser, 2009). Conversely, CBs 
operating on a less constrained business/dividend model and a single-layer 
governance structure would have lower agency costs. They, therefore, can obtain 
the reputational benefits from busy boards through their improved internal 
monitoring ability. As a result, due to the presence of systematic differences 
between the business models of CBs and IBs, the premise is that having a busy 
board in IBs is likely to be associated with a lower payout ratio than that in CBs. 
This is also attributable to the extended agency costs of IBs, requiring effective 
monitoring from the BoD (see Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Athari et al., 2016).  
The study measures the dividends payout by the ratio of dividends to net income 
and employs a comprehensive sample of 386 bank-year observations (70 listed 
banks) in eleven countries from 2010–2015. Findings show that for the full 
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sample (i.e. CBs and IBs together), banks with busy boards exhibit, on average, a 
higher payout ratio. This finding is consistent with the reputation hypothesis, 
suggesting that busy directors can use their expertise and connections to support 
effective dividends policy. Analyses conditioned on the bank type support the 
expectation and indicate that a CB with a busy board offers significantly high 
payout ratios. In contrast, having busy boards in IBs show a detrimental effect on 
the bank dividend level. These results suggest that dividend strategies of IBs are 
likely to be more sensitive to the board busyness level than their conventional 
counterparts, which can be attributable to the constrained dividend model of the 
former.  
This study contributes to prior literature in several ways. It is the first to examine 
the implications of board busyness and dividend policies in the banking industry 
and within a broader international context. The results also contribute to the 
inconclusive evidence within the US context, which has focused on non-financial 
industries (e.g. Sharma, 2011; Chou and Feng, 2018). This study is also the first to 
investigate the possible differential impacts on payout policies across different 
bank types by utilising an important board attribute such as busyness and 
exploiting a unique business model of IBs. Although prior studies in IBs are still 
accumulating and have discussed the theoretical implications of the payout 
process for such a bank type (e.g. Shaheen, 2005; Al-Gurrah Daghi, 2009; Essa, 
2010), empirical evidence on the relationship between dividends and board 
governance is still lacking. The study also extends previous research on the 
implications of overcommitted boards in governance studies in conventional 
banking (e.g. Sharma, 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2017; Chou and 
Feng, 2018) by introducing the comparative case with IBs. Moreover, the research 
contributes to the growing stream of Islamic-conventional banking literature (e.g. 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al., 2017; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018a). 
Finally, the study adds to the ongoing debate about the effect of institutional 
characteristics and stricter governance mechanisms on several firm outcomes such 
as firm performance, risk-taking, capital structure, cost of debt and cash holdings 
(e.g. Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Meng et al., 2018).   
The findings in this study provide important implications to bank regulators, 
investors and stock markets that engage with both bank types. The differential 
impact of board busyness across the two bank types imply that distinct dividend 
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strategies employed under different business models are substantially affected by 
this attribute of the BoD (i.e. board busyness). Accordingly, the findings are likely 
to inform the investment decisions of market participants who engage with the two 
bank types. Furthermore, as the international capital markets and regulatory 
standards have been continuously engaged in promoting sound financial systems 
and effective mechanisms for governance, the results might assist regulators in 
explaining the differential payouts patterns when banks are operating on a busy 
board structure. Finally, IBs can learn from their conventional counterparts on 
how to promote reputational benefits, including the effective mitigation of 
extended agency issues when recruiting busy boards.  
5.3 Background and Related Studies  
5.3.1 Theoretical Framework 
The agency theory represents one of the dominant views on dividend policies (see 
Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2015). Prior studies have long 
argued that managers (e.g. CEOs) have strong incentives to engage in 
discretionary acts (Williamson, 1964), take excessive compensation and 
perquisites (Sharma, 2011) and utilise the excess free cash flow in unprofitable 
projects. Easterbrook (1984) highlights that the monitoring and risk aversion 
preferences might lead to agency problems between managers and shareholders, 
and, hence, result in cash dividends. Managers are likely to manipulate and shift 
the amounts of dividends across future periods (i.e. the earnings smoothing effect) 
if they have the motives to increase the dividend ratios despite the low level of 
permanent earnings. A managerial discretion to establish the payout policy can 
exacerbate the agency problems between managers and shareholders; such 
conflict is particularly more severe in banks due to their highly levered capital 
structure (John et al., 2010).  
Dividend payout is not a governance mechanism; rather it plays a similar role as 
an implicit governance tool in reducing agency costs between shareholders and 
managers (Sharma, 2011; Onali et al., 2016). This is because the monitoring needs 
of capital providers are lower since the amount of free cash flow is reduced after 
distributing dividends, leading to a lower probability of managers wasting excess 
available cash (e.g. Easterbrook, 1984; Edmans, 2011). Furthermore, in line with 
the risk aversion perspective, managers are likely to have a lower risk tolerance 
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than firm shareholders since they might have substantial personal gains/incentives 
tied up with the firm’s performance. As identified by Easterbrook (1984), 
shareholders might have the preference for higher dividends payout, which 
reduces retained earnings and forces managers to raise external funds.  
Although managers would use dividend payment to lessen agency costs 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000), they still retain discretion over dividend 
strategies. Because dividends reduce the proportion of the available discretionary 
funds, those managers may try to manipulate dividend strategies to guarantee that 
excess profits will be retained in the company for their self-purpose, ceteris 
paribus (Easterbrook, 1984). Therefore, the presence of a BoD provides an 
essential internal governance mechanism to prevent managerial discretion. This 
board has an ultimate oversight responsibility to scrutinise payouts policies, 
including the levels and ratios of payments before announcing dividends to the 
capital markets (White, 1996). Such responsibility involves the consideration of 
various factors related to a firm’s growth opportunities, current leverage and 
potential emergencies before approving a payout. Therefore, the BoD has an 
important role in influencing and controlling the agency costs associated with the 
payouts process of dividends (Sharma, 2011).  
5.3.2 Previous Empirical Evidence 
The context of intense regulation and higher asymmetry in the banking sector lead 
to the unique relevance/role of the BoD who has a legal responsibility in 
approving a bank’s policies, procedures and business strategies. This board would 
have an ultimate oversight function for bank decisions (Elyasiani and Zhang, 
2015). The duties and obligations of the bank directors (i.e. inside and outside 
directors) serving on the board may arise in two main contexts. First, they need to 
bring a discrete decision to the board for approval which results in a rise of 
directors’ legal responsibility on the bank safety and soundness. Second, they 
must provide an effective bank oversight for the bank operations (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003; Adams and Mehran, 2003; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). Also, 
many stakeholders (e.g. authorities) have placed additional expectations on bank 
BoDs that delineate their responsibilities even further. Outside directors serving 
on the BoDs should have either, advisory or oversight role, or both over 
executives. They should also perform their tasks independently from inside 
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directors in which they can provide vigilant scrutiny over inside board members 
on behalf of shareholders and, thus, may reduce agency problems (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). To scrutinise managers more effectively, those outside directors 
might be required to invest their time, attention and efforts to analyse any 
information provided by managers, banks as well as consultants (Leblanc, 2004).  
Prior studies provide mixed evidence for the effect of CG on dividend policies. 
Within the industrial sector, the literature identifies the impact of BoD 
characteristics on firms’ dividend payout. This includes board size (e.g. 
Abdelsalam et al., 2008; Van Pelt, 2013), independent directors (e.g. Al-Najjar 
and Hussainey, 2009; Boumosleh and Cline, 2015), CEO duality (e.g. Officer, 
2006; Sawicki, 2009), age and experience (e.g. Custódio and Metzger, 2014), 
CEO entrenchment (e.g. Hu and Kumar, 2004), and board gender diversity (e.g. 
Saeed and Sameer, 2017; Chen et al., 2017). Other studies find a significantly 
positive impact of corporate governance index (G-Index) on the likelihood of 
paying dividends and/or dividend yield in the US market (e.g. Jiraporn and Ning, 
2006; Officer, 2006; Jo and Pan, 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2011). Hu and Kumar 
(2004) show that CEO entrenchment is likely to increase dividend payout ratios. 
Setia-Atmaja (2010) also indicates a positive influence of board independence and 
dividends paid in family-controlled firms. Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) 
argue that the voting power of executive directors has a significant relation to the 
propensity to pay dividends or the combination of dividends and share 
repurchases. Deshmukh et al. (2013) find that an over-confident CEO pays lower 
levels of dividends than a rational CEO to accumulate higher financial slack for 
future investment needs. Caliskan and Doukas (2015) document that inside debt 
induces CEOs to pay dividends while convex CEO compensation is related to 
lower payouts.  
Investigating board busyness and dividend policies have previously focused on 
non-financial firms within the US context. For a sample of US non-financial 
firms, Sharma (2011) shows that the decision to pay out dividends is associated 
with the strength of board governance, which is measured through the level of 
board busyness. Chou and Feng (2018) find that when industrial US firms have 
more limited investment opportunities, board busyness is positively associated 
with higher dividend payouts. They explain that multiple directorships are likely 
to enhance internal board monitoring and reduce the agency problems of a firm’s 
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liquid assets. Board busyness, they also suggest, results in using cash more 
effectively and, thereby, providing direct benefits to shareholders. Other studies 
identify the influences of busy BoDs while focusing on firm performance, market 
value, and cost of debt and/or risk-taking (e.g. Ferris et al., 2003; Field et al., 
2013; Chakravarty and Rutherford, 2017).  
Studies in the banking sector offer limited evidence of the association between 
governance and dividends payouts. Theis and Dutta (2009) examine the 
relationship between inside ownership and dividend payout policies after 
controlling for the levels of bank capitalisation. Akhigbe and Whyte (2012) find a 
negative effect of managerial stock ownership and payouts across the financial 
firms. Onali et al. (2016) find a negative impact of director ownership and CEO 
power on the dividends of European-listed banks.  
Accordingly, evidence on the board busyness and dividends payouts within the 
banking industry is scant. Moreover, none of the prior studies has tested for the 
influence of different bank types as a mediating factor for this possible association 
between board busyness and firm dividend decisions. This study, hence, seeks to 
fill in these gaps through a comparative assessment of IBs and CBs. 
5.3.3 Structural differences in dividend models 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the key feature differentiating Islamic from 
conventional financial intermediaries is the additional monitoring through a 
Shari’ah governance board, and the dominance of Islamic principles over the 
business model (i.e. the prohibition of interests and of speculative and uncertain 
trading activities). Under the conventional banking finance paradigm, a bank is 
likely to shift credit risk to the depositors under an interest-based contractual 
arrangement (Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018). Contrarily, as per Shari’ah 
guidelines, IBs are expected to perform their intermediation functions through 
PLS contractual agreements between the banks, depositors and IAHs (Farag et al., 
2018). According to the PLS paradigm, entrepreneurs share their profits and 
losses with IBs according to a pre-determined ratio. IBs pool all profits and losses 
from different investments and share the profits with depositors of funds taking 
into account the relative contributions of capital and equity and the investment 
deposits (Olson and Zoubi, 2008). A proportion of the remaining earned profits is 
used to pay dividends to equity holders, for which dividends on common equity is 
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discretionarily allocated and distributed by the bank managers (Khan and 
Mirakhor, 1989).  
The IB dividend model under this PLS paradigm indicates substantial differences 
in the distribution principles, the extent of flexibility of payouts and the 
mechanics and techniques when compared to the conventional banking dividend 
model (e.g. Ayub, 2007; Beck et al., 2013; Athari et al., 2016). This study 
summarises these key differences in Table 5.1. These differences are expected to 
influence the governance monitoring effectiveness of both bank types and the 
overall levels of dividend payouts.  
First, a payout policy in an IB is likely to be less flexible than that of a CB. While 
the dividend distribution decisions of the former are significantly affected by their 
challenges in managing liquidity and accessing short-term borrowings from 
outside sources (Beck et al., 2013; Elnahass et al., 2014), the latter has better 
liquidity opportunities promoted by their ease and quick access to external market 
sources and the availability of alternative instruments to raise funds such as 
hedging and derivatives (Bitar et al., 2017; Deng et al., 2017). IBs, therefore, are 
likely to hold greater capital buffers to mitigate their liquidity challenges as well 
as preserve their regulatory capital ratios. The existence of limited sources of 
finance, such as the issuance of Islamic bonds, to enhance the liquidity and capital 
position leads to substantial restrictions imposed on the bank business model and 
dividends strategies (Elnahass et al., 2014). As a result, CBs are better positioned 
to offer more frequent payouts of dividends at higher rates when compared to 
Islamic banking (Athari et al., 2016). 
Second, IBs encounter additional challenges related to their actual (Shari’ah) 
profit determination compared to CBs. Under the constrained dividends model, 
any fraction of earnings which are generated from investments that do not comply 
with the Islamic principles cannot be distributed to shareholders or used to acquire 
assets (Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018a).43 Given that an IB’s contracts should, 
in principle, be backed by underlying assets or investment activity, in many 
occasions it is too complex to determine the estimated profits when some projects 
                                                          
43 Permissible earnings and profits must be calculated from the volume of money which participated in the 
bank trading activities and investments within the specific pre-determined contractual timeframe for example 
when the capital was initially deposited (Ahmed, 1996). Provisions, depreciation expensed, or other expenses 




have not yet been realised before the end of the fiscal period. This can have 
implications on the bank’s dividends payouts. Also, unlike their conventional 
counterparts, IBs cannot employ all the capital available to undertake investment 
opportunities, either because the regulations do not allow them, or because the 
capital available for investment is higher than the IBs’ investment portfolio 
(Ahmed, 1996). However, such related complexities and issues are not raised in a 
CB business model as Islamic rulings will not constrain its distributable profits. 
Depositors in this bank type obtain their returns in the form of regular/composite 
interest payments which are treated as expenses when CBs compute their net 
profits and dividends for shareholders. As such, an important difference between 
IBs and CBs in this respect is the shift in treating returns payable to depositors as 
a distribution of shared profits and not an expense (Alhabshi, 2002; Saeed and 
Izzeldin, 2016). Moreover, in contrast to IBs, the interest expenses paid for 
depositors in CBs should be independent of the completion of investment projects. 
These banks, hence, may have lower difficulties of calculating profits 
distributable for shareholders. Accordingly, the IB financial structure of a 
dividend-based model differs from CBs (Schaik, 2001; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 
2018a), which may, in turn, lead to different payout levels between the two bank 
types. 
Third, with the restrictions imposed on the IB dividends model, which must 
comply with the Shari’ah principles, profit distributions by IBs reflect an active 
process involving a nexus of contracts between the bank, depositors and equity 
holders (Schaik, 2001; Alhabshi, 2002; Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018a). 
Thereby, the profit and dividend payout decisions of IBs are associated with an 
agreement among these three parties. In other words, the basis and manner of 
profit distributions could change in future and are subject to the contract 
agreement among parties. This adds to the main structural differences in the 
distribution motives of IBs relative to their conventional counterparts. The 
payouts decisions by IBs’ managers are ultimately driven by the preferences of 
both investors and depositors.44 In contrast, a sound distribution policy in CBs 
                                                          
44 While the bank should ensure that the depositors contracted under PLS contracts are sufficiently rewarded 
(Wilson, 2007), there are several key challenges which will affect a profit distribution policy within Islamic 
banks. These are (i) the profit-sharing ratio; (ii) the concentration of asset risks; (iii) the amount of reserves 
maintained; and (iv) weights assigned to the various classes of investment deposits to calculate regulatory 
capitals; and (v) the distributions of earnings to non-investment deposits as well as to priority deposits in 
financing and investment (FAS 5 and 6, AAOIFI, 1997). 
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depends solely and mainly on the preference of investors (shareholders) to 
enhance the bank market value (Al-Hunnayan and Hashem, 2011). As such, 
compared to CBs, additional monitoring costs imposed on IBs might be needed to 
avoid disappointing the investors/depositors45. 
Finally, the mechanics and techniques of IB dividend distributions are likely to be 
more complicated than those of CBs (Athari et al., 2016). A survey by Al-
Hunnayan and Hashem (2011) defines a commonly used dividend model in an IB 
and summarises its key structures based on four steps; (i) revenues and expenses 
allocation; (ii) reserves and provisions deductions; (iii) distributions for profit and 
loss saving and investment accounts (PSIA hereafter); and (iv) distribute 
dividends (see Figure 5.1). At each step of this payout process, there are potential 
variations in the practices of IBs. Moreover, under the PLS paradigm, the 
dividend decisions by IBs managers are subject to the interactions between PSIA 
and dividend distributions. In contrast, CBs are known as intermediates between 
depositors and borrowers, and their revenue is defined as the difference in the 
interest gains between the two parties. Thus, their net profit is calculated by the 
deduction of expenses from revenues (Saeed and Izzeldin, 2016). Payout 
decisions in CBs, nevertheless, are related to current bank profitability, future 
growth opportunities and optimal capital budget as well as the equity amount 
needed to finance the optimal budget via retained earnings (see Partington, 1989; 
Deshmukh et al., 2013; Onali et al., 2016). 
                                                          
45 When the rate of return of IBs is at a disadvantage, shareholders may have to scarify their profits to 
minimise withdrawal risk from depositors. Furthermore, the choice of an appropriate profit distribution 
principle in IBs can affect the depositors’ perceptions of the fair return distribution. 
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Aspects Islamic Banking  
Dividends Model 
Conventional Banking Dividends Model 
Shari’ah compliance and PLS 
principle is applied  
Yes None 
Rate of return on deposits  Uncertain, not guaranteed Certain and guaranteed 
Motives of payouts Preferences of both investors (shareholders) and 
depositors 
Preference of investors (shareholders) 
Conflicts between depositors and 
shareholders towards dividend 
payouts ratio for the latter 
High Low 
Depositors’ return is linked to the 
return on assets  
Yes No 
Banks’ pooling of depositors’ funds to 
provide depositors with professional 
investment management  
Yes No 
Process Activeness  High. Profit distribution is a more active process 
involving a nexus of contracts between the bank, 
depositors and shareholders. Hence, the profit 
distribution of Islamic banks is agreement among 
such three parties including depositors. 
 
Low. Depositors will receive interest payment from 
the banks. Interests paid for depositors are treated as 
expenses when calculating net profits and dividends 
for shareholders. Hence, the profit distribution of 
conventional banks is only an agreement between 
shareholders and the bank. 
Complexity of payouts mechanics and 
techniques 
High. Dividend decision subjects to the interaction 
between PSIA and dividend distributions. It 
depends much on the effectiveness of profit 
distribution among parties under the PLS 
arrangements.  
Low. Dividend decisions are not subject to the 
interaction between PSIA and dividend distributions; 
however, they are associated with current profitability, 
future growth opportunities, and optimal capital 
budget and equity amount needed to finance the 
optimal budget through retained earnings.  
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Difficulties in payouts High. It is difficult to determine the actual 
(Shari’ah) profits for any financial year because 
some investment projects may not be finished 
before the end of the accounting year. In addition, 
Islamic banks cannot use all the available fund to 
undertake investment activities which challenges 
their profit/dividend distribution. 
Low. Interest amounts are treated as expenses which 
are paid to depositors. Such expenses do not depend 
on the completion of investments and conventional 
banks can pool and employ all available capital. Net 
profits (after all expenses) will be distributed to 
shareholders according to the shareholding 
percentages. 
Flexibility of payouts policy Low. Dividend decisions appear to be significantly 
affected by Islamic banks’ challenges in managing 
liquidity and accessing Shari’ah short-term 
borrowings from outside sources. 
High. Higher liquidity position as they enable quicker 
access to external market sources and the use of 
hedging and financial instruments. 
Agency conflicts arise during payouts 
process 
High. The conflicts occur when managers, 
depositors and shareholders disagree about the 
profit distribution. Managers have more 
opportunities engage in discretionary acts 
comprising of controlling and managing dividend 
policy. 
Low. The conflicts occur only when managers and 
shareholders disagree about the profit distribution. 
This lowers opportunities for bank managers’ to 
engage in discretionary acts, relative to Islamic banks. 
Prediction for the Levels of payouts Low  High 































Figure 5.1: Four-step Dividend Payout Process in Islamic Banks 














(1) Sharing revenues and 
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After the Mudarabah fees and the Mudarabah 
net profit (Mudarabah profit attributed to 
shareholders after deducting the PSIA share and 
related expenses) are both calculated and 
channelled to shareholders as revenue. 
After deducting SG&A, statutory and 
general reserves, Zakat and corporate taxes 
(if any), and directors’ remunerations, the 
net income is then available for 
distribution to shareholders. 
157 
 
5.4 Hypotheses Development 
Irrespective of the bank type (i.e. IBs or CBs), the agency conflicts of dividend 
payouts represent an ultimate cost occurring when managers and shareholders 
disagree about the distributable profits. However, IBs encounter additional agency 
costs due to the indirect monitoring by IAHs who cannot intervene in the banks’ 
financial and business decisions. This offers opportunities for bank managers to 
engage in discretionary acts (Elnahass et al., 2018), possibly including controlling 
and managing dividends payouts. Moreover, conflicts among IAHs, managers and 
shareholders may arise from the overlap and interactions between the different 
components of the dividends model discussed above. Managers in IBs tend to 
have more opportunities to amend the reserves and provisions, the profit 
distribution rates on PSIA and the dividends which could lead to severe agency 
conflicts. Such a wide latitude of discretion further adds to the complexity in the 
structure of the dividend model employed by this banking sector. 
Prior literature on the payouts of dividends within the context of IBs is 
particularly limited. Hassan et al. (2003) use the signalling theory to indicate that 
dividends are the only relevant financial information that helps managers to signal 
returns on investments to the stock market. As such, they emphasise the 
importance of investigating an IB’s dividend model determinants. From a 
theoretical basis, Al-Gurrah Daghi (2009) and Essa (2010) describe the 
accounting process used in the profit distribution of IBs and refer to the relevant 
financial/accounting standards. For CBs, studies focus on the determinants of 
dividend payouts, such as insider holders (Theis and Dutta, 2009), growth 
opportunities (Collins et al., 1994; Casey and Dickens, 2000; Dickens et al., 
2002), and the external rating of listed banks (Boldin and Leggett, 1995). Some 
other studies (e.g. Filbeck and Mullineaux, 1993; Collins et al., 1994) document 
that dividends are usually employed as a signalling mechanism by banks; for 
example, they can convey useful information to investors about the bank growth 
opportunities (Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013). Thereby, a reduction in dividends 
can lead to lower equity valuations (Bessler and Nohel, 1996). 
Under the assumed discrepancies in the dividend distribution strategies between 
IBs and CBs, the extent and effectiveness of governance within the two banking 
sectors are expected to have implications on their payouts. The BoD’s 
158 
 
characteristics and attributes are likely to affect the dividend strategies for both 
bank types. A busy board, it is argued, can still promote reputational and 
preferential benefits to their firms.  
When distinguishing between the business models of the two bank types, the 
monitoring needs in IBs are likely to be higher than CBs due to their complex 
governance structure and trading process, including constrained 
products/activities (Safieddine, 2009). Unlike CBs, the scarcity of outside 
directors having expertise and knowledge in Shari’ah legitimacy alongside the 
unique dividend model employed, busy outside directors of IBs who possess 
several board directorships would be less capable of providing the necessary level 
of oversight to an IB’s policies and strategies. This is because a busy board might 
have less involvement (i.e. time, attention and efforts) to thoroughly review the 
long-term strategies and investment opportunities, which must be compliant with 
the Islamic principles, and make indicative decisions for dividend distributions. 
Hence, the pitfall related to less effective monitoring can lead to lower dividend 
levels as managers can pursue their interests at the expense of shareholders. 
According to the busyness hypothesis (e.g. Jiraporn et al., 2008; Sharma, 2011; 
Cashman et al., 2012), busy outside directors are less likely to effectively monitor 
managers’ risk-taking and expropriation behaviours for banks as they overstretch 
themselves across too many companies and spend less time on each board (Ferris 
et al., 2003; Cashman et al., 2012). Moreover, busy boards may not have 
sufficient reputational benefits to contribute to their institutions (Jackling and 
Johl, 2009). As such, an increase in their workload is closely associated with a 
decline in dividend payouts (Sharma, 2011). Thereby, an inverse association 
between busy BoDs and dividend payouts in IBs is predicted. 
Unlike IBs, CBs operating on a single layer of governance and a more 
flexible/stable dividend model tend to encounter relatively lower agency costs. 
For this specific banking business model, busy boards have several opportunities 
to promote additional reputational benefits for their banks (e.g. provides advising 
services on payouts policy, brings flexible and alternative funding sources) to the 
CBs’ dividend models by enhancing the board’s internal monitoring and 
mitigating the agency problems of a firms’ liquid assets, managerial opportunism 
and uncertainties (see Chou and Feng, 2018). However, these benefits are less 
likely to be obtained by IBs because their business model is marked with greater 
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complexity (i.e. restriction in business and payouts model; constraint in using 
financial instruments/derivatives due to Islamic rulings; inconsistent regulatory 
standard; operating in less developed capital markets) and because of their unique 
structuring of governance, which would require substantial scrutiny and effective 
monitoring (Beck et al., 2013; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Bitar et al., 2017). As a 
result, board busyness in CBs is predicted to be more beneficial from a 
reputational and expertise perspectives when compared to their Islamic 
counterparts. Such reputational benefits are likely to influence the dividends 
business model of CBs, leading to possibly higher payouts levels.  
In contrast, the costs of ineffective scrutinising by busy boards in the IB dividend 
model are expected to offset their reputational benefits which can have an adverse 
impact(s) on their dividends model. Having a busy board is anticipated to cause 
pronounced negative consequences on the payouts levels in IBs relative to CBs. 
This forms the hypothesis stated in an alternative form, as below: 
H6: Islamic banks with a busy board of directors pay lower levels of dividends 
than conventional banks 
5.5 Data and Methodology 
5.5.1 Data Collection  
This study employs the similar sample to the second study (see Section 4.5.1, 
Chapter 4). In brief, dividend and other consolidated financial data (in thousand 
U.S. dollars) are collected from DataStream and Bloomberg. Governance-level 
data is obtained from annual reports, which reflect board members’ profile for 
both listed IBs and CBs, including the number of directorships of outside 
directors, the number of directors and independent directors on boards, among 
others. Macroeconomics and country governance indicators used in the tests are 
obtained from the World Bank database. Four criteria are then applied to filter the 
sample, which are consistent with prior Islamic-conventional banking literature 
(see Beck et al., 2013; Mollah et al., 2017; Alqahtani et al., 2017). These include 
(a) banks located in countries which have both bank types, and at least two listed 
banks; (b) banks with annual reports published in their official website and of the 
financial year of 31 December; (c) banks are classified as commercial full-ledged; 
and (d) banks have at least three consecutive years data availability. Availability 
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of corporate governance, dividend and financial data reduces the sample size to 70 
listed banks in total, with 27 IBs (150 firm-year observations) and 43 CBs (236 
firm-year observations) operating in 11 countries such as Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and 
Oman.46  
5.5.2 Measures for Dividend Payouts Policy and Boards Busyness 
This study follows prior literature to measure the dependent variable; cash 
dividends over total net income (DIV/NI) (e.g. John and Knyazeva, 2006; Jiraporn 
et al., 2011; Bøhren et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2017; Byrne and O’Connor, 2017b). 
This proxy represents the proportion of cash dividends paid to the shareholders 
over the earnings reported in a given period. The research treats DIV/NI as a 
censored variable since it cannot be below zero (Jiraporn et al., 2011).  
Following previous literature (Onali et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2017; Chen et al., 
2017), this study further uses alternative measures of dividend strategies, 
comprising of the propensity to pay dividend (LIKE_PAY), dividends over total 
assets (DIV/Assets), dividends over sales (DIV/Sales) and dividends per share 
(DIV/Share), in the sensitivity tests. 
This current research uses the same measures for BoD busyness (ABOD; 
%BBOD) as the first two studies. 
5.5.3 Methodology and Empirical Models  
To the extent that dividends are expected to mitigate agency costs of managerial 
expropriation and overinvestment (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 
1986) and under the predictions of relatively higher agency conflicts arisen from 
the payout process in IBs compared to CBs, the study conjectures that CBs with a 
busy BoD are more likely to pay higher dividends to shareholders than IBs. It 
tests the possible relation between busy BoD and dividend payout ratio. However, 
since managers pay dividends to shareholders in ways that align interests between 
shareholders, managers and directors, board busyness and payouts decisions are 
likely to be determined endogenously. For example, busy outside directors can 
                                                          




choose to work for banks with high dividend payout (e.g. Sharma, 2011). Also, 
banks could simultaneously select busy outside directors and dividend policies to 
address agency problems of free cash flow. Therefore, like the first two research, 
this current study also performed the 3SLS estimations employing the same two 
IVs (i.e. the number of public firms headquartered in the same country of the 
bank; the country-level income generating category) to minimise the possible 
presence of endogeneity (e.g. Gugler, 2003; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Onali et 
al., 2016; Chakravarty and Rutherford, 2017).   
Under 3SLS estimations, this study treats both busy BoD and dividend payouts as 
endogenous variables47 and establish the simultaneous equations as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉/𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (eq.5.1) 
𝐵𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉/𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +   𝜙𝑃 +  µ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (eq.5.2) 
Where DIV/NI represents the cash dividends over net income. The study estimates 
the dividend payouts using busy BoDs (BBOD including ABOD; %BBOD). ϕP is 
a vector of control variables in the dividend regression model that account for the 
effect of corporate governance, bank-level and country-level characteristics on the 
dividend payout; Year effects and Country effects capture the year-fixed and 
country-fixed effects; εit is the error term.  
5.6 Control Variables Measurements 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Jiraporn et al., 2011; Sharma, 2011; Chen et 
al., 2017; Saeed and Sameer, 2017), the study also controls for other board 
characteristics, bank-level and country-level characteristics to mitigate potential 
omitted variables bias and capture other factors that have been found statistically 
significant in the previous dividend research. 
5.6.1 Corporate Governance Variables 
Managerial entrenchment is likely to affect dividend policy (Hu and Kumar, 
2004) and dividend payout is considered as a collective decision of the board 
(Saeed and Sameer, 2017). Therefore, the study controls for a set of board-related 
variables to capture the quality of bank governance such as board size 
                                                          
47 The study performed the Wu-Hausman endogeneity test across all the test models to examine whether 
endogeneity exists or not. The test statistics suggest the presence of endogeneity bias. 
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(LogBSIZE) and board independence (%INDEP). Briefly, the former is measured 
by the number of directors on the board while the latter is measured by the 
percentage of outside non-executive directors on the board (Hu and Kumar, 2004; 
Chen et al., 2017; Saeed and Sameer, 2017; James et al., 2017).  
5.6.2 Bank-level Characteristics Variables 
The controls for other bank-level characteristics which have been found to 
significantly affect corporate dividend payouts. It includes bank size (LogTA) and 
bank age (LogAge) that are expected to positively relate to a payout (e.g. Fama 
and French, 2001; Sharma, 2011; Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan, 2016; Saeed and 
Sameer, 2017). It also includes bank financial leverage (LEV) measured as the 
ratio of total liabilities (long-term and short-term) to total equity. This measure 
affects dividend payouts due to its role in reducing agency problems and due to 
debt covenants on dividends imposed by debtholders (Sharma, 2011). Big4 
Auditors dummy (BIG4) and subsidiaries dummy (SUB) variables are also 
included into the models to capture for the influences of the quality of auditing 
and ownership on the dividend decisions of the banks. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of growth opportunities (CAPEX/ASSETS), defined as 
the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, also helps capture potential 
mechanism though outside directors could affect decisions to pay dividends (see 
Fenn and Liang, 2001; Cuny et al., 2009; Sharma, 2011). The research also 
controls for the availability of cash/cash reserves through the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities divided to net assets (total assets minus cash and marketable 
securities), CASH/NETASSETS (Jiraporn et al., 2011; James et al., 2017). 
According to DeAngelo et al. (2006), retain earnings are essential determinants of 
dividend payouts. Therefore, the study controls for the ratio of retained earnings 
to total equity (RETAIN/EQUITY). In addition, it captures for profitability 
performance measured by the ratio of net income to total assets (ROA) which is 
expected to positively affect dividend payouts (Cuny et al., 2009; Sharma, 2011; 
Saeed and Sameer, 2017). This study finally controls for the possible impact of 
banking sector concentration (i.e. activity diversification) on dividend policy by 




5.6.3 Country-level Characteristics Variables and Type of Bank Variables  
The country-level characteristics variables include GDP growth rate 
(GDP_GROWTH) and annual rate of inflation (INFL) (Ashraf et al., 2016). In 
addition, it controls for the difference in the national quality of governance across 
countries by including determinants of regulatory quality (REGLATORY) (e.g. 
Bitar et al., 2017; Kutubi et al., 2018). This indicator measures the quality of 
governance performance that reflects perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and conduct good polices and regulations to promote the private 
sector. It is estimated by ranging from -2.5 (weak) to +2.5 (strong) (World Bank, 
2016). Furthermore, for the full sample, the research includes the type of banks 
variable (ISLAMIC) which is a dummy taking value of 1 if it is classified as IBs 
and 0 otherwise. This variable reflects the difference in the d between these two 
banking models. Table 5.2 presents the summary of controls used in the study 3. 
Appendix 2 provides definitions of all variables used in all tested models. 
Group Control variables Abbreviations 
Corporate 
Governance 
Board of Directors Size LogBSIZE 






Bank Size LogTA 
Bank age LogAge 
Bank Leverage LEV 
Profitability ROA 
Big4 Auditor BIG4 
Subsidiaries SUB 
Capital expenditure to total assets CAPEX/ASSETS 
Cash to total assets CASH/NETASSETS 
Retain earnings to equity RETAIN/EQUITY 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI 
Country-level 
characteristics 
GDP Growth rate GDP_GROWTH 
Inflation INFL 
Regulatory quality REGULATORY 
Type of bank Islamic banking dummy ISLAMIC 
Table 5.2: Study 3 - Control Variables 
5.7 Descriptive Statistics 
This section describes the data sample by reporting the descriptive statistics of 
















Variables/ Ratios N Mean Medi
an 
Std. Min Max 
DIV/NI 386 0.269 0.248 0.271 0 0.982 0.229 0.295 2.345** 
ROA 386 0.012 0.013 0.024 -0.34 0.064 0.005 0.016 3.830*** 
CASH/NETASSETS 386 0.106 0.087 0.083 0.004 0.723 0.122 0.095 -2.801*** 
RETAIN/EQUITY 386 8.357 7.817 6.066 -6.980 38.803 7.394 8.968 2.503** 
REGULATORY 386 -0.062 -0.102 0.634 -0.963 2.024    
Table 5.3: Study 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
5.7.1 Dividend Payouts, Boards Busyness and Corporate Governance 
According to the descriptive table (Table 5.3), IBs (0.229) show significantly 
lower dividend payments than their conventional counterparts (0.295). This is 
supported by the significant coefficient of the two-sample t-test.  
For the main independent variables (ABOD and %BBOD) and corporate 
governance variables (LogBSIZE and %INDEP), their descriptive statistics are 
reported in Chapter 4. Below presents the descriptive of control variables which 
were not reported in previous chapter. 
5.7.2 Bank-level Variables  
Descriptive of all variables including LogTA, LogAge, LEV, BIG4, SUB, 
CAPEX/ASSETS and HHI, were reported in Chapter 4. Therefore, in this section, 
only three additional bank-level variables (ROA; CASH/NETASSET; 
RETAIN/EQUITY) are illustrated.  
According to Table 5.3, the mean of ROA, CASH/NETASSET and 
RETAIN/EQUITY for full sample (IBs; CBs) is 0.012 (0.005; 0.016), 0.106 
(0.122; 0.095) and 8.357 (7.394; 8.968). Two sample t-test coefficients for three 
variables suggest that CBs exhibit higher profitability and higher retained 
earnings, but lower cash holdings than their Islamic counterparts.  
5.7.3 Country-level Variables and Bank types variables  
As can be seen from Table 5.3, the mean and median of this REGULATORY 
variable is -0.062 and -0.102, respectively. Its min-max range of value is from -
0.963 to 2.024 and the standard deviation is 0.634.  
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5.7.4 Correlation Matrix of All Independent Variables 
Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix and VIFs are also employed to check for 
multicollinearity. Table 5.4 (full sample) and Table 5.5 (IBs and CBs) show that 
pairs of independent variables with significant correlation coefficients are marked 
in bold. According to the guidelines of Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), the 
majority of significantly correlated independent variables are in the weak range 
(/r/ < 0.3). However, the coefficients of the rest of pairs of significantly correlated 
variables are greater than 30%. Most of those correlation pairs are in the moderate 
range, their absolute correlation coefficients are still within acceptable limits (0.8). 
This, alongside with the low individual VIF values (<10), low means of VIFs (<6) 
and low condition numbers (<15), indicates that there are no concerns on 
multicollinearity (Section 5.8). An exceptional pair of %BBOD and ABOD (full 
sample, CBs and IBs) are highly correlated; nevertheless, the study does not 
include them into the same models, thus, multicollinearity threat should not be a 
concern in the estimated models.
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
1. ABOD 1                  
2. %BBOD 0.813 1                 
3. LogBSIZE 0.128 0.191 1                
4. %INDEP 0.165 0.201 -0.403 1               
5. LogTA -0.038 0.005 -0.039 0.218 1              
6. LogAge 0.102 0.073 -0.073 0.045 0.239 1             
7. LEV -0.080 -0.053 0.153 -0.170 0.042 0.061 1            
8. ROA -0.011 0.003 0.046 -0.008 0.293 0.042 0.046 1           
9. BIG4 0.185 0.216 -0.248 0.387 0.466 0.219 -0.457 0.099 1          
10. SUB 0.079 0.029 -0.070 0.169 0.014 -0.039 -0.028 0.064 0.048 1         
11. CAPEX/ASSETS 0.029 -0.004 0.004 0.024 -0.297 -0.249 -0.084 0.084 -0.080 0.050 1        
12. CASH/NETASSETS 0.058 0.068 0.201 -0.087 -0.048 0.033 0.294 0.047 -0.257 -0.051 0.079 1       
13. RETAIN/EQUITY -0.135 -0.054 0.163 -0.110 0.111 -0.145 0.382 0.341 -0.252 0.049 0.111 0.159 1      
14. HHI 0.022 0.011 -0.024 -0.115 0.071 -0.051 -0.115 0.064 0.166 0.111 0.000 0.017 -0.048 1     
15. GDP_GROWTH -0.138 -0.094 -0.036 0.047 -0.020 -0.155 -0.020 0.095 -0.127 0.010 0.059 -0.036 0.097 -0.074 1    
16. INFL -0.194 -0.178 0.063 -0.313 -0.313 -0.044 0.396 -0.018 -0.516 0.162 0.090 0.101 0.372 0.128 -0.110 1   
17. REGULATORY 0.203 0.225 -0.149 0.353 0.352 0.025 -0.485 0.017 0.679 -0.130 -0.110 -0.188 -0.405 0.133 -0.117 -0.758 1  
18. ISLAMIC -0.072 -0.097 0.233 -0.071 -0.111 -0.179 0.052 -0.230 -0.173 0.073 -0.031 0.157 -0.127 0.144 -0.018 0.014 0.029 1 
Notes: The table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix among all independent variables used in the regression analysis for the Full sample from 2010-2015. Bold figures are significant at the 5% 
level. See Appendix 2 for all variable definitions. 
Table 5.4: Pearson Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix for Full Sample (N = 386) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
1. ABOD 1 0.792 0.267 -0.073 -0.063 0.002 -0.034 0.031 0.042 0.061 0.005 0.085 -0.108 0.183 -0.095 -0.182 0.187 
2. %BBOD 0.847 1 0.311 0.020 -0.015 -0.003 -0.119 0.098 0.166 -0.063 -0.042 0.012 -0.078 0.181 -0.034 -0.197 0.268 
3. LogBSIZE -0.051 0.076 1 -0.497 0.000 0.051 0.022 0.111 -0.083 -0.126 -0.008 -0.032 0.058 0.149 -0.139 0.018 -0.074 
4. %INDEP 0.481 0.418 -0.285 1 0.141 0.034 -0.095 0.081 0.230 0.209 -0.027 -0.088 -0.065 -0.077 0.129 -0.137 0.260 
5. LogTA -0.019 0.008 -0.032 0.296 1 0.135 -0.185 0.174 0.426 -0.157 -0.418 -0.131 0.042 0.096 -0.062 -0.315 0.365 
6. LogAge 0.223 0.139 -0.141 0.030 0.337 1 -0.005 -0.331 0.186 -0.165 -0.284 0.044 -0.302 -0.068 -0.234 -0.176 0.192 
7. LEV -0.134 0.031 0.288 -0.231 0.298 0.145 1 -0.392 -0.540 -0.174 -0.109 0.267 0.358 -0.287 0.075 0.489 -0.652 
8. ROA -0.067 -0.080 0.128 -0.066 0.381 0.128 0.213 1 0.228 -0.125 0.326 -0.128 0.404 0.027 0.115 -0.165 0.245 
9. BIG4 0.376 0.256 -0.396 0.540 0.496 0.204 -0.378 0.007 1 0.043 -0.143 -0.221 -0.230 0.319 -0.176 -0.456 0.642 
10. SUB 0.121 0.175 -0.040 0.140 0.258 0.137 0.108 0.181 0.082 1 0.075 -0.022 -0.043 0.023 -0.005 0.103 -0.067 
11. CAPEX/ASSETS 0.061 0.043 0.038 0.077 -0.146 -0.229 -0.057 -0.007 -0.017 0.025 1 0.061 0.094 -0.096 0.052 0.135 -0.160 
12. CASH/NETASSETS 0.062 0.161 0.370 -0.071 0.057 0.079 0.307 0.150 -0.254 -0.101 0.108 1 0.177 -0.086 0.108 0.177 -0.338 
13. RETAIN/EQUITY -0.212 -0.050 0.426 -0.192 0.183 0.005 0.445 0.371 -0.353 0.203 0.128 0.200 1 -0.196 0.103 0.355 -0.421 
14. HHI -0.122 -0.125 -0.261 -0.130 0.085 0.009 -0.012 0.127 0.099 0.171 0.093 0.040 0.130 1 -0.029 -0.139 0.309 
15. GDP_GROWTH -0.217 -0.194 0.131 -0.054 0.037 -0.067 -0.124 0.106 -0.075 0.032 0.069 -0.166 0.085 -0.116 1 -0.076 -0.102 
16. INFL -0.217 -0.158 0.114 -0.478 -0.315 0.094 0.315 0.035 -0.591 0.225 0.043 0.046 0.412 0.325 -0.151 1 -0.763 
17. REGULATORY 0.239 0.185 -0.270 0.450 0.354 -0.138 -0.341 -0.051 0.751 -0.204 -0.052 -0.093 -0.392 -0.004 -0.136 -0.756 1 
Notes: The table presents the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix among all independent variables used in the regression analysis for the IB subsamples (lower-left triangle) and CBs subsamples 
(higher-right triangle) from 2010-2015. Bold figures are significant at the 5% level. See Appendix 2 for all variable definitions. 




5.8 Empirical Results 
5.8.1 The level of cash dividend payouts within Islamic and conventional 
banks 
Table 5.6 presents the regression results on the link between BoD busyness and 
the payout ratio (DIV/NI) in Panels A (full sample), B (IBs sample) and C (CBs 
sample), respectively, within the 3SLS simultaneous equations framework. Table 
5.7 indicates very low individual (<10) and mean VIFs values (<6), in addition to 
low condition index (<15), suggesting no multicollinearity. 
In Panel A, Table 5.6, the study finds that the coefficient of board busyness 
(ABOD; %BBOD) is positively associated with DIV/NI for the whole sample. This 
result suggests that banks with busy BoD are likely to exhibit a greater cash 
dividend payout policy, which is in line with resource dependence theory 
indicating that outside directors working in multiple companies can promote 
stronger governance mechanism and bring valuable resources (i.e. expertise, 
skills, experience, and access to external resources) to their firms. Such 
reputational benefits appear to reduce the conflicts between managers and 
shareholders related to the usage of free cash flows (see Sharma, 2011) and hence, 
mitigate the probability that managers abuse that available cash. This, in turn, 
leads to high dividend ratio. The evidence also implies that banks tend to use 
board multiple directorships to gain access to external sources from the markets 
and obtaining reputational benefits. Intrinsically, the resource-rich outside 
directors have significantly contributed to the high demand of banks regarding 
outside resources or environmental interdependence. 
As for control variables (see Appendix 5A), the study finds support for several 
prior industrial firms’ studies (e.g. DeAngelo et al. 2004; Cuny et al., 2009; 
Sharma, 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2017; Chou and Feng, 2018) 
indicating that dividends are employed to disgorge free cash flow to investors in 
the absence of other devices. Indeed, LogTA and ROA have significantly positive 
impacts on the payouts ratio, which are in line with what we expect to find. Larger 
and more profitable firms exhibit larger subsequent dividend amounts, in 
accordance with findings of numerous studies such as Adjaoud and Ben-Amar 
(2010), Sharma (2011), Esqueda (2016), Byrne and O’Connor (2017a) and Chou 
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and Feng (2018). In contrast, board independence (%IND) and retain earnings 
(RETAIN/EQUITY) have negative and significant effects on the dividend ratio. 
Although negative coefficient of %IND is not the expectation, it is a possible 
result as Hu and Kumar (2004) find that board independence is only positive 
linked to payout if it exceeds 40%. The negative coefficient of RETAIN/EQUITY 
is in line with the results of Jiraporn et al. (2011)48.  
When examining the effect of the bank type on levels of payouts paid, analyses 
within the two bank types in panels (B and C), Table 5.6, show that IBs with busy 
BoD exhibit lower cash dividend payout ratios; with significantly negative 
coefficients on ABOD and %BBOD. In contrast, CBs having busy BoD tend to 
pay out significantly high levels of cash dividends to their shareholders, supported 
by positive coefficients on the test variables ABOD and %BBOD. These results 
indicate that the reputational benefits of busy BoD for banks dividend payout 
strategies obtained in Panel (A) (full sample) tend to be more pronounced in CBs 
rather than IBs.  
With regard to control factors (see Appendix 5A), the study finds board 
independence (%INDEP) has implications for distribution policy in CBs in that it 
is negatively related to the DIV/NI. For both bank types, the research finds that 
the effects of LogTA and ROA on DIV/NI are significantly positive. In addition, 
the study finds positive results for LEV in CBs, whereas IBs show insignificant. 
Although such effect is positive for CBs, it is still consistent with the study of 
Jiraporn et al. (2011) and Chou and Feng (2018) showing a positive relation 
between leverage and payouts. Finally, coefficients for RETAIN/EQUITY in both 
bank types are significant and negative, which is in line with those reported in 
Panel A49. 
Taken together, the findings provide evidence for the differing influence of board 
busyness on the dividend policy across the two bank types. Having a busy board 
increases the levels of cash dividends for CBs relative to IBs, which is in line with 
the hypothesis. The negative effect of busy boards on payouts of IBs can be 
                                                          
48 In unreported sensitivities, all three empirical studies replaced this GDP growth rate by log of GDP per 
capital (Borisova et al., 2012; Abedifar et al., 2013; Saeed and Izzeldin, 2016). Results remain relatively 
unchanged. Tables will be provided upon request. 
49 In unreported sensitivities, all three empirical studies excluded country dummies from all main models and 




justified by their constrained dividend model that is less flexible and dominated 
by several constraints and interactions. Hence, managers in IBs have more 
opportunities for discretion and control over the payout process. Having busy 
outside directors seems to have a detrimental impact on the bank levels of 
payouts. This result is in line with the predictions under the busyness hypothesis 
(Sharma, 2011) and are attributable to the possible inefficient monitoring ability 
for busy boards to review a constrained dividend model such as Islamic banking. 
This result also suggests that a busy board in IBs could lead to additional agency 
conflicts and/or opportunities for managerial discretion associated with their 
dividends model.  
In contrast and in line with expectations, the positive impact of board busyness on 
the dividend payouts in CBs suggests that busy boards seem to offer this set of 
banks superior preferential access to funds and other networking benefits that 
appear to promote distributions of high levels of dividends. The finding is 
consistent with the reputational view of busy boards (Chou and Feng, 2018). The 
overall results suggest that the natures and commitments of the regular BoDs in 
the IBs tend to be unique, which seems to have direct implications on their 
dividend strategies as well as the trust of their investors/depositors and withdrawal 
risks.50 
                                                          
50 In unreported sensitivities, like study 1 and 2, this third study also captured cross-country variations in 
governance perceptions for our sample by developing a country governance index (COUNTRY_GOV) as an 




 Panel A:  
Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
Panel B:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel C: 













ABOD 0.055***  -0.136***  0.128***  
%BBOD  0.419***  -0.684***  0.760*** 
Controls included YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept -1.431*** -1.367*** -1.017*** -1.455*** -1.676*** -1.826*** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Mean VIFs 1.79 1.80 2.56 2.53 2.10 2.11 
Sample size 386 386 150 150 236 236 
Adj. R-Square 0.408 0.347 0.548 0.360 0.130 0.159 
Wald Chi2 442*** 425*** 332*** 252*** 300*** 316*** 
LM Statistics  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test  0.126 0.159 0.183 0.234 0.113 0.458 
Notes: The table presents the results of the 3SLS estimations of the system of simultaneous equations (eq.5.1)-(eq.5.2) for the full sample (Panel A; models 1-2), IB subsample (Panel B; models 3-4) and 
CB subsample (Panel C; models 5-6) identifying the effect of busy BoD on a bank’s dividend payout ratio. The study treats both over-boarded directors and the dividend payout ratio as endogenous 
variables and builds simultaneous equations models. The ratio of cash dividends to net income (DIV/NI) is the main dependent variable which represents for dividend payout ratio. The average outside 
directorships of outside directors (ABOD) and the percentage of busy outside directors (%BBOD) are two alternative main variables of interest for busy BoD. Models are tested for the period of six-year 
from 2010. The study controls for year and country fixed effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. LM and Sargan test show that all models are correctly identified, and the 
selected IVs are valid. See full table in Appendix 5A. 
Table 5.6: 3SLS - Board of Directors Busyness and the Dividend Payout Ratio - Within Islamic and Conventional Banks 
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  Panel A: Full Sample  
(IBs and CBs) 
Panel B: Islamic banks  
(IBs) 













ABOD 1.25  2.07  1.30  
%BBOD  1.33  1.82  1.36 
LogBSIZE 1.47 1.57 2.00 1.99 1.61 1.78 
%INDEP 1.62 1.67 2.21 2.12 1.68 1.73 
LogTA 1.94 1.95 3.98 3.88 1.68 1.72 
LogAge 1.33 1.32 1.98 1.88 1.52 1.54 
LEV 1.75 1.75 2.21 2.32 3.06 2.95 
ROA 1.34 1.35 1.40 1.38 3.11 3.09 
BIG4 2.85 2.89 5.77 5.62 2.17 2.17 
SUB 1.19 1.18 1.49 1.55 1.44 1.41 
CAPEX/ASSETS 1.24 1.24 1.22 1.22 1.64 1.65 
CASH/NETASSETS 1.23 1.23 1.62 1.65 1.25 1.23 
RETAIN/EQUITY 1.72 1.72 2.10 2.08 2.42 2.41 
HHI 1.32 1.32 1.71 1.71 1.37 1.36 
GDP_GROWTH 1.23 1.22 1.46 1.44 1.27 1.26 
INFL 3.24 3.22 4.32 4.32 2.82 2.81 
REGULATORY 4.27 4.33 5.46 5.52 5.18 5.24 
ISLAMIC 1.34 1.36     
Mean VIF 1.79 1.80 2.56 2.53 2.10 2.11 
Conditional Index 4.81 4.83 6.05 5.94 5.18 5.27 
 
Table 5.7: VIFs in Bank Dividend Payouts Models – For Full sample (Panel A), IBs (Panel B) and CBs (Panel C) Sub-samples 
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5.8.2 Robustness Checks 
This section presents several robustness tests for the main results. The aim is to 
examine whether or not the findings hold when using alternative measures for 
dividend policy (i.e. the likelihood to pay dividends and other payout ratios) and 
alternative model specifications/estimation procedures. 
5.8.2.1 Analysis of the Propensity to Pay Dividends within IBs and CBs 
The study first extends the main analyses by examining whether CBs with a busy 
BoD are more likely to pay cash dividends to shareholders than IBs. Because the 
dependent variable is dummy, the study test this prediction using a Logit function 
where the probability of LIKE_PAY variable is estimated utilising the functional 
form π(x) = eg(x)/ (1+eg(x)). This is in line with the propensity to pay cash dividend 
literature (e.g. DeAngelo et al., 2004; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Sharma, 2011; 
Chen et al., 2017). The base-line model is specified as follows: P (LIKE_PAY) = f 
{β0 + β1ABODit + ϕP + µYear effects + εit} (eq.5.3). Where LIKE_PAY takes the 
value of 1 if the bank paid dividend in year t and otherwise 0. Robust standard 
errors are employed to account for potential correlation in errors. Across all 
models, the results of Nagelkerke pseudo R2 (>0.6) are relatively high, and the 
models X2 are significant at 1%. These suggest that models are appropriate and the 
chosen variables are good estimators for bank propensity to pay dividends. 
Analyses for both bank types in Table 5.8 (Panels B and C) indicate that IBs with 
busy boards are less likely to pay dividends; this is evident from the significant 
and negative coefficient of ABOD and %BBOD on LIKE_PAY. By contrast, CBs 
with busy boards are positively associated with the likelihood of a payout, 
suggesting that BoDs with busy outside directors are likely to recommend the 
payment of a cash dividend. These findings imply that the reputational benefits of 
a busy BoD for payout decisions might be more pronounced in CBs than IBs, 
providing additional support for the main results reported in Table 5.6. The 
adverse influences of a busy BoD on the propensity to pay dividends can also be 
explained by the high complexity of IBs regarding constrained business/dividend 
models and a double-layer governance system. Managers in IBs, thus, have more 
opportunities to decide not to pay dividends and use the available cash for their 
self-interest. Having a busy BoD under the constrained model of IBs may have 
negative effects on the likelihood of bank payouts. This is consistent with the 
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busyness hypothesis, showing that multiple directorships can shirk the 
responsibilities of outside directors due to the significant overloads that lead to 
lower payouts propensity (Sharma, 2011). By contrast, CBs operating on a less 
complex business/dividend model would have more opportunities to enjoy the 
reputational benefits from their busy outside directors who have wider networking 
and considerable experience in monitoring dividend strategies of many firms. 
Those directors are, therefore, argued to bring their reputational benefits to the 
firm payout policy and improve board internal monitoring (Chou and Feng, 2018), 
which encourage (or even force) CBs’ managers to pay cash dividends to 
shareholders. Overall, the findings support the differential impacts of BoD 
busyness on the propensity to pay dividends across the two banking models. 
 Panel A:  
Full Sample  
(IBs and CBs) 
Panel B:  

















ABOD 0.237***  -0.800**  0.434**  
%BBOD  0.860*  -0.108  1.377 
Controls incl. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept -23.013*** -21.720*** -23.933*** -26.745*** -40.163*** -39.333*** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 386 386 150 150 236 236 
Pseudo R2 0.637 0.630 0.695 0.671 0.765 0.749 
Wald X2 94*** 96*** 143*** 53*** 64** 62*** 
Notes: The table presents sensitivity of the pooled logit regression results of the equation (eq.5.3) for the full 
sample (Panel A; models 1-2), IB subsample (Panel B; models 3-4) and CB subsample (Panel C; models 5-
6) identifying the effect of busy BoD on a bank’s propensity/likelihood to pay dividends. The dummy 
likelihood to pay cash dividends (LIKE_PAY) taking the value of 1 if the bank paid cash dividend in year t 
and otherwise 0, is the dependent variable. The average outside directorships of outside directors (ABOD) 
and the percentage of busy outside directors (%BBOD) are two alternative main variables of interest for busy 
BoD. Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study controls for year fixed effects. P-
values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. See full table in Appendix 5B. 
Table 5.8: Board of Directors Busyness and the Likelihood of Dividend Payouts - 
Within Islamic and Conventional Banks 
5.8.2.2 Alternative Measures of Dividend Payout Ratios 
While on-going dividend literature argues the effectiveness of measures for 
dividend payout, the study further examines the link between dividend policy and 
board busyness by exploring the effect of the alternative measures for dividends. 
Specifically, the study presents estimates of the predicted cash dividend payout 
ratios using dividends over total assets (DIV/Assets), dividends over sales 
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(DIV/Sales) and dividends per share (DIV/Share)51. Those measures are widely 
employed in literature such as La Porta et al. (2000), Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005), Jiraporn et al. (2011), Hwang et al., 2013, Chen et al. (2017), Cao et al., 
(2017), Saeed and Sameer (2017). In Table 5.9, the study finds consistently across 
all regressions that coefficients of BoD busyness (ABOD; %BBOD) in IBs are 
significantly negative while those in CBs are significantly positive. These results 
are in line with the main findings and confirm that main findings are not sensitive 
to alternative indicators for dividends payouts. 
 
 
                                                          
51 In unreported descriptive statistics, the means (medians) of DIV/Assets, DIV/Sales and DIV/Share for full 
sample are 0.473 (0.312), 0.074 (0.035) and 0.114 (0.01), respectively. In addition, the means of DIV/Assets, 
DIV/Sales and DIV/Share of IBs (CBs) are 0.379 (0.533), 0.069 (0.077) and 0.121 (0.110), respectively. 
These results generally show that CBs have a higher dividend payout ratio than IBs, supported by the 




 Panel A:  
Islamic banks  
(IBs) 
Panel B:  


























ABOD -0.162***  -0.036***  -0.140***  0.338***  0.048***  0.059***  
%BBOD  -0.732***  -0.141***  -0.284***  1.158***  0.130***  0.400*** 
Controls included YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept -1.665*** -2.296*** -0.105 -0.284** 0.181 -0.418 -1.537*** -2.054*** -0.473*** -0.485*** -1.144*** -1.225*** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 150 150 150 150 150 150 236 236 236 236 236 236 
Adj. R-Square 0.737 0.695 0.748 0.745 0.676 0.843 0.165 0.625 0.042 0.578 0.516 0.403 
Wald Chi2 513*** 443*** 618*** 558*** 672*** 1117*** 686*** 1056*** 273*** 459*** 583*** 486*** 
LM Statistics  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test  0.672 0.109 0.456 0.148 0.125 0.101 0.640 0.250 0.512 0.267 0.102 0.270 
Notes: The table shows the 3SLS results for the IB subsample (Panel A; models 1-6) and CB subsample (Panel B; models 7-12) using alternative measures for bank’s dividend payout ratios. The study 
treats both over-boarded directors and the dividend payout ratios as endogenous variables and builds simultaneous equations models. The ratio of cash dividends to total assets (DIV/Assets), the ratio of 
cash dividends to sales (DIV/Sales), and the ratio of cash dividends per share (DIV/Share), are alternative dependent variables. The average outside directorships of outside directors (ABOD) and the 
percentage of busy outside directors (%BBOD) are two alternative variables of interest for busy BoD. Models are tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study controls for year and country fixed 
effects. P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. LM and Sargan test show that all models are correctly identified, and the selected IVs are valid. See full table in Appendix 5C. 
Table 5.9: Sensitivity Tests: Alternative Measures of Dividend Payout Ratios for the IBs and CBs Sub-samples 
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5.8.2.3 Two-step System Generalized Models of Moments  
Like the first two research, this study also investigates the robustness of the main 
findings by employing GMM technique (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). The dianostics tests reported in Table 5.10 show that all models are 
well-fitted with stastistically insignificant test statistics for both second-order 
autocorrelation (AR (2) p-values>10%, implying that the residuals in the second-
difference are serially uncorrelated by way of construction) and Hansen J-
statistics of over-identifying restrictions (p-values>10%). Results for first-order 
autocorrelation (AR (1) p-values<10%) suggest that the residuals in the first-
difference might be serially correlated. The Hansen test examines the null 
hypothesis of the IVs validity and indicates the statistically insignificant J-
statistics for all models implying that the IVs are valid. Table 5.10 show that main 
results using 3SLS are remain unchanged. Specifically, busy BoD in CBs tends to 
be positively linked to dividend payout ratio (DIV/NI) with negative impacts on 
IBs. The results reveal that main findings remain to hold, even after controling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity.  
  Panel A: Islamic banks  
(IBs) 










ABOD -0.030***  0.024***  
%BBOD  -0.321**  0.158** 
Controls included YES YES YES YES 
Intercept -0.071 -1.745** -1.215*** -2.123*** 
DIV/NIt-1 0.378*** 0.058* -0.044* -0.072** 
Year-effects YES YES YES YES 
Country-effects YES YES YES YES 
Sample size 123 123 193 193 
Wald Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (1) 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.003 
AR (2)  0.998 0.233 0.298 0.603 
Hansen test  0.100 0.144 0.269 0.102 
Notes: The table presents the robustness test results of the GMM estimations for the IB subsample 
(Panel A; models 1-2) and CB subsample (Panel B; models 3-4) identifying the impact of busy 
BoD on a bank’s dividend payout. The ratio of cash dividends to net income (DIV/NI) is dependent 
variable. The average outside directorships of outside directors (ABOD) and the percentage of busy 
outside directors on board (%BBOD) are two main variables of interest for busy BoD. Models are 
tested for the period of six-year from 2010. The study controls for year and country fixed effects. 
P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (1) and AR (2) are dianogtic tests 
for no serial correlation of first-order and second-order, respectively, in the first-differenced 
standard errors. Hansen is the test of over-identifying restrictions. See full table in Appendix 5D. 




5.9 Summary  
This study provides a new and novel perspective to the levels of the cash dividend 
paid to shareholders (i.e. the ratio of cash dividends over net income). It extends 
the payout model by integrating the impacts of BoD busyness for IBs and CBs. 
The analyses for the pooled sample (both bank types together) indicate that the 
representation of more busy outside directors on the board positively and 
significantly influence the payout ratio. The results support the RDT, which 
argues the reputational benefits brought to the banks by busy outside directors. 
This evidence suggests that busy outside directors are excellent resources of a 
bank through a high dividend payout of excess free cash flow. After controlling 
how this effect differs between IBs and CBs with different institutional 
environments and dividend models, the study finds the following significant 
opposing effects of busy boards on the dividend payment. That is, the dividend 
payout is stronger in CBs with busy BoD than IBs. This supports for the last 
hypothesis (H6), which predicts that IBs with a busy BoD pay lower levels of 
dividends than CBs. The results attribute to the complicated IB dividend model 
that follow Islamic rulings. They also provide empirical evidence for the 
differences in agency conflicts between two bank types which leads to differential 
influences of busy BoDs on dividend decisions. 
The overall findings imply that, unlike CBs, the dividend policy of IBs is likely to 
be more sensitive to the busyness level of outside directors serving on the board. 
The results indicating the positive impact of busy boards on the increasing levels 
of CB dividend payouts can partially reduce the concern that busy outside 
directors provide inefficient monitoring services to the firms. These results 
reinforce those of Chou and Feng (2018), showing that increasing the number of 
outside directorships of independent directors can enhance the board’s internal 
monitoring function. IBs should learn from CBs on how to effectively exploit the 
possible reputational benefits of independent directors who hold multiple 
directorships and how to successfully use these benefits to control their payouts 
strategies. 
The results reported in this study highlight the need to take into account the 
multiple directorships that influence a board’s ability to monitor and advise 
managers in future dividend policy studies in both banking models. The study also 
documents a systematic difference in dividend behaviours of the two bank types 
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which could be explained by the board busyness attribute. Shareholders can 
improve their understanding of how bank managers choose between paying cash 
dividends and retaining net profits, especially in the dual banking countries. 
Hence, they can seek and build a better board monitoring mechanism to maximise 
their wealth.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis explores an important board attribute (i.e. board multiple directorships 
or board busyness) and it studies its impact(s) on banking resilience, stock market 
valuations and dividends payouts. The research approach employed comparative 
assessments between alternative banking systems (i.e. IBs versus CBs) alongside 
an examination of the role of Shariah governance and the effect(s) of a busy SSB. 
The three studies utilised cross-country data and employed unbalanced panel 
regression analyses with an instrumental variable approach. 
With contradictory and limited evidence in conventional banking on the roles of 
busy outside directors in monitoring managers, no research, to the best of my 
knowledge, has comprehensively examined the effect of board busyness on 
Islamic banking. The analyses in this thesis provide the first evidence with which 
we can investigate whether board busyness exerts differential impacts on the 
financial stability of IBs and CBs, given the constrained IB business model. 
Furthermore, this thesis is among the early attempts to identify the differential 
market valuations for board busyness in IBs and CBs. It is also the first to test the 
relationship between board busyness and dividend payouts of the two banking 
models. The testing of three financial indicators (stability, market value and 
payouts policy) in this thesis aimed to provide empirical and updated evidence 
related to the board governance structures of both banking systems and contribute 
to the current literature on IBs and CBs. This thesis also uniquely identifies the 
influence of institutional bank characteristics and the business model on board 
busyness, something that prior studies have not investigated. This institutional 
context is particularly interesting in the context of the ongoing debate of the effect 
of banking models on financial indicators and the growing arguments around the 
IB model.  
Empirical Study 1 (Chapter 3). Board Busyness and Financial Stability: 
Evidence from Alternative Banking Models 
The findings in the first empirical study suggest that in CBs, busy BoDs are likely 
to increase bank financial stability (high profitability, high-cost efficiency, low 
insolvency and low credit risks). In line with the reputation hypothesis, these 
findings support the first hypothesis, suggesting that busy outside directors bring 
181 
 
their expertise and connections to market resources and effective monitoring 
services to their banks. However, IBs with busy BoDs tend to exhibit low 
financial stability (i.e. low profitability; poor cost efficiency; high insolvency and 
credit risks). By contrast, CBs having busy BoDs show significantly high 
financial stability, implying higher bank performance and lower risks than their 
Islamic counterparts do. These findings provide evidence supporting the second 
hypothesis indicating that a busy BoD is likely to reduce IBs’ financial stability 
relative to CBs. This finding can be explained by the high complexity of IBs in 
terms of business model, agency problems and corporate governance mechanisms 
compared to CBs, which require more effective monitoring from the busy BoDs. 
Under the complicated monitoring demands and mechanisms, in addition to the 
scarcity of BoDs specialised in Shari’ah legitimacy and the nature of the business 
model, busy BoDs in IBs would be less able to provide effective oversight, as 
justified by the busyness hypothesis. In contrast, busy outside directors in CBs can 
use their networking/experience to advise some efficient financing sources to the 
firm they are serving.  
Furthermore, the results for the BoD classifications reveal that the negative effects 
of a busy BoD on the financial stability of IBs are intensified when the degree of 
board busyness increases. Particularly, “Super-busy” BoDs within this banking 
model are likely to fail in effectively scrutinising risk-taking activities. These 
findings provide some support for the distinctiveness of the roles played and value 
added by BoDs in both CBs and IBs. They also support the main findings for the 
positive influences of BoD busyness on CBs’ financial stability. Unlike IBs, the 
reputation impacts within CBs appear to upsurge proportionally as the board’s 
multiple directorships increase. Therefore, the reputation impact appears to 
outweigh the cost of the busyness impact in this bank type.  
Additional analyses show that busy SSBs in IBs are also adversely associated with 
a bank’s financial stability, which is attributed to the complex business model of 
this type of bank. This is consistent with the third hypothesis and can be explained 
by (i) the scarcity and high reputation of Shari’ah scholars, leading to cost 
inefficiency (e.g. expensive compensation packages); (ii) the spreading of the time 
and efforts of busy SSB members (who have concurrent memberships of multiple 
SSBs and boards of different national and international Shari’ah standard-setting 
organisations) over several firms, which compromises their effective oversight of 
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bank-level performance and risk exposures. More interestingly, the results for the 
classifications of the degree of SSB busyness demonstrate that only “More-busy” 
and “Super-busy” SSBs significantly increase bank financial instability. This 
supports the main findings and highlights the detrimental influence of the 
presence of busy SSB members on IBs’ financial stability. Meanwhile, “Less-
busy” and “Non-busy” SSBs report significantly longer financial stability. Overall, 
as the degree of SSB busyness rises, this religious board tends to inversely 
jeopardise the IBs’ financial stability due to substantial lax screening. 
Summary (Study 1): For the full sample (i.e., CBs and IBs together), busy 
BoDs are likely to increase bank financial stability (high profitability, high cost 
efficiency, low insolvency and low credit risks). However, conditional on the 
bank type, BoD busyness exhibits a differential impact on bank financial 
stability. In comparison with CBs, IBs with busy BoDs show low performance 
and high risk-taking. These findings become more apparent as the degree of 
board busyness increases. The study also finds strong evidence for the negative 
impact upon IBs’ financial stability of appointing busy Shari’ah scholars. 
 
Empirical Study 2 (Chapter 5). Market Valuations of Busy Boards: Evidence 
from Alternative Banking Models 
The second empirical study deals with the examination of the influence of BoD 
busyness on market valuations of IBs compared to CBs. Due to the objectives of 
the study, the final sample was built upon stock markets and hence, the sample 
includes only listed banks. The results indicate that investors across the two bank 
types valued a busy BoD differently. In CBs, investors assign a high valuation to 
busy boards, while IB investors do not value such a board attribute. The result 
supports the fourth hypothesis, and this can be explained in two ways. From one 
side, the absence of market valuations for IBs can be justified through the 
signalling theory. Investors in IBs tend to be well informed about the scarcity of 
outside directors having sufficient expertise to review and monitor a constrained 
busyness model like Islamic banking. Thus, a busy BoD is more likely to convey 
to the stock markets that it might have limited time/attention to scrutinise banking 
activities and reduce any related agency conflicts and/or managerial discretions. 
This finding is in line with predictions under the busyness view. On the opposite 
side, the positive effect of board busyness on the market valuations of CBs 
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indicates that some reputational benefits are likely to dominate investors’ 
expectations. Stock markets appear to positively price BoD busyness for their 
CBs, as they are likely to facilitate access to market sources and promote greater 
expertise, and skills/knowledge in effective monitoring. The finding is in line with 
the reputation view of board busyness.   
Further testing shows that having busy Shari’ah advisors significantly lowers their 
banks’ market valuations, supporting the fifth hypothesis. Investors in IBs 
consistently perceive a busy SSB as damaging the bank value, with no evidence 
for such a perception for a busy BoD. This can be justified by the lax involvement 
of the busy SSB, which may result in a failure in ensuring the mandatory 
compliance of IBs to the rulings of Shari’ah. This promotes a reputation risk and 
hence, could trigger the collapse of IBs and cause systematic risk. Furthermore, 
busy SSB members might have limited time to review and advise on contractual 
arrangements/transactions, which might incorporate high uncertainty and risk-
taking. The overall results suggest that, unlike CBs, stock market engagement 
with IBs is likely to be more sensitive to the busyness level of SSBs but not to that 
of outside director.  
Summary (Study 2): The results indicate that busy BoD generally promotes 
high market valuations in support of additional preferential benefits that a busy 
board can generate for their firms. However, investors across the two bank 
types showed differential pricing for appointing a busy BoD. In CBs, investors 
assign a high valuation for busy board while IB investors do not value such 
board attribute. Further testing shows that having busy Shari’ah advisors 
significantly lower their banks’ market valuations. Investors in IBs consistently 
perceive busy SSB as damaging the bank value with no evidence for such 
perception for a busy BoD. 
 
Empirical Study 3 (Chapter 5). Board Busyness and Dividend Payouts: 
Evidence from Alternative Banking Models 
Finally, a review of the literature on board busyness reveals that this study is the 
first to examine busy BoDs as a factor influencing banks’ dividend payout policy 
(either the level of cash dividends or the likelihood of paying dividends). Building 
on the explanation of Sharma (2011) for her agency hypothesis of dividends (free 
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cash flow hypothesis), the board busyness-dividend hypothesis 6 is developed and 
tested for different banking models such as IBs and CBs. The findings show that 
BoD busyness in the two banking systems (i.e. IBs and CBs) has opposing 
impacts on the changes in dividend payout levels. That is, the level of dividends is 
greater in CBs with a busy BoD than in IBs. This provides empirical evidence for 
the differences in agency conflicts between the two bank types, leading to the 
differential influences of busy boards on dividend decisions. In IBs, due to their 
more complex and severe agency costs arising from the payout model, busy 
outside directors are unable to effectively reduce agency costs between 
shareholders and managers. Directors with multiple directorships may shirk their 
responsibilities due to their significant overload of work. Conversely, in CBs with 
lower agency conflicts compared to IBs, outside directors serving on multiple 
boards tend to be more effective advisors and monitors of managers’ behaviour, 
encouraging them to pay dividends to shareholders. Overall, managers in CBs are 
better monitored and directed by a busy BoD than those in IBs; thus, they are 
more likely to recommend higher payments of a cash dividend. 
An extended analysis of the propensity to pay dividends within IBs and CBs 
shows that IBs with busy BoDs are less likely to pay cash dividends. Meanwhile, 
CBs with busy BoDs are positively related to the likelihood of a payout, 
suggesting that BoDs with busy outside directors tend to recommend the payment 
of a cash dividend. These findings suggest that the reputational benefits of a busy 
BoD for payout decisions might be more intensified in CBs than in IBs, providing 
additional support for the main results. 
Summary (Study 3): The results indicate that the busyness of BoDs can 
explain differential dividend payouts behaviour between two banking systems. 
For CB dividend model, a busy board has a significantly positive impact on the 
bank’s dividend payout level. However, IBs operating under a more 
constrained (Shari’ah-compliant) dividend model, which employ a busy BoD 
report significantly lower levels of payouts. These results highlight a potential 
challenge for the unique agency conflicts arising from the complex payout 
model of Islamic banks (in terms of profit distribution principles, motives, 
mechanics and techniques, and flexibility of payouts), which is subject to the 
demand for greater monitoring and additional rulings when compared to the 
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conventional. Extended analysis further shows that CBs with busy BoDs have 
greater likelihood to pay a dividend than IBs. 
 
Overall thesis 
Overall, this thesis has successfully addressed three crucial financial aspects of a 
bank in an international setting, i.e., financial stability, market valuations and 
dividend payout policies in relation to busy boards. These indicators reflect well 
the overall picture about banks’ financial health through their profitability, cost 
effectiveness, risk-taking behaviour, investors’ valuations of bank securities and 
the effectiveness of ultimate profit distribution decisions. The results obtained 
across three empirical studies have ultimately drawn an interesting and consistent 
story: divergences in financial health and performance between banking 
institutions in general, and between two banking models (Islamic and 
conventional) in particular, are clearly explained by the discrepancies in the 
monitoring and advising effectiveness of the busy outside directors recruited by 
those firms. Consequently, the thesis has successfully enhanced the understanding 
of related stakeholders about the real influences of board busyness on bank 
financial outcomes and decisions. In addition, it has also discovered that the 
busyness of SSBs is an essential factor causing differences in financial stability 
and market valuations within IBs. Busy SSBs are not investigated in the third 
study (Chapter 5) because to the best of my knowledge, there has been a lack of 
theoretical explanations and empirical evidence providing robust support for the 
substantial role of these religious boards in the dividend payout decision process 
of IBs. This may be a topic for future research, but not in this current thesis.  
The findings of the thesis provide valuable insights and important policy 
implications for a wide range of stakeholders (e.g. regulators and policymakers, 
banks, investors) who engage with the two bank types. For CBs, regulators and 
market participants can benefit from the empirical evidence portraying that the 
busyness and networking of BoDs are likely to enhance bank financial stability, 
market valuations and dividend payout strategies. This offers important 
implications for wealth creation and the proper investment decisions of investors. 
Nonetheless, such reputational benefits associated with recruiting busy boards 
might not be invoked in the presence of unique institutional characteristics, as 
presented by IBs. IBs, by virtue of their unique and illiquid products, require 
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effective monitoring. Thus, effective Shari’ah monitoring is an essential 
determinant of the financial stability and market valuations of this banking sector. 
As IBs expand and experience rapid growth, regulators and policymakers need to 
understand the system of dual bank governance, in addition to the peculiarities and 
constraints imposed on the sector’s practices. This is particularly necessary when 
implementing future governance reforms as well as when developing financial and 
CG reporting standards.  
The findings also raise a call to regulators and policymakers for the need to 
develop stricter criteria and guidelines to govern outside BoD directorships and 
SSB busyness within the IB sector. They also raise awareness of IBs and 
regulators about the shortage of experienced outside directors and scholars, which 
is unlikely to be remedied quickly. Also, the way that BoDs and SSBs conduct 
their business, reach their findings and communicate them, should be more open. 
Opinions/rulings on Shari’ah matters should be published periodically and 
circulated. The BoD and SSB members must be obligated to disclose their 
directorships (affiliations with multiple boards) and any other issues that could 
lead to conflicts of interest. AAOIFI or IFSB can play a stronger role in 
standardising the interpretation and practical applications of standards related to 
Shari’ah. The stability of IBs in the past (i.e. the banking crisis 2007-2009) could 
be, in part, due to the excellent practice of BoDs and SSBs, and the morality, 
fairness and excessive risk avoidance practised by Shari’ah governance. 
Therefore, following the suggestions of the discussion above, there is scope 
related to the multiple directorships of BoDs/SSBs for the improvement of 
Shari’ah governance and for the reinforcement of the growth and stability of the 
Islamic finance sector in the future.  
Future research can attempt to develop empirical models that include factors such 
as the financial expertise, appropriate training and continuing education of 
different boards; or they could construct a new board governance quality index. In 
addition, this thesis is a quantitative research; hence, future qualitative studies 
should be conducted via surveys using questionnaires and/or interviews with 
outside directors and Shari’ah advisors. By doing so, researchers can conduct new 
and more in-depth investigations; for example about the perceptions of outside 
directors and other stakeholders of multiple directorships. Furthermore, this thesis 
only examines the influences of board busyness on three bank outcomes: financial 
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stability, market valuations and dividend policy. Thus, future studies can explore 
other financial indicators such as financing and investment policy, risk 
management, accounting conservatism, innovations and so on. Moreover, it will 
also be interesting to comparatively and empirically assess board multiple 
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Appendix 2: FULL DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
The table shows descriptions of all dependent and independent variables. This appendix briefly describes the definitions of each variable, together with 
abbreviations used in the multivariable analysis. 
Description of Variables  
Variables Abbreviations Definitions and sources of data 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Return on Average Equity ROAE Net income divided by average total equity. Source: annual report  
Cost Inefficiency COST/INCOME Cost to Income ratio. Source: annual report 
Insolvency Risk LogZscore The Z-score is the distance to default which calculated as a sum of the return on assets 
(ROA) plus Capital Assets Ratio (CAR) scaled by the standard deviation of ROA. This 
study proxies for insolvency risk by using the natural logarithm of Z-score. The higher the 
log of Z-score, the lower the insolvency risk. Source: annual report and author’ estimation 
using STATA 15.   
Credit Risk LLR/GR The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. The higher the ratio, the higher the credit 
risk. Source: annual report 
Tobin’s Q lnQ Natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q ratio, which is calculated by the natural logarithm of sum 
of a bank total debt and market value of equity, divided by its book value of total assets. 
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The market value of equity is computed as the number of outstanding shares multiplied by 
the stock prices. Source: Datastream 
Dividends over net income DIV/NI Dividends over net income. Source: Datastream 
Market Capitalisation lnMARCAP Natural logarithm form of the bank’s market capitalisation which is measured by stock 
price per share multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Source: Datastream 
Likelihood of a dividend 
payout 
LIKE_PAY Dummy variable, taking value of 1 if bank pays a cash dividend and 0 otherwise. Source: 
Datastream  
Dividends over total assets DIV/Assets Dividends over total assets. Source: Datastream 
Dividends over sales DIV/Sales Dividends over total sales. Source: Datastream 
Dividends per share DIV/Share  Dividends per share. Source: Datastream 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
EXPLANATORY FACTORS 
# Average directorships of 
outside directors 
ABOD  Average outside directorships per independent director, calculated as total number of 
outside boards held by independent directors divided by number of independent directors 
on the board. Source: annual report  
# Average directorships of 
Shari’ah advisors 
ASSB Average outside directorships per Shari’ah advisor, calculated as total number of outside 
boards held by Shari’ah advisors divided by number of Shari’ah advisors on the board. 
Source: annual report  
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% Busy outside directors %BBOD Percentage of busy independent directors on the board (%), calculated as number of 
independent directors serving on two or more outside firms divided by number of 
independent directors on the board. Source: annual report  
% Busy Shari’ah Advisors %BSSB Percentage of busy Shari’ah advisors on the board, calculated as number of Shari’ah 
advisors serving on two or more outside firms divided by the number of Shari’ah advisors 
on the board. Source: annual report  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTORS 
Board of Directors Size LogBSIZE Natural logarithm of the total number of board of directors’ members. Source: annual 
report  
Board Independence %INDEP Percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board of directors. Source: 
annual report  
CEO Duality DUAL Dummy variable, 1 if CEO is also the Chairman of board of directors; otherwise 0. Source: 
annual report  
BANK-LEVEL FACTORS 
Bank Size LogTA Natural logarithm of total assets of a bank at the end of the year. Source: annual report 
Bank Age LogAge Natural logarithm of the difference between the sample year and the year of a bank’s first 
appearance. Source: annual report  





CAPEX/ASSETS The ratio of capital expenditures to assets. Source: Datastream  
Cash/Total assets CASH/ASSETS The ratio of cash to total assets. Source: Datastream 
Cash/Net assets CASH/NETASSETS  The ratio of cash to net assets. Net assets are calculated as total assets minus cash and 
marketable securities. Source: Datastream 
Retain Earnings RETAIN/EQUITY  The ratio of retain earnings to total equity. Source: Datastream 
Bank Leverage LEV Bank leverage which is measured by total liability divided by Equity. Source: annual 
report 
Big 4 Audited BIG4 Dummy variable: 1 if the bank is audited by Big4 company, 0 otherwise. Source: annual 
report 
Listed Bank LISTED Dummy variable: 1 if the bank is listed in a stock market, 0 otherwise. Source: annual 
report  
Bank Risk-Taking  1/z Bank risk-taking behaviour which is calculated by the inverse of LogZscore. Source: 
author’s estimation 
The number of public firms No of Public firms The number of public firms headquartered in the same country. Source: World Bank 
High income countries HIGHINC  Dummy variable, 1 if a bank is based in a country classified as high-income nation. 
Source: World Bank 
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a measure of bank concentration. Higher HHI shows 
higher bank concentration. It is calculated by the square of the sum of the ratio of total 
assets of each bank-year to total assets of all banks each year. It has a value between zero 
and one. Source: annual report and author’s estimation 
COUNTRY-LEVEL FACTORS 
GDP growth rate GDP_GROWTH Annual Gross Domestic Products (GDP) growth rate. Source: World Bank 
Inflation rate INFL Annual inflation rate or year-on-year change of Consumer Price Index (CPI). Source: 
World Bank 
Legal system LEGAL Taking value of zero for countries not using Shari’ah law to define their legal system, the 
value of one for countries combining both Shari’ah law and others to define their legal 
system, and the value of two for countries, such as Saudi Arabia, only using Shari’ah law 
to define their legal system. Source: Abedifar et al. (2013) 
Control of corruption CORRUPTION Measuring the national quality of governance performance. It reflects the perceptions of 
petty and grand forms of corruption and capture of the state by elites and private interests. 




Political stability and absence 
of violence 
POLITICS Measuring the quality of governance performance that reflects perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. 
It is estimated by ranging from -2.5 (weak) to +2.5 (strong). Source: World Bank 
Regulatory quality REGULATORY Measuring the quality of governance performance that reflects perceptions of the ability of 
government to formulate and conduct good polices and regulations to promote private 
sector. It is estimated by ranging from -2.5 (weak) to +2.5 (strong). Source: World Bank 
BANK TYPE FACTOR 
Islamic Banking dummy ISLAMIC Dummy variable: 1 if the bank is Islamic, 0 otherwise. Source: annual report 
***Independent (non-executive) directors (also called as outside directors or external directors) are defined as members of the board of directors who 
are deemed to be independent if they do not have any business or personal relationships/links with the bank or its executive board (Liang et al., 2013; 
Onali et al., 2016). In this thesis, the author follows the definition of independent directors as reported in the individual annual reports of each bank 
each year. In most cases, individual banks often self-reported the number of independent directors serving on the board. This study, therefore, use the 
same method for board independence computation for comparability of the results across different banks (see Onali et al., 2016).  
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Appendix 3A: EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 – 3SLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PERFORMANCE 
Determinants of Bank Operating Performance. Dependent Variables: ROAE and COST/INCOME 
 Panel A: 
Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
Panel B:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel C:  





































ABOD 0.031***  -0.102***  -0.026**  0.073***  0.034***  -0.067***  
 (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.018)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.008)  
%BBOD  0.198***  -0.945***  -0.101**  0.610***  0.181***  -0.581*** 
  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.024)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
LogBSIZE -0.001 0.002 0.043 0.067 -0.005 -0.003 -0.416** -0.404** 0.017 -0.007 0.047 0.111* 
 (0.927) (0.757) (0.610) (0.458) (0.740) (0.743) (0.012) (0.015) (0.331) (0.736) (0.448) (0.082) 
%INDEP -0.104*** -0.103*** 0.205 0.333* 0.061 0.044 -0.185 -0.294 -0.091*** -0.091*** 0.038 0.094 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.163) (0.074) (0.119) (0.153) (0.364) (0.160) (0.005) (0.005) (0.682) (0.366) 
DUAL 0.030 0.031 -0.291** -0.313** 0.006 0.008 -0.962*** -1.060*** 0.036 0.025 -0.180* -0.201* 
 (0.202) (0.235) (0.046) (0.045) (0.810) (0.732) (0.007) (0.003) (0.291) (0.431) (0.061) (0.051) 
LogTA 0.019*** 0.017*** -0.159*** -0.154*** 0.014*** 0.015*** -0.280*** -0.296*** 0.008 0.012** -0.075*** -0.084*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogAge 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.041 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.086* 0.072 -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.008 0.017 
 (0.328) (0.282) (0.746) (0.223) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.117) (0.003) (0.003) (0.702) (0.492) 
BIG4 -0.035** -0.053** -0.036 0.143 -0.003 -0.017 -0.427*** -0.474*** 0.010 -0.025 -0.119** 0.023 
 (0.025) (0.010) (0.426) (0.233) (0.909) (0.383) (0.004) (0.002) (0.402) (0.292) (0.044) (0.755) 
SUB -0.023** 0.002 -0.032 -0.033 0.026* 0.012 -0.181*** -0.103 -0.034** -0.023* 0.096** 0.063* 
 (0.035) (0.727) (0.399) (0.331) (0.079) (0.268) (0.009) (0.233) (0.022) (0.087) (0.022) (0.068) 
HHI 0.180*** 0.160** -0.353 -0.676* 0.080 0.087 0.017 -0.197 0.198* 0.201* -0.054 -0.107 
 (0.002) (0.027) (0.355) (0.092) (0.231) (0.152) (0.968) (0.701) (0.080) (0.076) (0.875) (0.776) 
LISTED 0.018** 0.019* -0.088 -0.097 0.003 0.011 -0.496*** -0.441*** 0.017 0.016 0.152*** 0.132*** 
 (0.043) (0.055) (0.128) (0.115) (0.707) (0.260) (0.000) (0.000) (0.191) (0.210) (0.000) (0.000) 
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GDP_GROWTH 0.338** 0.169 -1.297 -0.324 0.106 0.147 -0.629 -1.327 0.090 0.022 -0.178 0.107 
 (0.050) (0.404) (0.222) (0.615) (0.477) (0.302) (0.764) (0.533) (0.570) (0.933) (0.813) (0.899) 
INFL -0.012 -0.089 -1.518 -0.482 -0.152 -0.167 -1.734 -2.125 -0.005 -0.214 -0.710 0.056 
 (0.912) (0.715) (0.258) (0.536) (0.597) (0.532) (0.464) (0.307) (0.975) (0.500) (0.437) (0.957) 
LEGAL -0.088*** -0.108*** -0.443*** -0.130 -0.047 -0.073** -0.324 -0.535 -0.084* -0.102** -0.221* -0.044 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.520) (0.172) (0.022) (0.365) (0.142) (0.068) (0.043) (0.082) (0.766) 
CORRUPTION 0.003 0.002 -0.017 -0.238 0.018 0.017 -0.596* -0.510 0.014 0.003 -0.061 -0.065 
 (0.855) (0.905) (0.838) (0.267) (0.523) (0.520) (0.088) (0.161) (0.771) (0.958) (0.685) (0.696) 
LEV 0.003** 0.003*** -0.013* -0.015** 0.004*** 0.003** -0.014 -0.014 0.002 0.001 0.009** 0.010** 
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.068) (0.042) (0.006) (0.018) (0.222) (0.185) (0.883) (0.616) (0.026) (0.034) 
1/Z 0.001 -0.001   -0.056*** -0.061***   0.026*** 0.026***   
 (0.678) (0.948)   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)   
ISLAMIC -0.019** -0.021** 0.084* 0.121**         
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.076) (0.032)         
Constant -0.250*** -0.211*** 2.511*** 2.133*** -0.156** -0.153** 5.220*** 5.626*** -0.003 0.024 0.648** 0.430 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.979) (0.806) (0.013) (0.138) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 770 770 772 772 342 342 343 343 428 428 429 429 
Overall R2 0.065 0.017 0.130 0.005 0.307 0.455 0.405 0.398 0.002 0.019 0.341 0.202 
Wald Chi2 430*** 417*** 337*** 274*** 401*** 443*** 251*** 250*** 169*** 169*** 349*** 294*** 
LM Statistics (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.100 0.107 0.723 0.070 0.110 0.332 0.115 0.237 0.056 0.055 0.220 0.439 




Appendix 3B: EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 – 3SLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RISKS 
Determinants of Bank Risks. Dependent Variables: LogZscore and LLR/GR 
 Panel A:  
Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
Panel B: 
 Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel C:  

























ABOD 0.290***  -0.493***  -0.090***  0.172**  0.136***  -0.099***  
 (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.047)  (0.000)  (0.004)  
%BBOD  0.678***  -0.239**  -0.480**  1.220**  0.891***  -0.599*** 
  (0.002)  (0.037)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.000)  (0.009) 
LogBSIZE 0.065 0.068 -0.043 0.118 0.689*** 0.748*** -0.147 -0.106 -0.172* -0.199 0.033 0.127 
 (0.604) (0.581) (0.495) (0.187) (0.001) (0.000) (0.489) (0.626) (0.078) (0.139) (0.786) (0.296) 
%INDEP -0.886*** -0.433** 0.191 0.091 0.721*** 0.605** -1.060*** -1.212*** -0.777*** -0.802*** -0.214 -0.209 
 (0.001) (0.021) (0.592) (0.484) (0.002) (0.023) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.212) (0.237) 
DUAL 0.424* 0.324 0.051 -0.134 1.123** 1.410*** -0.330 -0.233 0.285 0.268 0.244 0.246 
 (0.053) (0.126) (0.751) (0.416) (0.016) (0.002) (0.598) (0.687) (0.157) (0.197) (0.180) (0.187) 
LogTA 0.096*** 0.122*** 0.128*** 0.061** 0.129*** 0.161*** 0.062 0.053 0.041* 0.046 0.179*** 0.167*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.000) (0.168) (0.124) (0.079) (0.154) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogAge 0.053 0.081* 0.153** 0.095*** 0.104* 0.101* 0.162*** 0.169*** 0.143** 0.127** -0.137*** -0.140*** 
 (0.132) (0.054) (0.029) (0.006) (0.072) (0.077) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.027) (0.007) (0.008) 
COST/INCOME -0.384*** -0.311*** 0.149** 0.063* -0.167*** -0.173*** -0.002 0.010 -1.325*** -1.337*** 0.033 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.097) (0.002) (0.001) (0.965) (0.795) (0.000) (0.000) (0.893) (0.994) 
BIG4 -0.209 -0.103 0.591*** 0.311*** 0.317* 0.266 0.171 0.218 0.063 -0.128 0.163 0.129 
 (0.127) (0.416) (0.010) (0.001) (0.069) (0.164) (0.364) (0.247) (0.612) (0.359) (0.139) (0.303) 
SUB -0.258** -0.036 0.459** 0.004 0.252** -0.042 -0.280* -0.180 -0.201** -0.161* 0.257*** 0.256*** 
 (0.011) (0.647) (0.013) (0.953) (0.048) (0.685) (0.100) (0.204) (0.022) (0.075) (0.002) (0.002) 
HHI 0.084 0.305 -0.291 0.079 -0.141 0.171 0.642 0.235 0.324 0.636 -0.668 -0.645 
 (0.816) (0.611) (0.328) (0.851) (0.844) (0.771) (0.400) (0.654) (0.657) (0.401) (0.293) (0.317) 
LISTED 0.374*** 0.375*** -0.238* -0.228*** 0.135 0.108 -0.005 -0.023 0.645*** 0.653*** -0.307*** -0.313*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.003) (0.317) (0.372) (0.962) (0.852) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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GDP_GROWTH 1.211 0.527 0.271 1.595 -1.735 -0.566 1.202 1.922 1.387 1.593 0.876 0.768 
 (0.461) (0.761) (0.921) (0.206) (0.534) (0.780) (0.651) (0.477) (0.380) (0.345) (0.551) (0.606) 
INFL 1.274 0.479 -2.933 -1.290 -0.929 0.854 -1.600 0.224 0.654 -0.315 -3.456** -3.668** 
 (0.515) (0.808) (0.334) (0.479) (0.749) (0.785) (0.612) (0.943) (0.736) (0.877) (0.050) (0.042) 
LEGAL 0.157 0.407 1.668*** 0.623*** -0.461 -0.208 0.316 0.330 0.741*** 0.566** 0.662*** 0.692*** 
 (0.554) (0.111) (0.000) (0.003) (0.324) (0.662) (0.518) (0.527) (0.002) (0.040) (0.004) (0.006) 
CORRUPTION -0.034 -0.037 -0.514 -0.235 0.193 0.088 -0.473 -0.618 0.127 0.051 -0.298 -0.235 
 (0.864) (0.906) (0.262) (0.315) (0.660) (0.851) (0.301) (0.172) (0.691) (0.879) (0.310) (0.435) 
ISLAMIC -0.279*** -0.222*** 0.068 -0.038         
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.203) (0.488)         
Constant 1.145** 0.663 -5.399*** -5.023*** -0.338 -1.218 -4.571*** -4.780*** 2.368*** 2.531*** -5.176*** -5.062*** 
 (0.042) (0.218) (0.000) (0.000) (0.728) (0.215) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 770 770 725 725 342 342 307 307 428 428 418 418 
Overall R2 0.168 0.353 0.588 0.329 0.312 0.343 0.242 0.261 0.583 0.560 0.537 0.517 
Wald Chi2 470*** 476*** 301*** 387*** 184*** 187*** 230*** 232*** 669*** 618*** 523*** 498*** 
LM Statistics (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.154 0.377 0.177 0.100 0.192 0.591 0.103 0.070 0.873 0.928 0.692 0.124 





Appendix 3C: EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 – 3SLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ISLAMIC BANKS 
Determinants of Bank Performance and Risks. Dependent Variables: ROAE, COST/INCOME, LogZscore and LLR/GR 
 Panel A: 



















ABOD -0.024**  0.158***  -0.092***  0.068***  
 (0.018)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
ASSB -0.008***  0.092***  -0.091***  0.029***  
 (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  
%BBOD  -0.093**  0.491***  -1.323**  0.333** 
  (0.025)  (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.041) 
%BSSB  -0.179**  0.303***  -1.997***  1.410*** 
  (0.027)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.000) 
LogBSIZE -0.041* 0.011 -0.248 -0.454*** 0.469* 0.837*** -0.065 -0.345 
 (0.083) (0.349) (0.179) (0.002) (0.076) (0.000) (0.762) (0.106) 
%INDEP 0.024 0.051 -0.825*** -0.275 0.937*** 1.110*** -0.814*** -0.788*** 
 (0.507) (0.113) (0.007) (0.188) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
DUAL -0.054 0.023 -0.136 -0.955*** -0.132 1.304*** 0.021 0.322 
 (0.272) (0.560) (0.766) (0.003) (0.372) (0.008) (0.980) (0.699) 
LogTA -0.001 0.012** -0.103* -0.280*** -0.017 0.103* 0.098** 0.107** 
 (0.893) (0.030) (0.075) (0.000) (0.816) (0.056) (0.031) (0.023) 
LogAge 0.037*** 0.019*** 0.021 0.077* 0.222*** 0.066 0.159*** 0.203*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.696) (0.061) (0.005) (0.146) (0.010) (0.001) 
BIG4 -0.048 -0.058* -0.045 -0.322** 0.117 0.327 0.108 0.247 
 (0.141) (0.052) (0.756) (0.025) (0.340) (0.245) (0.554) (0.192) 
SUB 0.066*** 0.002 -0.537*** 0.016 0.496*** 0.196 -0.209 -0.072 
 (0.000) (0.825) (0.003) (0.719) (0.010) (0.180) (0.152) (0.613) 
HHI 0.105 0.123* -0.160 -0.152 0.437 0.029 0.892 0.772 
 (0.189) (0.062) (0.676) (0.620) (0.645) (0.972) (0.217) (0.281) 
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LISTED -0.006 0.017 -0.178 -0.468*** -0.127 0.412** 0.095 -0.133 
 (0.726) (0.231) (0.101) (0.000) (0.514) (0.019) (0.547) (0.409) 
GDP_GROWTH 0.625** 0.458* -1.244 -2.347 2.650 0.940 2.124 2.231 
 (0.031) (0.082) (0.341) (0.217) (0.412) (0.740) (0.400) (0.376) 
INFL -0.260 -0.109 -0.396 -2.647** 2.275 4.176 -1.309 -1.899 
 (0.443) (0.702) (0.785) (0.032) (0.564) (0.181) (0.676) (0.541) 
LEGAL 0.102 0.092 -2.114*** -0.886** 1.469** 1.994*** 0.102 -0.452 
 (0.126) (0.204) (0.001) (0.012) (0.036) (0.003) (0.822) (0.367) 
CORRUPTION -0.020 0.023 -0.619* -0.269 0.048 0.239 -0.821** -0.943** 
 (0.677) (0.367) (0.091) (0.420) (0.929) (0.598) (0.047) (0.024) 
LEV 0.002 0.003** -0.019 -0.022**     
 (0.104) (0.027) (0.128) (0.040)     
1/z -0.054*** -0.059***       
 (0.000) (0.000)       
COST/INCOME     -0.142** -0.075* 0.047 0.028 
     (0.031) (0.055) (0.360) (0.587) 
Constant 0.187 -0.108 1.821 5.534*** 1.639 -0.883 -5.422*** -5.165*** 
 (0.232) (0.341) (0.108) (0.000) (0.279) (0.433) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 336 336 337 337 336 336 301 301 
Overall R2 0.138 0.352 0.027 0.397 0.059 0.022 0.363 0.329 
Wald Chi2 325*** 340*** 241*** 265*** 364*** 191*** 410*** 310*** 
LM Statistics (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.210 0.100 0.468 0.489 0.560 0.172 0.083 0.405 
ABOD = ASSB (F-Test) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Note: P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 3D: EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 – ROBUSTNESS - GMM RESULTS FOR PERFORMANCE 
Determinants of Bank Performance. Dependent Variables: ROAE and COST/INCOME 
 Panel A:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel B:  

















ABOD 0.002  0.037**  0.013**  -0.013*  
 (0.627)  (0.035)  (0.044)  (0.088)  
ASSB -0.007**  0.015*      
 (0.046)  (0.085)      
%BBOD  -0.221***  0.220**  0.225**  -0.067* 
  (0.007)  (0.033)  (0.015)  (0.070) 
%BSSB  -0.436***  0.281*     
  (0.006)  (0.089)     
LogBSIZE -0.035 -0.243*** -0.245* -0.007 0.214 -0.156** -0.150 0.002 
 (0.166) (0.009) (0.100) (0.960) (0.139) (0.014) (0.122) (0.992) 
%INDEP -0.077* 0.179 -0.189 -0.659*** -0.238 0.569 -0.184 0.032 
 (0.087) (0.525) (0.291) (0.001) (0.136) (0.232) (0.274) (0.800) 
DUAL -0.079* 0.249* -0.254 -0.379 -0.033 -0.231 0.029 -0.040 
 (0.076) (0.056) (0.591) (0.402) (0.867) (0.364) (0.598) (0.397) 
LogTA -0.004 0.001 -0.114** -0.079* -0.066 0.053*** -0.102* 0.001 
 (0.826) (0.988) (0.035) (0.094) (0.171) (0.000) (0.095) (0.968) 
LogAge 0.012 -0.000 0.045 0.017 -0.106** 0.044 0.029 0.058* 
 (0.156) (0.997) (0.285) (0.674) (0.026) (0.421) (0.458) (0.092) 
BIG4 -0.106** -0.081 -0.600** -0.237 -0.036 -0.102 -0.170** -0.069 
 (0.050) (0.453) (0.046) (0.140) (0.566) (0.122) (0.014) (0.117) 
SUB 0.049 0.052 -0.303 -0.220 0.009 0.118 0.076 0.075** 
 (0.153) (0.381) (0.224) (0.264) (0.806) (0.416) (0.157) (0.027) 
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HHI 0.035 0.197*** -0.482** -0.140 -0.789 1.004 -0.202 -0.062 
 (0.633) (0.007) (0.028) (0.373) (0.144) (0.145) (0.163) (0.739) 
LISTED 0.004 0.273* -0.198 -0.447*** 0.333** 0.136 -0.086 0.034 
 (0.891) (0.073) (0.150) (0.000) (0.035) (0.119) (0.267) (0.511) 
GDP_GROWTH 0.475 0.403 -0.851 -0.904 0.040 -0.127 0.751 0.625 
 (0.133) (0.448) (0.640) (0.254) (0.909) (0.551) (0.357) (0.336) 
INFL 0.815 0.351 -0.746 -2.451** 0.459 -1.639** -0.028 -0.238 
 (0.218) (0.644) (0.367) (0.014) (0.292) (0.047) (0.951) (0.645) 
LEGAL -0.128 1.321 0.572 0.402 -0.228 -0.343 0.238 -0.018 
 (0.251) (0.105) (0.419) (0.531) (0.265) (0.306) (0.393) (0.947) 
CORRUPTION -0.055 -0.901*** -0.082 0.264 -0.341 0.800*** -0.141 0.073 
 (0.717) (0.001) (0.650) (0.197) (0.200) (0.000) (0.513) (0.693) 
LEV 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.016 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 0.004 
 (0.157) (0.240) (0.633) (0.106) (0.443) (0.319) (0.649) (0.469) 
1/Z -0.082* -0.423*   0.020*** 0.025***   
 (0.058) (0.078)   (0.000) (0.000)   
Performancet-1 0.244* 0.363* 0.373*** 0.447*** -0.106*** -0.007*** 0.759*** 0.678*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.094* -0.562*** 1.543 0.476 0.978 -0.370** -1.304* -0.408 
 (0.064) (0.001) (0.286) (0.666) (0.168) (0.018) (0.050) (0.419) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 285 285 285 285 357 357 357 357 
Wald Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(1) test statistics (p-value) 0.023 0.047 0.047 0.052 0.040 0.058 0.005 0.004 
AR(2) test statistics (p-value) 0.891 0.941 0.319 0.305 0.306 0.862 0.420 0.462 
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.148 0.425 0.998 0.241 0.755 0.942 0.245 0.657 




Appendix 3E: EMPIRICAL STUDY 1 – ROBUSTNESS - GMM RESULTS FOR RISKS 
Determinants of Bank Risks. Dependent Variables: LogZscore and LLR/GR 
 Panel A: 
 Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel B:  

















ABOD -0.092**  -0.138  0.020***  -0.507*  
 (0.028)  (0.501)  (0.007)  (0.074)  
ASSB -0.060**  0.097***      
 (0.028)  (0.008)      
%BBOD  -0.332***  0.496***  0.174***  -0.532** 
  (0.003)  (0.010)  (0.000)  (0.017) 
%BSSB  -0.975***  0.955***     
  (0.007)  (0.010)     
LogBSIZE 0.942 -0.127 -0.079 0.043 0.015 -0.118* 7.995* 0.119 
 (0.107) (0.636) (0.959) (0.817) (0.770) (0.063) (0.085) (0.653) 
%INDEP 0.579** -0.006 0.011 -1.380*** -0.055 -0.005 6.669 -1.358** 
 (0.046) (0.979) (0.987) (0.000) (0.228) (0.958) (0.126) (0.039) 
DUAL 0.382 -0.319 -0.195 2.515 0.174*** -0.004 -0.590 -0.105 
 (0.586) (0.357) (0.776) (0.194) (0.000) (0.939) (0.336) (0.628) 
LogTA 0.272*** 0.058 0.718*** -0.000 0.025 0.011 -1.127 0.157 
 (0.007) (0.319) (0.004) (0.997) (0.210) (0.544) (0.121) (0.241) 
LogAge 0.088 0.487*** -0.265 0.028 0.057** 0.043 -0.141 -0.006 
 (0.711) (0.004) (0.595) (0.664) (0.034) (0.172) (0.300) (0.964) 
COST/INCOME -0.060* -0.233*** 0.069 0.042*** -0.471*** -0.434*** 2.715* 1.401** 
 (0.061) (0.000) (0.509) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.027) 
BIG4 1.176*** 2.434* 1.102 -0.130 -0.091* -0.424*** 0.383 0.219 
 (0.004) (0.070) (0.602) (0.747) (0.089) (0.000) (0.103) (0.135) 
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SUB 0.702* 0.830 -1.056* -0.634*** -0.316*** 0.101 -0.711 -0.337 
 (0.055) (0.130) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000) (0.204) (0.202) (0.151) 
HHI -0.099 -1.270 0.509 -0.437*** 0.814*** 1.681*** -10.751* -1.038 
 (0.763) (0.318) (0.395) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.070) (0.487) 
LISTED -0.794 0.594* 0.155 0.035 0.347*** 0.503*** -0.789** -0.383** 
 (0.118) (0.062) (0.814) (0.777) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.018) 
GDP_GROWTH 0.207 -4.649 3.568 -0.864 0.589 0.368 -17.662* 0.234 
 (0.839) (0.119) (0.151) (0.498) (0.118) (0.465) (0.059) (0.904) 
INFL -7.272*** -2.849 -0.717 0.632 0.127 -0.097 -9.830 -6.096** 
 (0.007) (0.140) (0.863) (0.620) (0.667) (0.809) (0.170) (0.014) 
LEGAL 3.676** 0.441 -15.628*** -0.274* 0.683*** 0.627** 5.681* -0.331 
 (0.028) (1.000) (0.003) (0.068) (0.000) (0.020) (0.084) (0.771) 
CORRUPTION -0.539 0.657*** 0.754 -0.226* -0.017 -0.018 2.484* 0.747 
 (0.218) (0.006) (0.471) (0.053) (0.860) (0.866) (0.052) (0.372) 
Risket-1 0.433** 0.886*** -0.891*** -0.674*** 0.592*** 0.589*** 0.957*** 0.542*** 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant -0.442 -2.784 -0.336 -4.318*** 0.307 2.099*** 4.036 -2.138 
 (0.500) (0.337) (0.703) (0.000) (0.325) (0.000) (0.360) (0.402) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 284 284 301 301 356 356 347 347 
Wald Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(1) test statistics (p-value) 0.043 0.033 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.045 0.000 
AR(2) test statistics (p-value) 0.968 0.996 0.607 0.995 0.440 0.409 0.849 0.339 
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.223 0.966 0.529 0.816 0.736 0.934 0.333 0.909 




Appendix 4A: EMPIRICAL STUDY 2 – 3SLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ALL SAMPLES 
Determinants of Bank Market Valuation. Dependent Variables: lnQ 
 Panel A:  
Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
Panel B:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel C:  

















ABOD 0.329***  0.030  0.016  0.294***  
 (0.009)  (0.805)  (0.848)  (0.008)  
ASSB     -0.138***    
     (0.000)    
%BBOD  2.063***  -0.093  -0.011  1.765*** 
  (0.009)  (0.901)  (0.919)  (0.008) 
%BSSB      -2.225***   
      (0.000)   
LogBSIZE -0.524*** -0.608*** -0.721** -0.775** -0.932** -1.152*** -0.459** -0.478* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.048) (0.045) (0.014) (0.001) (0.019) (0.065) 
%INDEP -1.533*** -1.946*** 0.020 0.285 -0.506 -0.145 -1.116** -1.111** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.957) (0.371) (0.109) (0.691) (0.013) (0.046) 
LogTA 0.010 0.004 0.088 0.013 0.039 0.102 -0.098 -0.209*** 
 (0.815) (0.939) (0.409) (0.869) (0.711) (0.328) (0.114) (0.005) 
LogAge 0.160*** 0.144** 0.714*** 0.747*** 0.387*** 0.670*** -0.048 -0.074 
 (0.003) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.500) (0.490) 
DEP/SALES 5.467*** 8.722*** 8.814*** 8.403*** 7.219*** 10.372*** -7.069* -5.877 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.093) (0.341) 
PPE/SALES -0.339 -0.420 0.937 1.308 0.501 4.427 1.934*** 1.364* 
 (0.422) (0.433) (0.898) (0.829) (0.926) (0.569) (0.005) (0.093) 
CAPEX/ASSETS -0.036*** -0.024** 0.008 0.008 -0.005 0.013 -0.073*** -0.077*** 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.485) (0.480) (0.513) (0.264) (0.000) (0.000) 
CASH/ASSETS -0.958 -1.105 2.213* 2.596** 1.262 2.712** 0.629 0.331 
 (0.191) (0.180) (0.099) (0.031) (0.288) (0.042) (0.558) (0.852) 
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LEV -0.143*** -0.138*** -0.168*** -0.156*** -0.196*** -0.183*** -0.077*** -0.057** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.044) 
BIG4 -0.955*** -1.045*** -1.988*** -1.851*** -2.229*** -2.082*** -0.057 -0.363 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.782) (0.220) 
SUB 0.669*** 0.825*** 0.242 0.314* 0.532*** 0.346* 1.242*** 1.525*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.194) (0.099) (0.000) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI -0.239 -0.238 -0.233 -0.154 -0.447 -0.004 -0.145 0.608 
 (0.651) (0.724) (0.725) (0.806) (0.337) (0.986) (0.882) (0.701) 
GDP_GROWTH -0.217 0.567 0.013 -0.452 -0.826 -0.035 -0.868 -2.219 
 (0.921) (0.769) (0.995) (0.834) (0.710) (0.966) (0.733) (0.460) 
INFL -1.254 -1.082 -0.587 -0.951 -0.696 -0.109 -1.104 -5.023 
 (0.565) (0.715) (0.852) (0.758) (0.811) (0.926) (0.708) (0.298) 
LEGAL 0.327 0.342 0.069 -0.012 -0.642 -0.290 -0.131 -0.136 
 (0.373) (0.369) (0.851) (0.973) (0.107) (0.394) (0.795) (0.816) 
POLITICAL -0.297 -0.322 -0.219 -0.154 0.159 -0.439 -0.150 -0.047 
 (0.122) (0.157) (0.460) (0.587) (0.554) (0.112) (0.622) (0.891) 
ISLAMIC 0.100 0.119       
 (0.491) (0.482)       
Constant 1.989** 1.846** 0.449 1.555 7.034*** 3.837** 3.658*** 5.542*** 
 (0.012) (0.047) (0.769) (0.285) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 386 386 150 150 150 150 236 236 
Overall R2 0.068 0.034 0.786 0.787 0.658 0.643 0.013 0.118 
Wald Chi2 269*** 242*** 557*** 566*** 400*** 540*** 186*** 147*** 
LM Statistics (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.422 0.107 0.364 0.328 0.110 0.110 0.108 0.100 
ABOD = ASSB (F-Test)     0.000    
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test)      0.000   
Note: P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
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Appendix 4B: EMPIRICAL STUDY 2 – 3SLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ALL SAMPLES 
Determinants of Bank Market Valuation. Alternative Dependent Variables: lnMARCAP 
  Panel A:  
Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
Panel B:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel C:  

















ABOD 0.787**  0.518  0.291  0.790***  
 (0.039)  (0.132)  (0.255)  (0.009)  
ASSB     -0.478***    
     (0.000)    
%BBOD  4.450***  3.114  1.303  4.074*** 
  (0.001)  (0.209)  (0.127)  (0.008) 
%BSSB      -1.955***   
      (0.007)   
LogBSIZE -0.427 -0.938*** 0.710 0.665 -0.716* -1.807*** -0.319 -0.530 
 (0.299) (0.001) (0.342) (0.554) (0.075) (0.001) (0.351) (0.195) 
%INDEP -2.704*** -3.318*** 0.659 0.435 0.043 -1.745*** -0.567 -1.619* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.332) (0.615) (0.949) (0.007) (0.267) (0.097) 
LogTA 0.912*** 0.983*** 0.943*** 0.970*** 0.794*** 1.347*** -0.445*** -0.682*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogAge 0.128 0.256** 1.322*** 1.301*** 0.424 0.396*** -0.219** -0.275* 
 (0.257) (0.013) (0.000) (0.001) (0.155) (0.009) (0.047) (0.077) 
DEP/SALES 4.358*** 9.754*** 11.755*** 12.291*** 9.056*** 11.526*** -5.434 -7.627 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.553) (0.427) 
PPE/SALES -0.668 -1.612* 11.069 12.398 13.759 5.656 1.337* 1.790 
 (0.257) (0.068) (0.408) (0.457) (0.393) (0.651) (0.053) (0.107) 
CAPEX/ASSETS -0.033 -0.011 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.008 -0.106*** -0.066** 
 (0.102) (0.480) (0.912) (0.931) (0.798) (0.655) (0.000) (0.024) 
CASH/ASSETS -0.608 -2.201 3.053 2.460 -2.017 -1.412 2.263 1.677 
 (0.601) (0.111) (0.210) (0.408) (0.472) (0.239) (0.125) (0.549) 
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LEV -0.291*** -0.277*** -0.338*** -0.374*** -0.330*** -0.283*** -0.257*** -0.179*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 -1.519*** -1.738*** -5.310*** -4.399** -4.770*** -1.799*** 0.217 -0.721 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.003) (0.033) (0.001) (0.000) (0.582) (0.202) 
SUB 0.474 0.808*** 0.419 -0.320 0.252 0.199 1.310** 2.239*** 
 (0.171) (0.001) (0.173) (0.582) (0.500) (0.445) (0.011) (0.000) 
HHI -0.704 -1.252 -1.337 -1.533 -0.810 0.468 -1.474 1.359 
 (0.348) (0.273) (0.227) (0.304) (0.505) (0.396) (0.560) (0.582) 
GDP_GROWTH 0.488 -0.441 0.204 0.269 0.854 2.992* 0.321 -2.746 
 (0.809) (0.887) (0.958) (0.957) (0.842) (0.094) (0.899) (0.565) 
INFL -0.554 -4.227 1.110 -0.014 -2.899 -2.053 2.876 -6.747 
 (0.859) (0.387) (0.839) (0.998) (0.644) (0.379) (0.694) (0.386) 
LEGAL 1.434** 1.474** 1.809*** 1.823** -0.667 -0.073 1.866* 0.793 
 (0.034) (0.012) (0.006) (0.032) (0.416) (0.807) (0.068) (0.388) 
POLITICAL -0.421 -0.776** -0.595 -0.669 -0.325 0.223** -0.742 -0.608 
 (0.123) (0.039) (0.304) (0.359) (0.565) (0.044) (0.173) (0.255) 
ISLAMIC 0.190 0.183       
 (0.484) (0.505)       
Constant 0.758 0.153 -3.911 -5.266 15.710*** 0.766 6.029*** 4.364** 
 (0.676) (0.923) (0.207) (0.225) (0.000) (0.739) (0.004) (0.041) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 386 386 150 150 150 150 236 236 
Overall R2 0.011 0.077 0.685 0.599 0.141 0.626 0.041 0.264 
Wald Chi2 461*** 469*** 377*** 225*** 290*** 369*** 304*** 308*** 
LM Statistics (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.111 0.071 0.140 0.336 0.251 0.178 0.258 0.120 
ABOD = ASSB (F-Test)     0.000    
%BBOD = %BSSB (F-Test)      0.020   
Note: P-values in parentheses, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 4C: EMPIRICAL STUDY 2 – ROBUSTNESS CHECK: GMM 
Determinants of Bank Market Valuation. Dependent Variables: lnQ 
 PANEL A: 
ISLAMIC BANKS (IBs) 
PANEL B: 









ABOD 0.005  0.096**  
 (0.646)  (0.037)  
ASSB -0.008***    
 (0.008)    
%BBOD  0.034  0.469*** 
  (0.348)  (0.001) 
%BSSB  -0.312*   
  (0.078)   
LogBSIZE -0.159*** -0.099** -0.067 -0.070 
 (0.003) (0.047) (0.861) (0.631) 
%INDEP -0.063 -0.080 1.031 -0.109 
 (0.523) (0.293) (0.174) (0.721) 
LogTA 0.009 0.002 -0.115 -0.053 
 (0.615) (0.865) (0.360) (0.259) 
LogAge -0.011 -0.009 0.211 -0.017 
 (0.695) (0.808) (0.592) (0.797) 
DEP/SALES -0.307 -0.147 -7.698* 1.475 
 (0.191) (0.597) (0.071) (0.450) 
PPE/SALES 3.002** 2.694 0.875* 0.362 
 (0.048) (0.140) (0.092) (0.139) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.000 0.002 -0.023 -0.014** 
 (0.850) (0.330) (0.281) (0.016) 
CASH/ASSETS 0.349 0.343 4.779* -0.386 
 (0.224) (0.442) (0.081) (0.419) 
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LEV 0.004 0.004 -0.046* -0.015 
 (0.410) (0.515) (0.085) (0.212) 
BIG4 0.021 0.025 0.092 -0.026 
 (0.816) (0.771) (0.561) (0.730) 
SUB -0.041 0.016 0.675 0.359 
 (0.444) (0.538) (0.180) (0.140) 
HHI 0.224** 0.152 -0.014 0.130 
 (0.033) (0.234) (0.971) (0.245) 
GDP_GROWTH 1.088** 0.464 0.247 0.919* 
 (0.011) (0.697) (0.800) (0.062) 
INFL -1.128* -1.139 -1.248 -3.977** 
 (0.091) (0.135) (0.588) (0.028) 
LEGAL -0.110 0.468 0.370 0.068 
 (0.113) (0.159) (0.581) (0.729) 
POLITICAL 0.046 0.073 -0.023 -0.139*** 
 (0.449) (0.205) (0.853) (0.006) 
Lagged lnQ 0.978*** 1.021*** 0.413* 0.712*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.098) (0.000) 
Constant 0.411 -0.549 -0.895** -0.415 
 (0.207) (0.135) (0.047) (0.214) 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Observations 123 123 193 193 
Wald Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(1) test statistics (p-value) 0.022 0.038 0.070 0.095 
AR(2) test statistics (p-value) 0.936 0.332 0.656 0.582 
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.621 0.179 0.475 0.197 




Appendix 5A: EMPIRICAL STUDY 3 – 3SLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ALL SAMPLES 
Determinants of the Level of Cash Dividends. Dependent Variables: DIV/NI 
 Panel A:  
Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
Panel B:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel C:  













ABOD 0.055***  -0.136***  0.128***  
 (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.007)  
%BBOD  0.419***  -0.684***  0.760*** 
  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.000) 
LogBSIZE 0.072 0.048 -0.101 -0.135 0.099 -0.039 
 (0.108) (0.254) (0.331) (0.320) (0.185) (0.522) 
%INDEP -0.264*** -0.342*** -0.254*** -0.248** -0.289** -0.568*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.018) (0.029) (0.001) 
LogTA 0.100*** 0.106*** 0.102*** 0.149*** 0.062*** 0.093*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
LogAge 0.015 0.006 -0.027 -0.050 0.044 0.050* 
 (0.238) (0.716) (0.487) (0.303) (0.159) (0.093) 
LEV -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.020* 0.030*** 
 (0.653) (0.750) (0.664) (0.668) (0.050) (0.000) 
ROA 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.008* 0.004 0.210*** 0.253*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.451) (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.002 -0.136** 0.509*** 0.384* -0.085 -0.248*** 
 (0.954) (0.012) (0.009) (0.087) (0.166) (0.001) 
SUB -0.084** -0.050 0.119*** 0.106* -0.022 0.001 
 (0.019) (0.127) (0.006) (0.078) (0.739) (0.976) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.003 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
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 (0.166) (0.345) (0.214) (0.169) (0.593) (0.501) 
CASH/NETASSETS -0.122 -0.040 -0.006 0.051 0.107 0.069 
 (0.301) (0.717) (0.976) (0.777) (0.547) (0.753) 
RETAIN/EQUITY -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.038*** -0.045*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI -0.032 -0.049 -0.011 -0.007 0.175 0.353 
 (0.808) (0.693) (0.942) (0.962) (0.450) (0.186) 
GDP_GROWTH 0.354 0.223 0.676 0.662 0.057 -0.253 
 (0.342) (0.666) (0.301) (0.389) (0.898) (0.647) 
INFL -0.036 -0.505 -0.368 -0.536 0.659 -0.809 
 (0.947) (0.492) (0.608) (0.469) (0.559) (0.468) 
REGULATORY -0.035 -0.022 -0.054 -0.043 0.120 0.174 
 (0.558) (0.712) (0.441) (0.550) (0.323) (0.160) 
ISLAMIC -0.036 -0.035     
 (0.166) (0.265)     
Constant -1.431*** -1.367*** -1.017*** -1.455*** -1.676*** -1.826*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 386 386 150 150 236 236 
Overall R2 0.408 0.347 0.548 0.360 0.130 0.159 
Wald Chi2 442*** 425*** 332*** 252*** 300*** 316*** 
LM Statistics (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.126 0.159 0.183 0.234 0.113 0.458 





Appendix 5B: EMPIRICAL STUDY 3 – SENSITIVITY 3SLS RESULTS FOR ALL SAMPLES 
Determinants of the Propensity to Pay Dividends. Dependent Variables: LIKE_PAY 
 Panel A:  
Full Sample (IBs and CBs) 
Panel B:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel C:  













ABOD 0.237***  -0.800**  0.434**  
 (0.006)  (0.046)  (0.016)  
%BBOD  0.860*  -0.108  1.377 
  (0.091)  (0.914)  (0.114) 
LogBSIZE 0.169 0.201 2.707* 1.526 1.034 1.196 
 (0.755) (0.724) (0.059) (0.204) (0.372) (0.284) 
%INDEP 3.570*** 3.297*** 13.042*** 9.412*** 5.812*** 4.330** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.012) 
LogTA 0.998*** 0.937*** 0.065 0.637 1.980*** 1.896*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.914) (0.374) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogAge -0.224 -0.200 0.869 0.594 -1.984*** -1.829** 
 (0.423) (0.464) (0.190) (0.322) (0.007) (0.013) 
LEV 0.682*** 0.687*** 0.731*** 0.603*** 1.473*** 1.506*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 7.586*** 7.490*** 9.161*** 8.227*** 13.709*** 13.064*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 -1.016* -1.065* 0.071 -1.251 -2.472** -2.574** 
 (0.064) (0.058) (0.979) (0.531) (0.026) (0.019) 
SUB -0.974* -0.695 0.114 -0.758 -2.168* -1.332 
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 (0.092) (0.227) (0.938) (0.421) (0.095) (0.254) 
CAPEX/ASSETS 0.005 0.009 -0.055 -0.044 0.124 0.129 
 (0.915) (0.849) (0.495) (0.562) (0.250) (0.230) 
CASH/NETASSETS 2.606 2.790 0.720 0.093 13.586* 13.523* 
 (0.298) (0.262) (0.890) (0.981) (0.099) (0.052) 
RETAIN/EQUITY -0.880*** -0.882*** -0.923*** -0.773*** -1.799*** -1.743*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI -3.900* -3.792* 2.137 0.244 -6.106 -5.001 
 (0.078) (0.082) (0.613) (0.944) (0.176) (0.203) 
GDP_GROWTH -37.452*** -37.555*** -66.489*** -54.399** -72.109*** -64.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.038) (0.001) (0.001) 
INF 31.964*** 28.909** 65.955* 59.456** 48.213* 48.268** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.055) (0.013) (0.071) (0.043) 
REGULATORY -0.774 -0.677 0.627 0.508 -1.108 -0.293 
 (0.303) (0.328) (0.581) (0.603) (0.470) (0.830) 
ISLAMIC 0.545 0.418     
 (0.299) (0.403)     
Constant -23.013*** -21.720*** -23.933*** -26.745*** -40.163*** -39.333*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 386 386 150 150 236 236 
Pseudo R2 0.637 0.630 0.695 0.671 0.765 0.749 
Wald X2 94*** 96*** 143*** 53*** 64** 62*** 




Appendix 5C: EMPIRICAL STUDY 3 – SENSITIVITY 3SLS RESULTS FOR ALL SAMPLES 
Determinants of the Level of Cash Dividends. Alternative Dependent Variables: DIV/Assets, DIV/Sales and DIV/Share 
 Panel A:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel B:  

























ABOD -0.162***  -0.036***  -0.140***  0.338***  0.048***  0.059***  
 (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.004)  
%BBOD  -0.732***  -0.141***  -0.284***  1.158***  0.130***  0.400*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
LogBSIZE 0.088 0.098 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.085 0.152 -0.159* 0.014 -0.029* -0.065* -0.105** 
 (0.631) (0.623) (0.616) (0.602) (0.752) (0.194) (0.317) (0.058) (0.596) (0.099) (0.073) (0.020) 
%INDEP -0.673*** -0.596*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.254*** -0.395*** -0.418* -0.767*** -0.090* -0.126*** -0.231*** -0.384*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.082) (0.003) (0.059) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) 
LogTA 0.106** 0.165*** 0.005 0.022** -0.024 0.025 -0.008 0.075*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.047*** 0.054*** 
 (0.035) (0.001) (0.517) (0.021) (0.338) (0.174) (0.855) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LogAge 0.075 0.071 0.021 0.019 0.128*** 0.132*** 0.098* 0.097** 0.017** 0.022*** 0.127*** 0.136*** 
 (0.279) (0.345) (0.115) (0.187) (0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.018) (0.016) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV -0.015 -0.015 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.008 -0.000 0.057*** -0.001 0.006*** -0.001 0.006 
 (0.270) (0.303) (0.644) (0.355) (0.662) (0.151) (0.986) (0.000) (0.736) (0.002) (0.986) (0.277) 
ROA 0.013 0.009 0.003* 0.002 0.005** -0.000 0.674*** 0.771*** 0.044*** 0.061*** 0.101*** 0.123*** 
 (0.118) (0.291) (0.089) (0.305) (0.047) (0.843) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.583* 0.324 0.110* 0.037 0.386*** -0.070 -0.132 -0.322*** -0.027 -0.044** -0.074** -0.161*** 
 (0.091) (0.270) (0.089) (0.508) (0.009) (0.494) (0.230) (0.008) (0.220) (0.025) (0.048) (0.005) 
SUB 0.177** 0.150* 0.018 0.012 -0.068 -0.052 -0.555*** -0.072 -0.073** -0.007 -0.008 0.013 
 (0.024) (0.086) (0.230) (0.454) (0.186) (0.224) (0.002) (0.301) (0.013) (0.635) (0.844) (0.639) 
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CAPEX/ASSETS -0.009* -0.008* -0.002** -0.002** 0.001 -0.001 -0.007 0.002 -0.002** -0.003*** 0.002 0.003 
 (0.063) (0.099) (0.024) (0.048) (0.389) (0.688) (0.450) (0.701) (0.046) (0.009) (0.471) (0.220) 
CASH/NETASSETS 0.084 0.062 0.009 0.031 -0.110 0.026 0.235 -0.092 0.054 0.026 0.367** 0.357** 
 (0.807) (0.851) (0.892) (0.622) (0.360) (0.818) (0.650) (0.812) (0.611) (0.752) (0.020) (0.033) 
RETAIN/EQUITY -0.016*** -0.014** -0.002** -0.002** -0.004** -0.005* -0.071*** -0.090*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.020) (0.019) (0.045) (0.044) (0.060) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI 0.046 0.051 -0.021 -0.009 0.029 0.002 0.102 0.870* -0.027 0.068 0.068 0.070 
 (0.886) (0.845) (0.742) (0.853) (0.729) (0.982) (0.874) (0.063) (0.836) (0.504) (0.774) (0.732) 
GDP_GROWTH 5.356*** 5.089*** 0.624*** 0.560** -0.410 1.006** 1.157 -0.112 0.324 0.133 0.312 0.196 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.016) (0.352) (0.042) (0.342) (0.912) (0.202) (0.516) (0.505) (0.641) 
INFL -0.985 -0.978 -0.042 -0.122 -1.314* -0.110 1.749 -2.051 0.619 0.115 0.609 0.053 
 (0.441) (0.456) (0.862) (0.621) (0.082) (0.863) (0.413) (0.213) (0.164) (0.735) (0.432) (0.951) 
REGULATORY 0.041 -0.010 0.007 -0.007 0.061 0.014 0.140 0.319 0.071 0.094** -0.073 -0.034 
 (0.730) (0.932) (0.755) (0.755) (0.426) (0.815) (0.609) (0.107) (0.208) (0.025) (0.405) (0.754) 
Constant -1.665*** -2.296*** -0.105 -0.284** 0.181 -0.418 -1.537*** -2.054*** -0.473*** -0.485*** -1.144*** -1.225*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.346) (0.021) (0.563) (0.122) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 236 236 236 236 236 236 
Overall R2 0.737 0.695 0.748 0.745 0.676 0.843 0.165 0.625 0.042 0.578 0.516 0.403 
Wald Chi2 513*** 443*** 618*** 558*** 672*** 1117*** 686*** 1056*** 273*** 459*** 583*** 486*** 
LM Statistics (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.672 0.109 0.456 0.148 0.125 0.101 0.640 0.250 0.512 0.267 0.102 0.270 





Appendix 5D: EMPIRICAL STUDY 3 – ROBUSTNESS CHECK: GMM 
Determinants of the Level of Cash Dividends. Dependent Variables: DIV/NI 
 Panel A:  
Islamic banks (IBs) 
Panel B:  









ABOD -0.030***  0.024***  
 (0.004)  (0.009)  
%BBOD  -0.321**  0.158** 
  (0.011)  (0.014) 
LogBSIZE -0.189*** 0.106 0.054 0.024 
 (0.006) (0.516) (0.523) (0.840) 
%INDEP -0.099 -0.343 0.038 -0.161 
 (0.443) (0.185) (0.830) (0.321) 
LogTA 0.099*** 0.160** 0.055* 0.099** 
 (0.001) (0.035) (0.059) (0.025) 
LogAge -0.016 0.016 0.040 0.002 
 (0.762) (0.878) (0.202) (0.962) 
LEV -0.000 -0.011 0.013 0.051*** 
 (0.956) (0.480) (0.260) (0.000) 
ROA 0.040*** 0.035* 0.250*** 0.281*** 
 (0.001) (0.077) (0.000) (0.000) 
BIG4 0.074 -0.341 -0.070 -0.060 
 (0.559) (0.177) (0.261) (0.410) 
SUB 0.057 0.359*** -0.263*** 0.163 
 (0.192) (0.007) (0.010) (0.168) 
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CAPEX/ASSETS -0.002 -0.015 0.004 0.003 
 (0.310) (0.259) (0.405) (0.512) 
CASH/NETASSETS 0.142 -0.885 0.646*** 0.638 
 (0.536) (0.208) (0.004) (0.257) 
RETAIN/EQUITY -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.063*** -0.066*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
HHI 0.115 0.541 0.488 0.600 
 (0.205) (0.195) (0.117) (0.112) 
GDP_GROWTH 0.487 5.566* 1.692** -0.409 
 (0.373) (0.070) (0.031) (0.622) 
INFL 0.364 0.836 0.332 -0.374 
 (0.558) (0.575) (0.709) (0.739) 
REGULATORY 0.067 -0.068 0.132 0.199 
 (0.627) (0.566) (0.408) (0.176) 
Lagged DIV/NI 0.378*** 0.058* -0.044* -0.072** 
 (0.003) (0.089) (0.051) (0.049) 
Constant -0.071 -1.745** -1.215*** -2.123*** 
 (0.881) (0.029) (0.008) (0.001) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES 
Observations 123 123 193 193 
Wald Chi2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(1) test statistics (p-value) 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.003 
AR(2) test statistics (p-value) 0.998 0.233 0.298 0.603 
Hansen J-statistics (p-value) 0.100 0.144 0.269 0.102 
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